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
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PHILOSOPHICAL

ARRANGEMENTS

BY

IAMES HARRIS ESQ.

LONDON

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ADVERTISEMENT.

MOST of the Speculations, contained in the following Work, are not the Author's own, but the Speculations of ancient and respectable Philosophers. His employ has been no more, than to exhibit what they taught, which he has endeavoured to do after the best manner he was able. The perusal of old Doctrines may afford perhaps amusement, if it be true (as he has observed in another place *), that, what from it's Antiquity is but little known, has from that very circumstance the recommendation of Novelty.

See the Preface to Hermes.

A 2

If

If he might ask a favour from his Readers, the favour should be this—that, they would not reject his Work upon a cursory inspection, should it appear in some parts too abstruse, and perhaps in others too obvious. He could not well avoid either the one or the other, without impairing an Arrangement, which had been established for Ages.

THE

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PHILOSOPHICAL ARRANGEMENTS

ADDREST TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE THOMAS LORD HYDE CHANCELLOR OF THE DUTCHY OF LANCASTER &c. &c.

CHAPTER I.

Introduction—Scope, or end of the Inquiry
—Begins from the Arrangement of
fimple, or fingle Terms—Character of
these Terms—Nature and Multitude of
the Objects, which they represent.

PHILOSOPHY, taking its name from the Love of Wisdom, and having for its End the Investigation of Truth, has an equal regard both to Practice and Speculation, in as much as Truth of every kind is fimilar and conge-B nial.

Ch. I. nial. Hence we find that some of the most illustrious Actors upon the great Theatre of the World have been engaged at times in Philosophical Speculation. Pericles, who governed Athens, was the Disciple of Anaxagoras; Epaminondas spent his youth in the Pythagorean School; Alexander the Great had Aristotle for his Preceptor; and Scipio made Polybius his Companion and Friend. Why need I mention Cicero, or Cato, or Brutus? The Orations, the Epistles, and the Phi-Josophical Works of the first, shew him sufficiently conversant both in Action and Contemplation. So eager was Cato for Knowledge, even when furrounded with Business, that he used to read Philosophy in the Senate house, while the Senate was affembling: and as for the Patriot Brutus, though his life was a continual Scene of the most important Action, he found time not only to study, but to compose a Treatise upon Virtue.

WHEN

WHEN these were gone, and the worst Ch. I. of times succeeded, Thrasea Patus, and Helvidius Priscus were at the same period both Senators, and Philosophers; and appear to have supported the severest trials of Tyrannic Oppression by the manly system of the Stoic Moral *. The best Emperor, whom the Romans, or perhaps any Nation, ever knew, Marcus Antoninus, was involved during his whole life in business of the last consequence; fometimes Conspiracies forming, which he was obliged to diffipate; formidable Wars arising at other times, when he was obliged to take the field. Yet during none of these periods did he forsake Philosophy, but still persisted in Meditation +, and in committing his thoughts to

Bs

writing,



See Arr. Epictet. lib. i. c. 1. and 2. and the Notes of my late worthy Friend, the learned Editor, Upton. See also Mrs. Carter's excellent Translation.

⁺ See the Original, particularly in Gataker's Edition. See also the learned and accurate Translation of Meric Casauban.

Ch. I. writing, during moments gained by stealth from the hurry of courts and campaigns.

IF we descend to later ages, and search our own Country, we shall find Sir Thomas More, Sir Philip Sidney, Sir Walter Raleigh, Lord Herbert of Cherbury, Milton, Algernon Sidney, Sir William Temple, and many others, to have been all of them eminent in public Life, and yet at the same time conspicuous for their Speculations and Literature. If we look abroad, examples of like character will occur in other Countries. Grotius, the Poet, the Critic, the Philosopher, and the Divine, was employed by the court of Sweden as Ambassador to France: and De Witt, that acute but unfortunate Statesman, that Pattern of parcimony and political accomplishments, was an able mathematician, wrote upon the Elements of Curves, and applied his Algebra with accuracy to the Trade and Commerce of his Country.

And so much in Defence of Philo- Ch. I. SOPHY against those, who may possibly undervalue her, because they have succeeded without her; those I mean (and it. must be confest they are many) who, having spent their whole lives in what-Milton calls the busy hum of Men, haveacquired to themselves Habits of amazing efficacy, unassified by the helps of Science and Erudition. To such the retired Student may appear an aukward Being, because they want a just standard to meafure his merit. But let them recur to the bright examples before alledged; let them remember that these were eminent in their own way; were men of action and business; men of the world; and yet did they not disdain to cultivate Philosophy, nay, were many of them perhaps indebted to her for the splendor of their active Character.

This reasoning has a farther end. It justifies me in the address of these Philo-B 3 Sophical

PHILOSOPHICAL

Ch. I. faphical Arrangements, as your Lordship has been distinguished in either character, I mean in your public one, as well as in your private. Those, who know the History of our foreign transactions, know the reputation that you acquired both in Poland and in Germany*; and those, who are honoured with your nearer friendship, know that you can speculate as well as ast, and can employ your pen both with Elegance and Instruction.

It may not perhaps be unentertaining to your Lordship to see, in what manner the Preceptor of Alexander the Great arranged his Pupil's Ideas, so that they might not cause confusion for want of accurate disposition. It may be thought also a fact worthy of your notice, that he be-

came

The Treaty of Warfaw, negotiated and figned by Lord Hyde, was made in January, 1745; that of Drefden, made under Lord Hyde's Mediation, was figned the December following. By this last Treaty, not only the Peace of Germany was restored, but the Austrian Netherlands, and the King of Sardinia's Territories were in consequence of it preserved.

the venerable Pythagoras, who, unless he drew it from remoter sources, to us unknown, was, perhaps, himself its inventor and original teacher (a).

POETS relate that VENUS was wedded to VULCAN, the Goddess of Beauty to the God of Deformity. The Tale, as some explain it, gives a double representation of Art; Vulcan shewing us the Pragressions of Art, and Venus the Complex

tions. The Progressions, such as the hew-

Fabricius, in his Bibliotheca Græca, T. i. p. 394, mentions a Tract upon this Subject, published at Vosice an. 1571, under the name of Archytas, but he informs us withal, that its Authenticity is doubted, because the above-mentioned Quotations from Archytas, made by Simplicius, are not to be found there. This Tract I have never seen.

B 4

ing

⁽a) From Pythagoras it past to his Disciples, and among others to Archytas, who wrote upon the Subject in the Doric Dialect, the Dialect generally used by Pythagoras, and his Followers. This Treatise of Archytas, is in part still extant, tho' but little known, large Quotations out of it being inserted by Simplicius into that valuable, but rare Book, his Commentaries on the Predicaments, from which many of them are transferred into the Notes upon the different Chapters of this Work.

Ch. I. ing of Stone, the grinding of Colours, the fusion of Metals, these all of them are laborious, and many times disgustful: the Completions, such as the Temple, the Palace, the Picture, the Statue, these all of them are Beauties, and justly call for admiration.

Now if Logic be one of those Arts, which help to improve Human Reason, it must necessarily be an Art of the progressive Character; an Art which, not ending with itself, has a view to something farther. If then in the following Speculations it should appear dry rather than elegant, severe rather than pleasing, let it plead by way of defence that, tho' its importance may be great, it partakes from its very nature (which cannot be changed) more of the desormed God, than of the beautiful Goddess.

THE subject commences in the manper following.

THE

ARRANGEMENTS.

THE VULGAR can give reasons to a Ch. I. certain degree (d), and can examine after a manner, the reasons given them by others.—And what is this, but NATURAL LOGIC? If therefore these Efforts of theirs have an Effect, and nothing happen without a Cause, this Effect must of necessity be derived from certain Principles.

THE Question then is, What these Principles are; for if these can be once investigated, and then knowingly applied, we shall be enabled to do by Rule, what others do by Hazard; and in what we do, as much to excell the uninstruct-

ontaining Crooxile

⁽d) Πάντες γὰρ μέχρι τινος κὰ ἐξετάζειν κὰ ὑπέχειν λόγον, κὰ ἀπολογεῖσθαι κὰ κατηγορεῖν ἐγχειρᾶσιν. Τῶν μὲν ἐν πολλῶν οἱ μὲν εἰκῆ κ. τ. λ. Omnes enim quadam tenus et exquirere et sustinere rationem, et desendere, et accusare aggrediuntur. At ex imperità quidem multitudine alii temerè, &cc. Arist. Rhetor. lib. i. cap. 1. See also Vol. the first of these Works, Treatise the third, in the Notes, p. 286.

Ch. I. ed Reasoner, as a disciplined Boxer surpasses an untaught Rustic.

Now in the investigation of these Principles we are first taught to observe, that every Science (as Arithmetic, Geometry, Music, Astronomy) may be resolved into it's Theorems; every Theorem into it's Syllogisms; every Syllogism into it's Propositions; and every Proposition into certain simple, or single Terms.

If this be admitted, it is not difficult to see, that, in order to know Science, a man must know first what makes a Theorem; in order to know Theorems, he must know first what makes a Syllogism; in order to know Syllogisms, he must know first what makes Propositions; and to acquire a general Knowledge of these, he must first know simple or single Terms, since it is out of these that Propositions are all of them compounded.

And

And thus we may perceive, that where Ch. I. these several Resolutions end, 'tis hence' precisely the disquisition is to begin (e).

(e) There is an elegant Simile, taken from Architecture, to illustrate this Speculation. The Quotation from the original Author (Ammonius) may be found in the first Volume of these Treatises, p. 271. to which a Translation is there subjoined.

Ammonius, after he has produced his Similitude, applies it as follows.

Ούτως έν κρό φιλόσοφο ωσιεί βελόμενο γαξ **ω**οιήσαι απόδειξιν, Φησί ωρος έαυτον, βέλομαι ωερί 'Αποδείξεως είπεῖν. 'Αλλ' ἐπειδή ή ἀπόδειξις συλλογισμός έςιν έπιςημονικός, લોδύναλου είπευ τερί τέτε τον μα ερότερον είποντα, τί έςι συλλογισμός· τον δε απλώς συλλογισμον έκ αν μαθοίμεν, κ μαθόντες, τί έςι ωρότασις. λόγοι μέν λαβ τινές ξισιν αι αβοτάσεις. των 🛭 τοι έτων λόγων συλλογή ές ιν ο συλλογισμός Ε Ες Ενευ το γυώναι τας προτάσεις, άδύνατον μαθείν τον συλλογισμόν' ἐκ γάρ τέτων σύγκειται' άλλ' ἐδὲ τὴν ωρότασιν, बैंग्डा राज्य वेग्वमध्या में राज्य वृत्तमध्या, हें केंग उपग्रंत्तामह करेंद्र λόί. Τὰ δὲ ἀνόματα, κὰ ῥήμαλα ἀνευ τῶν ἀπλῶν Φωνών έκας ον γας τέτων Φωνή έςι σημαντική. την ωρότερον ωτρί των απλών Φωνών είπειν. Ένταυθα द्रिंग में Эεωρία κατέληξε, κ၌ γίγνείαι τέτο της πράξεως aeχή. Ch. I. It must begin, where they end, that is to say, from simple Terms; because, if

άρχή. Πρότερον γάρ διαλέγεται ωερί των άπλων Φωνών έν ταις Κατηρορίαις. Είθ έτω ωερί ονομάτων, κ ρημάτων, 3 σροτάσεως, έν τῷ σερί Ερμηνείας είτα ωτρὶ τῶ ἀπλῶς συλλοίτσμῶ, ἐν τοῖς ωροτέροις 'Αναλυ-TIKOÎS' EÎO BTW WEEL ARODEIZEWS, EN TOÏS VETEOIS ANAλυτικοίς. Ένταυθα έν τὸ τέλ 🕒 τῆς ωράξεως, ὅπερ ἦυ αρχη της θεωρίας --- And thus also the Philosopher does: being willing to form a Demonstration, he says to himself, I am willing to speak concerning Demonstration. But, in as much as Demonstration is a Scientific Syllogism, it is impossible to say any thing concerning it, without first saying what is a Syllogism; nor can we learn what is simply a Syllogifm, without having first learnt what is a Proposttion; for Propositions are certain Sentences; and it is a Collection of such Sentences that forms a Syllogism: so that without knowing Propositions, it is impossible to learn what is a Syllogism, because it is out of these that a Syllogism is compounded. Farther than this, it is impossible to know a Proposition, without knowing Nouns and Verbs, out of which is composed every Species of Sentence; or to know Nouns and Verbs without knowing Sounds articulate, or simple Words, in as much as each of these is a Sound articulate, having a Meaning. It is necessary therefore in the first place to say something concerning simple Words.

Here then ends the Theory, and it is this, which becomes the Beginning of the Practice, (that is, from this last part the Theory is to be carried into execution.)

organity (100) (10

First

it were to begin sooner, it would begin Ch in the middle; and because if the Resolutions did not stop somewhere, there could be no beginning at all.

Ch. I.

Now as to the Subject, whence the Disquisition is to begin (I mean the Contemplation of Simple Terms) tis obvious it must be widely different from the several Subjects that precede it. The preceding Subjects, such as Theorems, Syllogisms, Propositions, may all of them

First therefore (with a view to the practical Part) be differts concerning simple articulate Sounds in his PREDICA-MENTS: after that, concerning Nouns and Verbs, and Propositions, in his Treatise concerning INTERPRETATION: then, concerning Syllogism, simply so called, in his FIRST ANALY-TICS: and finally, concerning Demonstration, in his LATTER ANALYTICS. And here is the End of the Practice, which End (as we have shewn above) was the Beginning of the Theory. Ammon. in Prædic. p. 16. ed. 8vo.

We have made this large Extract from Ammonius, not only as it fully explains the Subject of this Treatise, but as it gives a concise, and yet an elegant View of that celebrated Work of Aristotle, his Organon, and of that just and accurate Order in which its several Parts stand arranged.

Ch. I. be refolved, because they are all of them compound: But Terms cannot be resolved, because they are simple or single. The most we can do, as their Multitude is large, is to seek after some Method, by which they may be classed or arranged; and if different Methods of Arrangement occur, then to adopt out of the serveral that, which appears to be the best.

It being therefore adjusted, from what Subject we are to begin (namely, from simple or single Terms) and after what Manner we are to begin (namely, by classing or arranging them) a farther Question occurs before we proceed, and that is, What is it, that these Terms represent?

THERE seem but three Classes possible, and these three are either Words—or IDEAS—or THINGS, that is to say, Individuals.

Now

Now they cannot represent merely Ch. I. Words, for then the Treatise would be Grammatical—nor yet merely Ideas, for then the Treatise would be Metaphysical—nor yet merely Things or Individuals, for then the Treatise would be Physical.

How then shall we decide?—Shall we deny that fimple Terms represent any one of these? Or shall we rather assume the contrary, and say they represent them all?—If so, and this be, as it will appear, the more plausible Hypothesis, we may affirm of simple Terms (the Subject of this Inquiry) that they are Words representing Things, through the Medium of our IDEAS (f).

THAT

⁽f) Ammonius, in his excellent Commentary upon these Predicaments of Aristotle, informs us there were different Sentiments of different Philosophers as to the Subject, concerning which these Predicaments were conversant. Some, as Alexander of Aphrodiseum, confined them wholly to Words: others, as Eustathius,

Ch. I.

THAT this in fact is their Character, may appear from the many Logical, Metaphysical, and Physical Theorems, and to these (as Man is a Part of Nature) we may add also Ethical Speculations, which are occasionally interspessed in the course of this Inquiry (g).

But

thius, wholly to Things: a third fet, of which was Porphyry, wholly to our Thoughts or Ideas. Ammonius appears to have supposed that they all erred, and that, not so much in the respective Subjects they adopted, as in the restriction or limitation to one Subject only. For this reason he immediately subjoins—

Οἱ δὲ ἀκριδές ερον λέγονλες, ων εῖς ἐςι κὰ Ἰαμβλιχος, Φασὶν ως ἔτε ωτρὶ νοημάτων μόνων ἐςὶν αὐτῷ ὁ λόγος, ἔτε ωτρὶ Φωνῶν μόνων, ἔτε ωτρὶ ωραίμάτων μόνων, ἀλλ ἔςιν ὁ σκοπὸς τῶν κατηίοριῶν ωτρὶ Φωνῶν σημαινεσῶν ωράγμαία, διὰ μέσων νοημάτων——But those, who speak more accurately, of which number lamblichus is one, say that Aristotle discourses not upon Ideas alone, nor upon Words alone, nor upon Things alone; but that the Scope or End of his Categorics, is, concerning Words, signifying Things, thro' the Medium of our Thoughts or Ideas. Ammon. in Pradicam, p. 14. 6. ed. 8vo.

(g) Thus Boethius-Plac quoque nobis de decem Pradicamentis inspectio, et in Physica Aristotelis Doctrina, BUT to return to our subject, the Ch. I. Contemplation of Simple Terms.

As they appear to be Words, and not only Words, but Words which represent Things through the medium of our Ideas, it may not be improper to observe something upon the several Objects

et in Moralis Philosophia Cognitione perutilis est 3, quod per sugula currentibus magis siquebit. Bouth. in Cat. p. 113. Edit. sol. Basil.

Ammenius speaks to the same purpose in suller and more general terms—"Οτι δὶ χρήσιμόν ἐςι τὸ βιβλίον εἰς τε τὸ βιβρηλικον Φιλοσοφίας μέρθη, κὴ τὸ Εραπτικον, ἐκ τῶν Ερουιρημένων δηλου, εἴπερ κὴ την ἀπόδειξιν, ἢν ἐδείξαμεν, ἄνευ τῶν ἀπλῶν Φωνῶν να ἔτε γνῶναι, κὴ ὅτι Ερεί τῶν ποινοτήτων διαλαμβάνει, εἰς ἐ τὰ ὅντα Εάντα διαιρεῖται—that the Book is useful both to the speculative Part of Philosophy, and the Prastical, is evident from what has been said, if it be true both that Demonstration, as we have shewn, cannot be known without simple Words, and that the Book also treats concerning those common characters or Attributes, into which all Beings are divided. Ammon. in Præd. p. 16. Edit. Vermet. Evo.

thus

PHILOSOPHICAL

Ch. I. thus represented, and that with respect both to their Nature, and to their Multitude.

18

philosophically minute), 'tis enough to observe, that some of them are sensible Objects, and some of them are intelligible—that the sensible are perceived by our several Senses, and make up the Tribe of external Individuals—that the intelligible are more immediately our own, and arise within us, when the Mind, by marking what is common to many Individuals, forms to itself a Species; or, when by marking what is common to many Species, it forms to itself a Genus.

Nor are these mental Productions the mere efforts of Art, the ingenious inventions of Human Sagacity, but, under the original guidance of pure Nature, even Children in their early days spontaneously fashion them, and spontaneously

neoufly refer them to Individuals, as they Ch. I. occur, faying of this Individual, 'tis a Horse; of another, 'tis a Dog; of a third, 'tis a Sparrow (h).

Ir from the Nature of these Objects (which we have now supposed to be either sensible or intelligible) we pass to their Multitude, we shall find the Genera to be sewer than the Species, and that from this plain reason, because many Species are included within one Genus. We shall find also the Species to be sewer than the Individuals, and that by parity of reason, because many Individuals are included within one Species. But as for Individuals themselves,

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⁽h) See Hermes, B. III. c. iv. where the Doctrine, of general or univerfal Ideas is discust more largely.

See also the Essaywyn, or Introduction of Porphyry, where the Subject of Genus and Species is treated in a perspicuous and easy method. This Tract is usually prefixt to Aristotle's Logic.

Ch. I. these we shall find to be truly infinite; and not only infinite, but changing every moment, as the old are incessantly perishing, the new incessantly arising.

YET 'tis these that compose that Universe, in which we exist; and without knowing something of these, we may be considered as living, like the Cimmerians, in Homer,

'Hiρι κ νεΦέλη κεκαλυμμένοι — *
Cover'd with mist and cloud.

IF, therefore, all Science be something definite and steady (for without this character it would not merit the name), how can it possibly bear relation to such a Multitude as this, a multitude in character so truly contrary to it's own, a multitude every where steeting, every where infinite and vague? How indeed

should

^{*} OSUGG. A. 15.

Thould the fleeting be known fleadily; Ch. I. or how should the vague and infinite (i) be known definitely?

Such was the doctrine of Boethius, who, according to the practice of the age, in which he lived, united the Platonic and the Peripatetic Philosophies. But Ariffelle himself taught the same doctrine many centuries before.

Εί δη το μεν απειρον, η απειρον, αγνωσον, το μεν κατα το πλήθο ή μέγεθο απειρον, αγνωτον σοσόν τι το δε κατ' είδι άπειρου, άγνως ον ωριόν τι των δ' άρχων άπείρων έσων κ) κατά ωλήθων κ) κατ' εἶδω, αδύνατον είδεναι τα έκ τέτων. Ετω γαρ είδεναι το σύνθετον ύπολαμβάνομεν, όταν είδωμεν έχ τίνων κζ σόσων esiv. Arist. Phys. 1. i. p. . Edit. Sylb. If therefore INFINITE, considered as infinite, be UNKNOWABLE, then that which is infinite in Multitude or Magnitude is unknowable as to QUANTITY, and that which is infinite in Form is unknowable as to QUALITY. But the Principles being infinite both in Multitude and in Quality, 'tis impossible to know the Beings derived out of them. For then'tis we conceive that WE KNOW ANY BEING COMPOSITE, when we know out of WHAT Things, and HOW MANY Things it is compounded.

As

⁽i) Infinitorum nulla cognitio est; infinita namque animo comprehendi nequeunt; quod autem ratione mentis circumdari non potest, nullius Scientiæ sine concluditur: quare infinitorum Scientia nulla est. Boeth. in Præd. p. 113. Edit. Bas.

Ch I. As this can hardly be supposed, 'tis for this reason that Logic, which is july called the Organ (5), or Instrument of the Sciences, has for it's for Employment to reduce Infinitude; and this it does by glabiliting certain definitive Arrangements, or Classes, to

(1) The Since held Logic to be a Part of Philoloplay; the Peripateties held it no more than an OR-GAN, or INSTRUMENT; Plate held it to be both, as well a Part as an Organ. His Reasoning, according to Amminias was, as follows. Katanie yae Onese o Eiere darde, & per peren, d de pereipere, m d र्म मृत् कि यह शिक्ष रेपूर्ड बंदबर्गमा अ में Aslind anei μιν των περγμάτων έσα, δεγανόν έσι της Φιλοσοφίας, e pasagenin de tois weappari, mie@ isi The Oi-7:55 2.25. As the Quart, fays he, is twofold, one that which measures, the other that which is measured; and as that, which measures, is the Organ of Mensuration; that, which is measured, the Part of some whole or intire fluid: in like Manner alfo Logic, when taken apart from things, is an Organ of Philosophy; when connected with them, is a Part of Philosophy.

Thus Ammonius on the Categories, p. 8. where we may find also the reasonings both of the Stoics and the Peripatetics.

fome

fome of which all Particulars may be re-. Ch. I. ferred, however numerous, however diversified, the past, the present, the future, all alike.

And thus we return to Classing and Arranging, the Process already suggested to be the proper one.

IT remains to inquire, whether there are more Methods of Arrangement than one; and, if more, then, from among them, which method we ought to prefer.

Bur this will be the Subject of the following Chapter.

C4 CHAP.

CHAP. II.

A Method of Arrangement proposed—rejected, and why—another Method proposed—adopted, and why—General Remarks—Plan of the Whole.

Ch. II. ONE Method of Arrangement is as follows,

THE Multitude of Ideas treasured up in the human Mind, and which, bearing reference to Things, are expressed by Words, may be arranged and circumferibed under the following characters. They all denote either Substance or Attribute—and Substance and Attribute may be each of them modified under the different characters of Universal and Particular, as best besits the Purposes of Reasoning and Science. Thus Man is an universal Substance; Alexander.

ander, a particular One: Valour, an uni- Ch. II. versal Attribute; the Valour of Alexander, a particular One.

And hence there arises a QUADRUPLE ARRANGEMENT OF TERMS; an Arrangement of them into Substance universal, and Substance particular; into Attribute universal, and Attribute particular, to some one of which four not only our Words and our Ideas, but the innumerable Tribe of Individuals may all of them be reduced (a).

A LARGE

⁽a) This method may be found in the beginning of Aristotle's Predicaments, before he comes to the actual enumeration of the Predicaments themselves.

See Aristot. Pradic. p. 23. Edit. Sylb. Των ονίων τα μέν καθ' υποκειμένα κ. τ. λ.

The Stagirite, in giving this quadruple Arrangement, explains himself not by Names, but by Descriptions. Substance universal he describes, as follows—καθ υποκειμένε τινὸς λέγεται, ἐν υποκειμένω δ' ἐδενί ἐςι—Attribute particular, ἐν υποκειμένω μέν ἐςι, καθ' υποκειμένε

Ch. If.

A LARGE Reduction this, yet a Reduction which may possibly lead us into another Extreme, by rendering that Multitude, which we would confine, too limited, too abridged. Suppose, therefore, we were to inquire whether this Reduction might not be enlarged, and a second and more perfect Method than the last be established.

THE World, as we see, is filled with various Substances. Each of 'these possessies it's proper Attributes, and is at the same time encompassed with certain

Circum-

nesμένε δε εδενός λέγεται—Attribute general, καθ ύποnesμένε τε λέγεται, κ) εν ύποκειμένω εςίν—Substances particular, Έτε εν ύποκειμένω εςίν, Έτε καθ ύποκειμένε τυος λέγεται.

Those, who would see an explanation of those several Descriptions, and why Aristotle prefers them to their peculiar Names, may consult his Greek Commentator, Ammonius, and his Latin one, Boethius, who are both of them copious and accurate upon the subject.

Circumstantials. Not to speak of intelli- Ch. II. gible Substances (which belong rather to Metaphyfics), natural Substances appear all to be extended; nor that fimply, but under a certain external Figure, and internal Organization. A Lion and an Oak agree, as they are both extended; yet have they each a Figure, and Organization peculiar. A living Lion and a brazen Lion may have the fame external Figure, but within there is a wide Difference from the possession of Organization on one fide, and the want of it on the other. If then we call the Attribute of Extension QUANTITY, that of Figure and Organization QUALITY, we may fet down these two (I mean Quantity and Quality) as the two great effential Attributes belonging to every Substance, whether natural or artificial.

AGAIN, every Substance, whether natural or artificial, either from Will or from Appetite, or, where these are wanting,

Ch. II. ing, from such lower Causes as it's Figure or mere Quantity, has (in an enlarged use of the Words) a Power to act. Thus 'tis through Will, that Men study; through Appetite, that Brutes eat; through its Figure, that the Clock goes; and through its Quantity, that the Stone Nor are they only thus capable of acting, but also of being acted upon, and that too each of them, according to its respective Character. Mind is acted upon by Truth, the Appetite by Pleasure, the Clock by a Spring, and the Stone by Gravitation. Thus then, besides Quantity and Quality, we have found two other Attributes, common to all Substances, and these are Ac-TION and Passion.

> AGAIN, it often happens when Subflances are not present to us, that we are desirous to know, when and where they existed. When, we ask, lived Homer? Where, we ask, stood the antient Memphis?

phis?—In the answer to these Questions Ch. II. we learn the Time and Place, which circumscribed the existence of these Beings. Now as all sensible Substances are circumscribed after these manners, hence we may consider the When, and the Where, as two Circumstantials, that inseparably attend them. And thus have we added two more Attributes to the number already established.

things exist, we are often led to consider their Position, and that more especially in living Substances possessing the Power of Self-Motion. There is a manifest difference between reclining and string; between sitting and standing; and there are other Circumstances of Position, which extend to all Substances whatever. And thus must Position or Situation be subsoined as another different Attribute.

Add

Ch. II.

ADD to this, when Substances are surperinduced upon Substances, we consider them under the character of Cleathing are Habit. Thus in the strict sense of the word, the Glove, covering our hand, the Shoe our foot, the Coat our Body, are so many Species of Habit. By a more distant Analogy the Corn may be said to cloath the sields, the Woods to cloath the Mountains; and by an Analogy still more remote than that, the Sciences and Virtues to be Habits, that cleath the Mind.

Last of all, in the variety of co-existing Substances and Attributes, there are
many whose very Existence infers the Existence of some other. Thus in Substances,
the Existence of Son infers that of Father; of Servant, that of Master: in
Quantity, the Existence of greater infers that of less; in Position, above infers
below; and in the time When, subsequent
has

has a necessary respect to prior. 'Tis Ch. H. when we view things in these mutual Dependencies, in these reciprocal Inferences, that we discover another Attribute, the Attribute of RELATION.

AND thus instead of confining ourfelves to the simple Division of Substance and Attribute, we have divided Attribute itself into nine distinct sorts; some of which we have
considered as essential, others as circumstantial, and thus made upon the whole
(by setting Substance at their Head) ten
comprehensive and universal Genera, called, with reference to their Greek
name, Categorics; with reference to
their Latin name, Predicaments; and
styled in the Title of this Work, Philosophical Arrangements (b). When

⁽b) The Antients gave to these ARRANGEMENTS different Names, and made also the Number of them different. Some, as Archytas, called them καθόλυ λόδο.

Ch. II. enumerated (c), their several Names are in order, as they follow: Substance,

Qua-

λόδοι, universal Denominations; others, as Quintilian, Elementa, Elements; others, as Aristotle, gumara narnyogias, Figures, or Forms of Predication; narnγορίαι, Prædicaments; γένη γενικώτατα, the most general or comprehensive Genera, τὰ ωρώτα γίνη, the primary Genera. They differed also as to their Number. Some made them two, Subject and Accident, or (which is the same) Substance and Attribute; others made them three, dividing Accidents into the inherent and circumstantial; the Stoics held them to be four, vineκείμενα, σεία, ωως έχουτα, κά σρός τι ωως έχοντα, Subjects, things distinguished by Qualities, distinguished by being peculiarly circumstanced within themselves, distinguished by being so with reference to something else; Plate faid they were five, boia, rautotne, ereporne, xivnois n' saois, Substance, Identity, Diversity, Motion, Reft ; others made seven; lastly, the Pythagoreans and Peripatetics, maintained the Number usually adopted, that is to fay, those ten, which make the Subject of this Treatife.

See Aristot. Prædic. p. 24, et Metaphys. p. 79, 100, 104, &c. Edit. Sylburg. Quintil. l iii. c. 6. Ammon. in Prædicam. p. 16, 17, &c. Edit. Venet. 8vo. 1545. Simplic. in Prædicam. p. 16. V. Edit. Basil. Fol. 1551.

As Words, by fignifying Things, through the Medium of our Ideas, are effential to Logic, and are the Mate-

QUALITY, QUANTITY, RELATION, Ac- Ch. II. TION, PASSION, WHEN, WHERE, Position, and Habit.

As each of these ten Predicaments has it's subordinate distinctions, the Basis of our Knowlege will be now so amply widened, that we shall find Space sufficient, on which to build, be our Plan diversissed, and extensive, as it may.

WE cannot conclude this Chapter without observing, that the doctrine of these CATEGORIES, these PREDICA-MENTS, these PRIMARY GENERA, or

Materials of every Proposition, the present Work may be called Logical. But as the Speculations extend to Physics, to Ethics, and even to the First Philosophy, they become for that reason something more than Logical, and have been called, with a view to this their comprehensive Character, not Logical, but Philosophical Arrangements.

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PHILO-

⁽c) Των κατα μπδεμίαν συμπλοκήν λείομενων, έκαενν άτοι ἐσίαν σημαίνει, ἢ ωσσὸν, ἢ ωσιὸν, ἢ ωρός τι, ἔ ων, ἢ ωστὶ, ἢ κεῖσθαι, ἢ ἐχειν, ἢ ωσιεῖν, ἢ ωάχειν. Aristot. Præd. p. 24. Edit. Sylb. The passage needs no other translation, than what appears in the Text.

Ch. II. Philosophical Arrangements, is a valuable, a copious, and a sublime Theory; a Theory, which, when well understood, leads by Analogy from things sensible to things intelligible; from Effect to Cause; from that which is passive, unintelligent, and subordinate, to that which is active, intelligent, and supreme; a Theory, which prepares us not only to study every thing else with advantage, but makes us knowing withal in one respect, where particular studies are sure to fail;

own accomplishments *.

This is in fact the necessary consequence of being shewn to what Portion of Being every Art or Science belongs, and how limited that Portion, when compared to what remains. The want of this ge-

knowing in the relative value of things, when compared one to another; and modest, of course, in the estimate of our

[•] See the last Chapter of this Treatise, p. 462, 463.

heral knowlege leads to an effect the Ch. II. very reverse; so that men, who possess it not, though prosoundly knowing in a fingle Art or a fingle Science, are too often carried by such partial Knowlege to a blameable Arrogance, as if the rest of mankind were busied in pursuits of no value, and themselves the monopolizers of Wisdom and of Truth.—But this by the way.

THE distinct discussion of each one of these Categories, Predicaments, Arrangements, or Genera, will become the business of the following Chapters; which discussion, joined to what has been already premised, as well as to such future inquiries, as shall naturally arise in confequence, will include all we have to offer upon this interesting subject (d).

Αs

⁽d) The Greek Logicians divided their speculations on this subject into three τμήματα, or Sections, calling the first Section, τὸ πρὸ τῶν κατηγοριῶν;

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Ch. II. As for Propositions, which have for their materials the simple Terms, here enumerated; and for Syllogisms, which have for their materials the several Species of Propositions; both these naturally make subsequent and distinct Parts of Logic, and must therefore be consigned to some future Speculation.

IF we go back farther, and recur to Theorems of Science, or to Sciences them-

the second, το ωτρί αὐτών κατηγοριών; the third, το μετά τὰς καθηγορίας. Ammon. in Prædic. p. 146.

The Latins, adhering to the same Division, coined new names, Anti-prædicamenta, or Præ-prædicamenta; Prædicamenta; and Post-prædicamenta. Sanderson, p. 22, 51, 55. Edit. Oxon. 1672.

In the present Work, the first Section begins from Chapter the first; the second Section, from Chapter the third; the third Section, from Chapter the fisteenth. Of these Sections, the second (which discusses the Predicaments, or Philosophical Arrangements) makes the real and effential part of the Speculation: the first and third Sections are only subservient to it; the first to prepare, the third to explain.

selves,

felves, these will be found not properly Ch. II.

Parts of Logic, but works of a different
and higher character; works, where Logic serves the Philosopher for an Instrument or Organ, as the Chizzel serves the
Statuary, the Pencil serves the Painter.

AT present we are to proceed to the Speculation concerning Substance.

 D_3 CHAP.

C H A P. III.

Concerning Substance natural—how continued, or carried on—Principles of this Continuation, two—increased to three—reduced again to two—these last two, Form and a Subject, or rather Form and Matter.

Ch. III. O explain how natural Substances originally began, is a task too arduous for unassisted Philosophy. But to inquire after what manner, when once begun, they have been continued, is a work better suited to Human abilities; because to a portion of this Continuity we are personally present, nay within it we ourselves are all included, as so many parts.

Now as to the manner, in which substites the Continuity of natural Sub-stances,

flances, and as to the Causes (a) by Ch. III. which that Continuity is maintained; there is no one, it is probable, who imagines every Birth, every recent Production, that daily happens in the Universe, to be an absolutely fresh Creation; a realizing of Non-entity; an Evocation (if it may be so described) of something

D 4

out



⁽a) The Doctrine of Causes, and their different Species, is treated at large in the first volume of these Miscellanies, through the whole Treatise upon Art, and in the Notes subjoined to the same, particularly page 280.

The Author defires to inform his Readers, that in the subsequent disquisitions he hath not confined himfelf merely to Logic, but has interspersed many Speculations of different kinds; acting in this view differently from the Model set him by the Stagirite. Stagirite left no Part of Philosophy unexplored, and of course had separate and distinct Treatises for · Logic, Physics, and the many other Branches of Science, as well the practical, as the speculative. so the Author of this Treatise: he by no means pretends to emulate the comprehensive variety of that fublime and acute Genius, whose writings made him for more than two thousand years the admiration of Grecians, Romans, Arabians Jews, and Christians. Such esteem could not have been the effect either of Fashion, er of Chance.

PHILOSOPHICAL

40

Ch. III. out of nothing.—What then is it?— "Tis a Change or Mutation out of Something, which was before. It appears, therefore, that to inquire how natural Substances are continued, is to inquire what are the Principles of Mutation or Change.

> FIRST, then, let us observe, what is in fact most obvious, that there can be no Mutation or Change, were every thing to remain precisely one and the fame; hot and cold, precisely as they are, one hot, the other cold; so likewise crooked and strait; black and white, &c. On the contrary, Mutation or Change is from one thing into another (b), from

pot .

⁽b) Thus Aristotle-Haga perabodn igu in tuch FIG TI. He then subjoins the Etymology of the word μεταδολή, to confirm his doctrine—δηλος γάρ κ ΜΕΤ' ΆΛΛΟ γάς τι, κό το μέν ωρότερου δηλοί, το δ' usepou. Even the Name (fays he) shews it; for 'tis something after something else; and one of these things denotes prior, the other denotes subsequent. Physic. lib. v. c. 1. p. 95. Edit. Sylb.

hot into cold, or from cold into hot; Ch.III. from strait into crooked, or from crooked into strait; and so in other instances. It follows hence, that the *Principles* of Mutation or Change are necessarily Two; one, a Principle, out of which; the other, a Principle into which.

AGAIN, these two Principles are not merely casual and temerarious (c). Hot changes not into Crooked, but into Cold; Crooked not into Cold, but into Strait; White not into Moist, but into

Black;

⁽c) Thus the same Author— Απάντων τῶν ὄντων ἐ
Δεν ἔτε ωοιεῖν ωέφυκεν, ἔτε ωάχειν τὸ τυχὸν ὑπὸ τὰ

τυχόντες, ἐδὲ γίγνεὶαι ὁτιᾶν ἐξ ὁτουᾶν— ἀλλὰ λεῦκον μὲν γίγνεὶαι ἐξ ἐ λεύκα, κὴ τέτα ἐκ ἐκ ωαντὸς,

ἀλλ' ἐκ μέλαν το ἢ τῶν μεταξὺ, κὴ μεσικὸν κ. τ. λ.

Universally with regard to all Beings whatever, no one

Being is formed by Nature either to act upon any other indifferently, or to be acted upon indifferently; nor is any thing

produced or generated [indiscriminately] out of any thing

—but white is generated or produced out of something Not

subite; and this, not every thing that may be so called, but
either out of Black, or some of the intermediate Colours.

The same holds as to the production of what is Musical,

&c. Arist. Phys. 1. i. c. 5. p. 14. Edit. Sylb.

Ch.III. Black; Moist not into Black, but into Dry. The same holds in other instances more (d) complicated. The becoming a Statue is a Change from indefinite Configuration into definite; the becoming a Palace, a Change from Dispersion into Combination, from Disorder into Order. Already the Principles, which we investigate, have appeared to be Two; and now it further appears that they must be Contraries (e) or Opposites.

⁽d) Καὶ τὰ μη άπλα των ζυτων, άλλα σύνθετα, κατα τον αυτον έχει λόγον-ήτε γαρ οικία γίνεται έκ रहें μमें συπείσθαι, αλλα διηρήσθαι ταδι ώδι· nà ó abορίας κο των εχημαλισμένων τι έξ αλχημοσύνης, κο έκαςου τέτων τα μέυ τάξις, τα δε σύνθεσίς τίς ές μ. Beings too, which are not simple, but composite, admit the same reasoning—for the House is formed from certain Materials, which are not previously so compounded [as to make a House], but which lie separate; and the Statue, and every one of those things, which have Figure given them, are formed out of something, which wants that Figure; and each Production has a different Name, sometimes'tis ORDER, sometimes 'tis Composition. Arist. Phys. l. i. c. 5. p. 14, 15.

⁽e) See the same Author in the same Treatise, p. 11, 12, &c. See also the Quotation in the Text from

AUTHORITY is not wanting to countenance this last position. The Scripture (f) tells us, that the Earth in the beginning was without form, and void, and darkness was upon the face of the deep. After this it became enlightened, as well as replenished; replenished with various Forms both Vegetable and Animal; enlightened by the sublime Command of, Let there be Light, and there was Light. In the whole of this Progress we may remark Contrariety; Formless opposed to Form; Vaid to Replenished; and Darkness to Light.

Among the ancient Philosophers, some held the Principles of things to be hot and cold; others, to be moist and dry; others, to be dense and rare; others, in a

more

from Scripture, which immediately follows, as well as the subsequent Notes.

⁽f) Genesis, chap. i.

being.

Ch.III. more abstracted way, to be Excess and Desect; Even and Odd; Friendship and Strife. Among the moderns, we know the stress laid on Action and Re-action; Attraction and Repulsion; Expansion and Condensation; Centripetal and Centrifugal: to which may be added those two Principles held by many Ancients as well as Moderns, the Principles of

We shall subjoin the following passage from a Treatise of ancient date, because in it the Force of Contraries is exemplified with elegance.

Atoms and a Void (g), which two stand opposed nearly as Being and Non-

⁽g) Democritus, says Aristotle, holds THE SOLID and the Void, το ειρεον κή κενον, to be Principles, ων το μέν ως ον, το δ' ως κα ον είναι Φησι, of which be says the one is the same as Bring, the other the same as Non-Being. See Arist. Phys. 1. i. c. 5. p. 13. See also c. 4. p. 11. where the other Contraries are explained at large.

⁶⁶ Some

"Some (fays an ancient Author) (h) Ch.III.
"have wondered how the World, if it be
"composed, as it appears, out of con"TRARY PRINCIPLES (the Dry, the
"Moist, the Cold, and the Hot) has not
"for ages ago been ruined and destroyed.
"As if indeed men should wonder how a
"City could subsist, composed (as it is) out

See Fabricius's Biblioth. Grae. T. ii. p. 127, where the learned Author, with his usual labour and accuracy, has collected all the sentiments both of Antients and Moderns on this valuable work.

es of

⁽b) See the Treatise Hepi xioque — It is given to Aristotle, and always makes a part of his Works; but although it be of genuine antiquity, and truly fublime, both in language and fentiment, yet fome have thought it of a later period, and not written in the close manner and style of Aristotle. A Translation of it is extant, as old as by the Philosopher Apuleius, besides other Translations more modern. The Tract itself stands the fifth in the volume of Ariflotle's Physical Pieces, according to Sylburgius's edition, and the passage here translated may be found, cap. 5. page 12. of that edition, beginning at the Words, Καί τοι γέ τις έθαύμασε ωως ωολε εί έχ των εναντίων κ. τ. λ. In Apuleius the words are, Et quibusdam mirum videri solet, quod, cum ex diversis, &c. p. 731. Edit. in Usum Delphini. Quarto.

Ch.III.

es of contrary Tribes (I mean the Poof s and the Opulent, the Young and the 46 Aged, the Weak and the Strong, the 66 Good and the Bad), and be ignorant that ethis of all things is most admirable in "Political Concord; I mean, that by ad-" mitting every Nature and every Fortune, " it forms out of MANY dispositions one s disposition; and out of Dissimilar ones, a " Similar. Perhaps also NATURE herself " has an affection for Contraries, and " chooses out of these to form the Conso-" nant, and not out of things fimilar; fo sthat in the same manner as she associated " the Male to the Female, and not each to "it's own Sex, did she establish through " Contraries, and not Similars, the first " and original Concord. ART too, in imies tation of Nature, appears to do the same. "Thus Painting, by blending the Natures " of things white and black, pale and red, " produces Representations consonant to " their originals. Thus Music, by mixing " together Sounds that are sharp and flat, " that es that are long and short, out of different Ch. III.

voices produces one Harmony. Thus

ss Grammar, by forming a mixture out of

« Vowels and Mutes, through these hath

es established the whole of it's Art. And

s this is what appears to have been the

es meaning of that obscure Philosopher He-

se raclitus. You are, says he, to connect the

of Perfect and the Imperfect, the Agree-

es ing and the Disagreeing, the Consonant

es and the Dissonant; and out of All

of THINGS, ONE; AND OUT OF ONE,

" ALL THINGS."

Thus far this ingenious Author, with regard to whose doctrine, as well as that of the many others already mentioned, we cannot but remark, that whatever may have caused such an *Unanimity* of opinion, whether it were that men adopted it from one another by a fort of Tradition, or were insensibly led to it by the latent force of Truth; all Philosophers, of all ages, appear to have sayoured

Ch.III. voured Contrariety, and given their fanction to the Hypothesis, that Prince Ciples are Contraries (i).

But farther still—'Tis impossible for Contrarieties to co-exist, in the same place, at the same instant. 'Tis impossible, for example, that in the same place and instant should co-exist Cold and Hot; Crooked and Strait; Dispersion and Combination; Disorder and Order. As therefore the Principles of Change are Contraries, and Contraries cannot co-exist, it follows that one Principle must necessarily depart, as the other accedes. Thus in the Mutation out of Disorder into Order, when the Principle into which,

thas

⁽i) Πάντες γὰρ τὰ ςοιχεῖα κỳ τὰς ὑκ' αὐτῶν καλυμένας ἀρχὰς, καίπερ ἄνευ λόγε τιθέντες, ὅμως τὰναντία λέγυσιν, ὥσπερ ὑκ' αὐτῆς τῆς ἀληθείας ἀναίκασθένιες. For ALL Philosophers hold the Elements and those other Causes, which they call PRINCIPLES (though they suppose them without giving a reason) to be CON-TRARIES, compelled as it were to do so by Truth itself. Aristot. Phys. 1. i. c. 5. p. 15.

that is Order, accedes, the Principle OUT Ch.III. of which, that is Difarder, departs.

The same happens in all other instances.

A QUESTION then arises. If one of them necessarily depart, as soon as the other accedes, how can Nature possibly maintain the Continuity of her Productions? To depart, is to be no more, a sort of Annihilation, or Death; to accede, is to pass into Being, a sort of Production or Birth. They cannot co-exist, because they are absolutely incompatible (k); so that upon this Hypothesis

⁽k) To mi woisin duo monon, exel tivà doyon anogiosis yaç an tis, was in wuxnotns tin mavotila woisin wéduren, in autri tin wuxnotnla omoiaus de ni addin
omoiaus inailiotns. That we should not make two
PRINCIPLES only, has some appearance of reason: for a
man may well doubt, how Density should be formed by
nature to make Rarity, or this last, Density; and so in
like manner with respect to any other Contrariety whatever. Arist. Phys. 1. i. c. 6. p. 16.

Simplicius well observes—το μέν γαρ ωοιών είς ύπομένον τι ωοιεί· το δε ενανίον έχ υπομένει το εναντίον Ε — That

Ch.III. there can be no Continuity at all, but every new Production must be a realizing of Non-entity, a fresh and genuine. Evocation of something out of nothing.

If this in the Continuity of Beings appear a difficulty, let us try, whether we can remove it by any aid not yet suggested. Crooked, we are told, is changed into Strait, a Contrary into a Contrary; one of which necessarily departs, and the other accedes. We admit it.—But is there not Something, which during the Change, neither departs nor accedes? Something which REMAINS, and is all along still one and the same (1).

THE

[—]That, which acts, acts upon something which remains; but Contrary does not remain and wait for Contrary. Simpl. in Præd. p. 43. B. Edit. Basil. 1551.

⁽¹⁾ Καὶ τᾶτο ὀρθῶς λέγει Διογένης, ὅτι εἰ μη ἦν ἰξε ἐνὸς ἄπανθα, ἐκ ἂν ἦν τὸ ποιεῖν κὰ πάχειν ὑπ' ἀλλή-λων' οἶον τὸ Θερμοὶν ψύχεσθαι, κὰ τᾶτο Θερμαίνεσθαι πάλι»

ARRANGEMENTS.

ģi Ch. III.

THE Stick, for example, changes from Crooked into Strait; and if there was not a Stick, or fomething analogous, no

τάλιν ε ραρ ή Βερμότης με αβάλλει κ) ή ψυχρότης είς αλλάλα, αλλά δήλου, ότι το υποκίμενου ώς ε εν οίς το το υποκίμενου ώς ε εν οίς το το υποκίμενου ώς ε εν οίς το το υποκείμενου μίαν είναι την υπωτειμίνην Φύσιν:— And this is rightly said by Diogenes, that if all things were not out of ONE thing, it would not be possible for them to act, or be acted upon by one another; for example, that, what is hot, should become cold; or reciprocally, that this should become hot; for 'tis not the Heat or the Coldness, which change into one another, but 'tis that evidently changes, which is the Subject of these Affections: whence it follows that in those things, where there is acting, and being acted upon, 'tis necessary there should belong to them some ONE Nature; their common Subject. Arist. de Genèr. et Corlib. 1: c. 6. p. 20. Edit. Sylb.


Aristotle, who gives this quotation, well remarkes that it was too much to affirm this of all things, but that it should be confined to such things only as reciprocally ass, and are asted upon; and so in his Comment we may perceive he restrains them.

See more of this ONE Being, the common Subject, or Substratum, in the following Chapter.

The Diogenes here mentioned was a contemporary of Anaxagoras, and lived many years before the Cynle of the fame name. See Diog. Laert. ix. 57.

E 2

Such



Ch. III. fuch Change could be effected. Yet is it less a Stick for becoming Strait; or was it more so, when Crooked? Does it not remain (m), confidered as a Stick, precisely,

(m) Ori dei ati ti unoineichai to gifvontevor, z τετο εί κ αριθμώ ές ιν έν, αλλ' είδει γε έχ έν (τὸ γαρ είδει λέγω, κ λόγω ταυτόν.) ε γαρ ταυτόν ανθρώπω κὸ τῷ ἀμέσω είναι κὸ τὸ μὲν ὑπομένει, τὸ δ εχ ύπομένει το μεν ύποκείμενου ύπομένει (ό γάρ ανθρωπ 🕒 ύπομένει) τὸ δὲ ἄμυσον ἐχ' ὑπομένει. cessary that in every Production there should be a Subject [or a Substratum], and this, though One numerically, yet not One in Form (I mean, by one in Form, the same as One in Reason, in Detail, or Definition). Thus'tis not the same thing to be a Man, and to be a Being Immusical, or Void of musical Art. [In the formation of a Musician] the one remains, the other remains not; the Subject or Substratum remains (for Man remains); the being Immusical, or Void of musical Art, remains not Ifor that is lost, as foon as he becomes an Artist. 1 Arist. Phys. 1. i. c. 7. p. 18. Edit. Sylb.

The Production, or Formation here spoken of, means the becoming a Musician by the acquisition of the musical Art. The same reasoning may be applied to any other Art or Science, which Man, as Man, is capable of acquiring.

Again, the same Philosopher— Ετι το μεν υπομέτει, το δ' ενανίου έχ υπομένει ες ιν άξα τι τείτον ωα-

As therefore the Stick is to Crooked and Strait, so is the Bar of Iron to Hot and Cold; the Brass of the Statue to Figure and Deformity; the Stones of the Palace to Order and Confusion; and something, analogous in other Changes, to other Contraries, not enumerated.

If therefore we were right in what we afferted before, and are so in what we affert now; it should seem that THE PRINCIPLES OF CHANGE OF MUTATION WERE THREE (n); ONE, that which departs;

pà rà evavria. Add to this (says he) there is some-THING [in productions of all kinds] WHICH RE-MAINS; but the Contrary does not remain; there is therefore some THIRD thing over and above the Contraries. Metaph. A. p. 196. Edit. Sylb.

If there appear a difficulty in the first quotation of this note, concerning a Subject being One numerically, but not so in Form, or Character, see Note on the word Privation, in the first part of the following Chapter.

⁽π) Διόπερ, εἴ τις τόν τε ωρότερον ἀληθη νομίσειεν εἴναι λόγον, κὰ τἔτον ἀναγκαῖον, εἰ μέλλει διασώσειν E_3 ἀμΦο-

Ch.III. parts; ANOTHER, that which accedes; and a THIRD, that which remains. Take an example or two from Man. The healthful departs; the morbid accedes; the Body remains. The morbid departs; the healthful accedes; the Body remains. Tis thus we change reciprocally as well to better, as to worse.

aμφοτέρυς αθτυς, υποτιθέναι τι τρίτου—If any one therefore think the former Reasoning, and the present Reasoning, to be each of them true; 'tis necessary, in order to preserve both of them intire and unimpeached, to lay down and establish some THIRD PRINCIPLE.

He soon after adds—τὸ μὲν ἔν τρία Φάναι τὰ τοιχεῖα εἶναι, ἔκ τε τύτων κὰ ἐκ τοιύτων ἄλλων ἐπισκοπῶτι δόξειεν ᾶν ἔχειν τινὰ λόγον. Το say therefore that the Elements [or Principles of Things] are Three, may appear to have some soundation to those, who speculate from these and other Reasonings of like sort. Arist. Phys. 1. ï. c. 6. p. 16, 17. Edit. Sylb.

And again more explicitly in his Metaphysus— Τρία δὰ τὰ αίτια, κὰ τρεῖς αὶ ἀρχαί δύο μὲν ἡ ἐναντίωσις (ῆς τὸ μὲν λόγω κὰ εἶδω, τὸ δὲ είρησις) τὸ δὲ τρίτον ἡ ὕλη.—Wherefore the Causes of Things are THREE, and the Principles are THREE; two, the Con-TRARIETY (of which Contrariety one part is the DEFI-NITION and FORM; the other part, the PRIVATION); and the third Principle, the MATTER. Metaph. A. p. 197. Edit. Sylb.

IT may be observed of these three Ch. III. Principles, that two of them, being Contraries, maintain a perpetual warfare:



Haud bene conveniunt, nec in una fede morantur-

the third, like a neutral Power, ferves an intercourse with both, and fometimes affociates with one. fometimes with the other. be observed also of the two hostile or contrary Principles, that one of them appertains for the most part to the better Co-arrangement (o) of things, and one

to

⁽e) Co-ARRANGEMENT.—So I here ventured to translate the word Συςοιχία, or Συςοιχεία, for it is written both ways in Aristotle. See Metaph. l. i. c. 5. p. 13. l. iii. c. 2. p. 52. Edit. Sylb.

The Pythagoreans, observing through the world a difference in things as to better and worfe, and that this difference often led to a fort of Contrariety or Opposition, arranged them into two Classes, a better Class and a worse; and, placing the two Classes by the side of each other, called them συςοιχίαι, or Co-arrangements. In the better Class E 4

Ch.III. to the baser; to the better appertains Figure; to the baser, Deformity; to the better, Order; to the baser, Confusion; to the better, Health; to the baser, Dis-Now if we call those of the better Tribe by the common name of FORM. and those of the other Tribe by the common name of Privation (p), diftinguish-

> they put Unity, Bound, Friendship, Good, &c.; in the other they put Multitude, Boundless, Strife, Evil, &c. Some of this school limited the Number, others left it indefinite, confidering all things as double, one against another, according to the Language of Eccles stasticus, chap. xxxiii. v. 14, 15. and chap. xlii. v. 24.

> See (befides the quotations mentioned already) Ethic. Nicom. 1. i. c. 6. p. 15. Edit. Oxon. 17.16. and Eustratii Com. in Ethic. Nic. p. 13. B.

> (ρ) Των εναυτίων ή ετέρα συςοιχία, ςέρησις-The OTHER CO-ARRANGEMENT of Contraries is PRI-VATION. Aristot. Metaph. 1. 3. c. 2. p. 52. Edit. Syll.

> By the word other, he means the baser and subordinate Class, to which Class he gives the common name of PRIVATION, as including all the Genera therein enumerated, Strife, Evil, &c. And hence it įs,

tinguishing the neutral Principle withal Ch.III. by the name of Subject, we shall then find the three Principles of Mutation, or Change, to be FORM, PRIVATION, and a Subject.

OF these three, if we compare FORM to PRIVATION, we shall find FORM to be definite and simple; PRIVATION to be infinite and vague. Thus there are insinite ways of being diseased, though but one of being healthy; infinite ways of being vicious, though but one of being virtuous (q).

Should it be asked, how PRIVATION is one, having this infinite and vague Character; we may answer, because as Privation,

is, that Privation is in this Treatife foon after called infinite and vague; for $\tau \circ {}^{\vee}A\pi \epsilon \iota \rho \circ \nu$, Infinite, made one in this baser Arrangement. See Blemmidæ Epitom. Physic. p. 60. Philop. in Arist. Phys. lib. i. sub fin.

⁽q) 'Eσθλοί μέν γας απλώς, σανδοδαπώς δε κακοί. Theognis.

Ch.III.

of that Form, to which it is opposed. Thus to be diseased (though the ways are infinite) is nothing more than the Absence of Health; to be vicious, (though the ways are infinite) nothing more than the Absence of Virtue.

And hence, perhaps, it may be possible to reject PRIVATION for a Principle, and fupply it's place, when wanted, by it's Opposite, that is to say FORM; not however by the specific Form then actually tending to existence, but by every other congenial Form, of which this Specific Form is the Privation. Thus in the producing of the Sphere, it's Privation may be found in the Presence of the Pyramid, or of any Figure, besides the Sphere, whether regular or irregular. Thus in the producing of that Harmony called the Diapason, it's Privation may be found in the Presence of the Diapente, or of any other Tensions, befides fides those of the Octave, be they conso- Ch. III.

nant or dissonant. 'Tis certain that by
such a reciprocal acceding and receding of
all possible Forms, by such an Absence and
Presence (r), by such a continued Revolution

(r) — Ίκανὸν γὰς ἔςαι τὸ ἔτερον τῶν ἐναντίων ωοιεῖν τῆ ἀπεσία κὰ ωαρεσία την μεταθολήν — One of the two Contraries (that is to fay Form) will be sufficiently able, by it's Absence and it's Presence, to effect Mutation. Aristot. Phys. 1. i. c. 7. p. 20. Edit. Sylb.

On this passage, Themistius thus comments.—Having inserted the words above quoted, he subjoins—
ωςε το Είδω την χώραν αποπληροί ω της Στερήσεως η γαρ Στέρησις ε Φύσις τις κ Είδω ες ν, άλλ' απισία τε Είδις. So that the FORM supplies also the place of the PRIVATION; for the PRIVATION is itself no particular Nature or Form, but rather THE ABSENCE OF THE FORM [which is then passing into existence]. Themist. in Arist. Phys. p. 21. B. Edit. Ald.

Simplicius on this occasion explains himself as follows— ἐ μέντοι ἀξίωσεν ἐν τοῖς ςοιχείοις Θεῖναι τὴν Στέρησιν κὴ τὸ κατ' αὐτην μη οὐ, διότι ἀπωσία μόνον ἐςὶ τὰ ωιΦυκότ, ἐδἐν ἄλλο ἐαυτῆ συνεισάγωσα ἀρωκόση δὶ τῷ Εἴδει μόνω κὰ αὐτὸς, τῆ ωαρωσία τῆ ἐαυτὰ κὰ τῆ ἀπωσία δυναμένω την γένεσιν κὰ την Φθοραν κὰ σδιδόναι,— Aristotle has not deigned to place among the Elements

Ch.III. lution and periodical Succession, suppose ing a proper SUBJECT withal to receive

and

Elements [of Natural Productions] PRIVATION, and that Mode of Non-being, which is consonant to it; because Privation is no more than the Absence of the thing produced, introducing along with itself no other particular Attribute. He himself also has been satisfied with the FORM alone, as being able by it's PRESENCE and it's ABSENCE to effect both Generation and Dissolution. Simplic. in Aristot. Phys. lib. i. p. 54. Edit. Ald. Fol. 1526.

Perhaps Simplicius alludes to what Aristotle says in the following passage.— Η δέ γε μόρφη κ η φύσις δι-χως λέγεται κ γαρ ή εέρησις είδος τως εςίν. The Terms FORM and NATURE have a double meaning: far in one Sense even PRIVATION is FORM. Physic. Aristot. 1. ii. c. 1.

Philoponus gives a pertinent instance to explain, how PRIVATION may be FORM. He tells us—

π γὰρ Λύδι ἀρμονία γίγνε αι ἐκ τῆς ἀναρμοςίας τῆς Λυδίκ ἀλλ ἡ Λύδι ἀρμονία γίγνε αι ἀναρμοςία δύναται εἶναι Φρύγι ἀρμονία, ἡ ἐτέρα τις δύναται δὶ κὰ ἀπλῶς ἀναρμοςία εἶναι τῶν χορδῶν ὁπωσῦν ἐχυσῶν, κὰ τῦτο ποικίλως ἄλλοις ἄλλως ἐπιτεταμίνων μᾶλλον, ἡ ἀνειμένων.—The Lydian Mode or Harmony is made out of Lydian Dissonance [that is, before the strings of a Lyre were tuned to that Mode, they were tuned after another manner, which manner he calls properly, Lydian Dissonance]. Now Lydian Dissonance may

and give them up, we may conceive how Ch.III. Changes may be performed, and new Substances produced, though (as we have said already) the Principle of Privation were to be withdrawn. No harm accrues to the Doctrine from a supposition like this; only, if we admit it, we again reduce the Principles from three to two; not however the former two, those that exist in Contrariety, for now we adopt the more amicable ones, those of a Form and a Subject (t), or (if

may be the Phrygian Mode or Harmony, or it may be any other of the Modes [Doric, Ionic, &c.]; it may also be simply the Dissonance of the Strings under any casual tension, and that in various and different ways, either as they are more stretched, or more relaxed [that is, either sharper or flatter.] Philop. in Physic. 1. i. p. 45.

This shews that the *Phrygian* Mode in this example, though clearly a *Form* of Harmony, is nevertheless, when referred to the *Lydian* Mode, as much a *Privation*, as any casual Tention of the Strings, totally void of all Concord.

[&]quot;(t) This is implied in the words—"Οτι γίγνεται απαν έκ τε τε υποκειμένε κ) της μορφης. That every thing

Ch.III. (if we take Matter in it's proper meaning) those of Form and Matter.

'Tis in these we behold the Elements of those composite Beings, NATURAL SUBSTANCES. The Disquisition makes it expedient to consider each of the two apart, and this we shall therefore do by beginning with MATTER.

thing is made or produced out of a SUBJECT and a FIGURE. Arift. Phys. 1. i. c. 7. p. 19.

FIGURE, Mogen, means the same with Eiders FORM; Trocksuperor, Subject, means the same with Tan, Matter. See the Treatise just quoted, particularly towards the conclusion of the first Book.

CHAP.

C H A P. IV.

Concerning MATTER-An imperfect Description of it-it's Nature, and the Necessity of it's existence, traced out and proved-first by Abstraction-then by Analogy-Illustrations from Mythology.

TATTER is that Elementary Con- Ch.IV. fituent in composite Substances, which appertains in common (a) to them all, without distinguishing them from one another.

⁽a) If we compare the beginning of this Chapter with the beginning of the following, it will appear that, though MATTER and FORM are the ELE-MENTS, or inherent Parts of every composite Substance, yet they effentially differ, in as much as Matter being COMMON, Form PECULIAR, Form gives every fuch Substance it's Character, while Matter gives it none.

Thus Philoponus-nat' auto yae [to Eido scil.] χαρακτηρίζον αι τα τράγμα α, κατά δε την Τλην θδιν αλλήλων διαφέρυσι.- By FORM things are characterised; by MATTER they differ not one from another. Com

PHILOSOPHICAL

Ch.IV. another.—But 'tis fitting to be more explicit.

64

Every thing generated or made, whether by Nature or Art, is generated or made out of fomething else; and this fomething else is called it's Subject or Matter. Such is Iron to the Saw; such is Timber to the Boat.

Now this Subject or Matter of athing, being necessarily previous to that thing's existence, is necessarily different from it, and not the same. Thus Iron, as Iron, is not a Saw; and Timber, as Timber,

Com. in Phys. Arist. p. 55. d.—And soon after — dioti auto χαρακτηριςικόν έςι της εκάς εσίας ή γαρ "Τλη, κοινή.—This [that is, the FORM] is CHARACTERISTIC of every Being's Essence; for as to the MATTER, it is COMMON [and runs through all.]

Ammonius says expressy—n μεν γας Υλη κοινωτίας είν αιτία τοις ωράγμασι, το δε Είδω διαφοράς.— MATTER with regard to things is the Cause of their general Community, or common Nature; Form, the Cause of their peculiar Difference. Ammon. in Cat. p. 25. B.

ter of every Subject or Matter, that is, the Character of Negation or Priva-

AGAIN, though the Subject or Matter of a thing be not that thing, yet were it incapable of becoming so, it could not be called it's Subject or Matter. Thus Iron is the Subject or Matter of a Saw, because, though not a Saw, it may still become a Saw. On the contrary, Timber is not the Subject or Matter of a Saw, because it not only (as Timber) is no Saw, but can never be made one, from it's very nature and properties. Hence then, besides Privation, another Character of every Subject or Matter, and that is the Character of Apritude or Capacity.

AGAIN, when one thing is the Subject or Matter of many things, it implies a Privation of them all, and a Capacity to them

Ch.IV. them all (b). Thus Iron, being the Subject or Matter of the Saw, the Axe,

(b) PRIVATION and CAPACITY are effential to every thing, which bears the name of MATTER; and this is the meaning of the following passage-Ες οδ το υποκείμανον αριθμώ μέν έν, είδει δε δύο-The Subject or Matter is one numerically, but in character it is Two, that is to say, Two, as it has a Capacity to become a thing, and yet is under a Privation, till it actually become fo. Arift. Physic. 1. i. p. 17. --- And foon after, he fays-Eregon yae to avθρώπω κ) τῷ ἀμάσω είναι, κ) τῷ ἀχηματίςω κ) χαλκῷ. 'Tis a different thing to be a Man, and to be Void of the musual Art; 'tis a different thing to be Void of Figure, and to be Brass. - As much as if he had faid, that the Man, before he became a mufual Artist, had both a Capacity for that character, and a Privation of it; the Brass a similar Capacity and Privation, before it was: cast into a Statue.

Thus too Themistius—Kai τοι λέγομεν της ύλης το είναι εν τῷ δυνάμει ἡ δὲ δύναμις δηλονότι μετὰ ςερή-σεως ἐδὲ γὰρ ἔτι δύναμις είη, μη σὺν αὐτῆ τὰντως κὴ της ςερήσεως νουμένης—We say the Essence of MATTER is in Capacity; and Capacity is evidently connected with PRIVATION; since it would no longer be Capacity, could Privation in no sense be understood, as existing with it. Themist. in Arist. Physic. p. 21. Edit. Ald.

See before, Note p. 52, and Note p. 71.

and

and the Chiffel, implies Privation and Ch.IV. Capacity with respect to all three.

AGAIN, we can change a Saw into a Chissel, but not into a Boat; we can thange a Boat into a Box, but not into a Saw. The reason is, there can be no Change or Mutation of one thing into another, where the two changing Beings do not participate the fame Matter (c).

But

⁽c) This reasoning has reference to what the Ancients called The wροσεχες, THE IMMEDIATE MATTER, in opposition to The spots, THE REMOTE OF PRIMARY MATTER, of which more will be said in the course of this Speculation.

Tis of the immediate Matter we must understand the following Passage—Endexital of, mias the understand the following Passage—Endexital of, mias the understand from, stage players a sid the the unitary of each extension, stages of the unitary of t

Ch.IV. But even here, were the Boat to moulder and turn to Earth, and that Earth by natural process to metallize and become Iron, through such progression as this, we might suppose even the Boat to become a Saw. Hence therefore it is, that ALL CHANGE is by immediate or mediate participation of THE SAME MATTER.

HAVING advanced thus far, we must be careful to remember—first, that every Subject or Matter implies, as such, Privation and Capacity—and next, that all Change or Mutation of Beings into one another, is by means of their participating the same common Matter. This we have chosen to illustrate from Works of Art, as falling more easily under human cognizance and observation. Tis however no less certain as to the

one-av Google

example, that a Saw cannot be made out of Wood; nor is this a work in the power of the Efficient Cause. Arist. Metaph. H. 1160. J. p. 138. Edit. Sylb.

Productions of Nature, though the fu- Ch.IV. perior Subtlety in these renders examples more difficult.

THE Question then is, whether in the World which we inhabit, it be not admitted from Experience, as well as from the Confession of all Philosophers, that Substances of every kind, whether natural or artificial, either immediately or mediately pass one into another; that we suppose at present no Realizings of Non-entity, but that reciprocal Deaths, Dissolutions, and Digestions, support by turns all Substances out of each other, so that, as Hamlet says, from the Idea of this rotation,

Imperial Cæsar, dead and turn'd to clay, May stop a hole, to keep the winds away.

The Question in short is, whether in this World which we inhabit, there be not an F₃ uni-

Ch. IV. universal Mutation of all things into all (d).

If there be, then must there be some one
PRIME

(d) The Peripatetics, according to the erroneous Astronomy by them adopted, supposed the fixt Stars, the Planets, the Sun, and the Moon, to move all of them round the Earth, attached to different Spheres, which moved and carried them round, the Earth itself being immoveable, and placed in the Centre of the Universe. This Motion, purely and simply local, was the only one they allowed to these Celestial Bodies, which in Effence they held to be perfectly unchangeable. Things on the surface of this Earth (such as Plants and Animals), and things between that furface and the Moon (such as Clouds, Meteors, Winds, Sec.) these they supposed obnoxious to Motions of a. more various and complicated character; Motions, which changed them in their Qualities and Quantities, and which even led to their Generation and Dissolution, to Life and to Death. Hence the whole Tribe of these mutable and perishable Beings were called sublu-NARY, because the Region of their existence was beneath the Sphere of the Moon. Twas here existed those Elements, which, as Milton tells us,

Perpetual circle, multiform, and mix
And nourish all things—— Par. Lost.

Twas here that Ariflotle held— ετι waν έκ waντος γίνισθαι wiφυκε, that every thing was naturally formed to arife PRIMARY MATTER, common to all things; Ch.IV.

I fay, fome one PRIMARY MATTER,
and that Common to All Things, fince,
without fome fuch Matter, fuch Mutation
would be wholly impossible.

But if there be some one Primary Matter, and that common to all things; this Matter must imply, not (as particular and subordinate Matters do) a particular Privation, and a particular Capacity, but, on the contrary, Universal

arise out of every thing. Lib. de Ortu et Int. p. 39. Edit. Sylb.

Ocellus Lucanus (from whom, and from Archytas, Timæus, and the other Pythagoreans, both Plate and Aristotle borrowed much of their Philosophy) elegantly calls this imaginary Sphere of the Moon's Grbit, iσθμος άθανασίας η γενήσεως, the Isthmus of Immortality and Generation, that is, the Boundary, which lies between things immortal, and things transitory. Gale's Gouse. Mythog. p. 516.

The Stoics went farther than this Isthmus.—They did not confine these Changes to a Part only of the Universe; they supposed them to pass through the F 4 whole;

Ch.IV. PRIVATION, and Universal CAPA-CITY (e).

> Ir the notion of such a Being appear strange and incomprehensible, we may farther prove the necessity of it's existence from the following considerations.

> whole; and to continue without ceasing, till all was at length lost in their Ἐκπύρωσις, or general Conflagration, after which came a new World, and then a new Conflagration, and so on periodically. Diog. Laert. vii. 135, 141, 14/2.

(e) To wower unoutherou, duranterou anacae dixiedai tas poppas, in signou pin isin anacae— The primary Subject or Matter, having a Ca-PACITY to admit all Forms, exists in a Privation of them all. Themist. in Arist. Phys. p. 21.

Themistius well distinguishes between two words, expressing the same Being, I mean imoresquesos and van. The first he makes the Subject or Substratum of Something ACTUALLY existing; the other, that Matter which has a CAPACITY of becoming many things, before it actually becomes any one of them.

This is that ONE Being, mentioned by Diogener, whose words we have quoted in the preceding Chapter, p. 51, in the Note.

EITHER

EITHER there is no such general Ch.IV. Change, as here spoken of, which is contrary to fact, and would destroy the Sympathy and Congeniality of things; or if there be, there must be a Matter of the character here established, because without it (as we have said) such Change would be impossible.

ADD to this, however hard universal Privation may appear, yet had the Primary Matter in it's proper nature any one particular Attribute, so as to prevent it's Privation from being unlimited and universal, such Attribute would run thro' all things, and be conspicuous in all. If it were white, all things would be white; if circular, they would be circular; and so as to other Attributes, which is contrary to fact (f). Add to this, that the

⁽f) This Argument is taken from Plate.—Speaking of the primary Matter, he says—susses yage on two

Ch.IV. Opposite to such Attribute could never have existence, unless it were possible for the same thing to be at once and, in the same instance both white and black, circular and rectilinear, &c. since this inseparable Attribute would necessarily be every where, because the Matter, which implies it, is itself every where, at least

ἐπεισιόντων τινὶ, τὰ τῆς ἐναντίας, τά τε τῆς ωαράπαν ἄλλης Φύσεως, ὁπότ' ἔλθω, δεχόμενον, κανῶς ἄν ἀφομοιοῖ, τὴν αὐτε ωαρεμΦαίνων δψιν—Were it like any of those things that enter into it, in such case, when it came to receive things of a nature contrary and totally different from itself, it would exhibit them ill, by shewing 1T'S OWN NATURE ALONG WITH THEM at the same time. Plat. Tim. p. 50.

Thus Chalcidius, in commenting the Passage here quoted—Si set aliquid candidum, at himmission, deinde oporteat hoc transferri in alium colorem, wel diversum, ut ruborem sivi pallorem, vel contrarium, at atrum; tunc cander non patietur introcuntes colores synceros perseverare, sed permixtione sui faciet interpolatos. Chalcid. in Tim, Com. p. 434.

Hence we see the propriety of those descriptions, which make the primary Matter, to be void of Body, of Quality, of Bulk, of Figure, &c. ἀσώμαθο, αποιο, ἀμεγίθης, ἀχημάτιςο, ἄμοςΦο, κ. τ. λ.

may

may be found in all things, that are ge-Ch.IV. nerated and perishable,

HERE then we have an Idea (such as its is) of that fingular Being, TAH HPOTH, the PRIMARY MATTER; a Being, which those Philosophers, who are immerged in sensible Objects, know not well how to admit, though they cannot well do without it (g); a Being, which slies the Percep-

⁽g) So strange a Being is it, and so little comprehensible to common Ideas, that the Greeks had no name for it in their language, 'till TAH came to be adopted as the proper word, which was at first only affumed by way of Metaphor, from fignifying Timber or Wood, the common materials in many works of Art. Hence it was that Ocellus, Timous, and Plate, employ various words, and all of them after the same metaphorical manner, when they would express the nature of this mysterious Being. Ocellus calls it Παυδεχές κέ Έκμαγείου της γενέσεως, the universal Recipient, and Impression of things generated, as Wax receives Impressions from various Seals. Timeus uses the word TAA in the Doric Dialect, and explains it (like Ocellus) by Exmageior, to which he adds the Appellations of Mariea x Tillavav, Mother and Nurse.

Ch.IV. Perception of every fense, and which is at best even to the Intellect but a negative object, no otherwise comprehensible than either by ANALOGY or ABSTRACTION.

WE gain a glimpse of it by ABSTRAC-TION, when we say that the first Matter is not the Lineaments and Complexion, which make the beautiful Face; nor yet the Flesh and Blood, which make those Lineaments, and that Complexion; nor yet the liquid and solid Aliments, which

Nurse. Plato calls it first wάσης γενίσεως ὑποδοχην, οδον τιθήνην, the Receptacle of all Generation, as it's Nurse—then wavros αίσθητω μητίφα η ὑποδοχην—the Mother and Receptacle of every sensule Object. Gale's Opuse. Mytholog. p. 516. 544. Platon. Tim. p. 47. 51. Edit. Serr. See Hermes, p. 308, &c.

Aristotle also observes, consistently with one of the above expressions—π μεν γαρ υπομένωσα, συναιτία τη μορφή των γινομένων ές ν, ωσπερ μήτης—that the MATTER, by remaining, is in concurrence with the Form, a Cause of things generated, under the character of a Mother. Phys. 1. i. c. 9. p. 22. Edit. Sylb.

make

make that Flesh and Blood; nor yet the Ch.IV. simple Bodies of Earth and Water, which make those various Aliments; but Something, which being below all these, and supporting them all, is yet different from them all, and effential to their existence (h).

We obtain a fight of it by ANA-LOGY, when we say, that as is the Brass

Thus Chalcidius-Sublatis que sunt singulis, QUOD SOLUM REMANET, IPSUM ESSE, QUOD QUÆRITUR. In Tim. Com. p. 371.

⁽b) ABSTRACTION appears to have been used by Plato-Διο την το γείονότ 🕒 ορατο κ σαντός αίσθητο בחדב בש טחססס צאש שחדב אחש שחדב מבנפת, שחדב שנף, שוורב שלשם אוֹץשׁשְנוי, שְאֹדוּ פֿסת וֹא דערשי, שְמִּדוּ בֹב ביי ταυτα γέγουεν αλλ' αόραθον είδός τι κ) άμορΦου, σανδεχές μεταλαμδάνου δι απορώταλά πη τω νοητώ, κά durahuroralor auro heyorles, & devoquela .- Let us therefore fay that THE MOTHER and RECEPTACLE of every visible, nay of every sensible Production, is neither Earth, nor Air, nor Fire, nor Water, nor any of the things which arise out of these, nor out of which these arife, but a certain INVISIBLE AND FORMLESS BE-ING, THE UNIVERSAL RECIPIENT; concerning which Being, if we fay it is in a very dubious way intelligible, and something most hard to be apprehended, we shall not speak a falfbood. Plat. Tim. p. 51. Edit. Serr.

Ch.IV. to the Statue, the Marble to the Pillar, the Timber to the Ship, or any one ferendary Matter to any one peculiar Form; so is the First and Original Matter to all Forms in general (i).

AND

(i) The Method of reasoning on this Subject by Analogy was used by Aristotle.— n δ' υποκειμένη Φύσεις ἐπιςπτὰ κατὰ ἀναλογίαν ὡς γὰρ πρὸς ἀνδριάνλα χαλκὸς, ἡ πρὸς κλίνην ξύλον, ἡ πρὸς τῶν ἄλλων το τῶν ἐχόθων μορΦὰν ἡ ῦλη κὰ τὸ ἄμορΦον ἔχει, κὰ τὸ τοῦς τὴν μορΦάν ἄτως αῦτη πρὸς ἐσίαν ἔχει, κὰ τὸ τόδε τι, κὰ τὸ ὅν. Phys. 1. i. c. 7. p. 20. Εdit. Silb.— The Sabjett—Nature, (that is, the PRIMARY MATTER) is knowable in the way of Analogy: for as is the Brass to the Statue; the Timber to the Brd; or the immediate and formless Material to any of those things which have Form, before it assumes that Form; so is this [general and primary] Matter to Substance, and to each particular Being.

Not that Ariflotle rejected the Argument from AB-STRACTION.—Aiya & UAN n xal abrin pite the pite wood, pite addo puder deviat of were to or Str yap ti, xal & xalnyopeital thru thase, & to enval trepor, n tap xalnyopein train—I mean by MAT-TER, that which of itself is not denominated either this particular Substance, or that particular Quantity, or any other of those Attributes, by which Being is characterised. And here, if a Digression may be per-Ch.IV. mitted, let us ressect for a moment on the character of old Proteus.

Omnia

It is indeed that, of which each one of those is predicated, and subject has an Essaye in severy one of the Predicaments. Maraph. Z. p. 106. Edit. Sylb.

And here we may observe, that as ABSTRACTION and ANALOGY are the two Methods, by which this frange Being (as it has been called) was investigated by the aricient Philosophers, so for that reason Timeustolls us, that it was made known to us deliamed to by a spurious kind of Reasoning, p. 545.—Plato says the same, only he is more full.—Matter, according to him, was per armothers arrow, dogstone time to be fully another than to be believed, and that by means of a spurious kind of reasoning. Tim. Plat. p. 52. Edit. Serr.

This spurious Reasoning is emplained by Timaus, who says that MATTER is so comprehended To minu nat extunction voticed, by it's not being understood in a direct way, but only obliquely, and by implication. Opusc. Mys.'s. Gale, p. 545.

As to the being tangible without Sensation, this means, that though it be an effential to Body, which appears to make it tangible, yet the Abstraction makes it stand under the same character to the Touch, as Darkness shands to the Sight, Silence to the Hearing; we cannot be said to see the one, nor to hear the other; and yet without the help of those two Senses we could have no Compre-

Ch.IV. Omnia transformat sesse in miracula rerum,
Ignemque, horribilemque feram, suviumque liquentem. Georg. IV.

Thus VIRGIL - thus, before him, Homer:

Πάντα δε γιγνόμενος ωειρήσεται, όσο επί γαῖαν Ερπετα γίνοναι, κὰ ὖδως, κὰ Θεσπιδαίς ωῦς. Οδυσ. Δ. 417.

Made into all things, all he'll try; become Each living thing, that creeps on earth; will glide

A liquid Stream, or blaze a flaming Fire (k).

Comprehension of those two Negations, or perhaps more properly, those two sensible Privations.

Both Timeus and Plate drop expressions, as if they considered MATTER to be PLACE. Timeus calls it τόπ and χώρα; Plate calls it χώρα and εδρα. Ορυςί. Myth. p. 544. Plat. Tim. p. 52.

Chalcidius elegantly shews, how in this negative manner it attends all the Predicaments, and serves for a support to each. Essentia est, ut opinor, cum eam Species, &c. See Com. in Tim. p. 438.

(k) To the Poets here quoted may be added Herace Sat. lib. ii. S. 3. v. 73. Ovid. Metam. viii. 730.

WHAT

WHAT wonder, if this fingular Deity Ch.IV. fuggest to us that fingular Being, which we have been just attempting to describe? The Allegory was too obvious to escape the Writers of any age, and there are many, we find, by whom it has been adopted (1).

That great Parent of Mythology as well as Poetry, Homer, not only informs us concerning PROTEUS, but concerning his daughter EIDOTHEA, who discovered her father's abode.

We shall perceive in the Explanations which follow, how this Fable applies itself to the Subject of the present Chapter.

(1) Some, fays Euflathius, when he comments the passage above cited from Homer, hold "PROTEUS to " be that original MATTER, which is the Receptacle of " Forms; that, which being IN ACTUALITY NO ONE " of these Forms, is yet IN CAPACITY all of them-" which Proteus (they add) Eldothea his 44 Daughter is elegantly said to discover, by leading him es forth out of Capacity into Actuality; that is, the is that " PRINCIPLE OF MOTION, which contributed to make bim Rush into Form, and be moved and actuated.

Heraclides Ponticus having adopted the same Method of explaining, subjoins-" that hence it was with " goed reason, that the FORMLESS MATTER was called " PROTEUS; and that PROVIDENCE, which modified eacb

PHILOSOPHICAL

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" each Being with it's peculiar Form and Character, was called EIDOTHEA."

Τhe words of Eustathius in the original are—
ΠΡΩΤΕΑ την ωρωτόγονον είναι ύλην, την των είδων δεχάδα, την ενερεεία μεν ώσαν μηδεν των είδων, δυνάμει δὲ τὰ ωάνδα— ον δη Πρωτέα καλως λέγειαι ή ΕΙ-ΔΟΘΕΑ εκφαίνειν, διὰ της έκ τὰ δυνάμει εἰς την ενίργειαν ωροαίωγης. ήγων ή κίνησις, η ΕΙΣ ΕΙΔΟΣ ΘΕΕΙΝ αὐτόν, κὸ κινείσθαι μηχανωμένη. Ευβαίλ. in Hom. Odyff. p. 177. Edit. Bofil.

We shall only remark, as we proceed, that the Etymology here given of EIDOTHEA, eic eid I Sein, to rush into Form, is invented, like many other ancient Etymologies, more to explain the word philosophically, than to give us it's real origin. 'Tis perhaps more profitable, though not equally critical, to etymologize after this manner; and such appears to have been the common practice of Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics.

The words of Heraclides are—ως εὐλοίου, την μέν ἄμοςΦου ΰλην ΠΡΩΤΕΑ καλεῖσθαι, την δ' εἰδωλοπλας ήσασαν ἕκας α Πρόνοιαν ΕΙΔΟΘΕΑΝ. Heraclid. Pontic. p. 490. Gale's Opusc. Mythog. 8vo.

To these Greeks may be subjoined a respectable Countryman of our own.

Lord Verulam tells us of Proteus, that he had his Herd of Seals, or Sea-calwes; that these twas his Conftom every day to tell over, and then to retire into a Cavern, and repose himself. Of this we read the following Explanation—" that under the Person of Proteus is signified Matter, the most ancient of all Things, " next

next to the Deity—that the Herd of Proteus was nothing else, than the ordinary SPECIES of Animals, Plants, and Metals, into which MATTER appears to diffuse, and as it were to consume itself; so that after it has formed and finished those several Species (it's task being in a manner complete) it appears to skep and he at rest, nor to labour at; attempt, or prepare any Spesies farther." De Sapientia Vet. C. 13.

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The Author's own words are—sub Protei enim persona Materia significatur, omnium rerum post Deum antiquissima.—Pecus autem, sive Grex Protei non aliud videtur esse, quam Species ardinariae Animalium. Plantarum, Metallorum, in quibus Moteria videtur se disfundere, et quasi consumere; adeo ut, postquam istas Species essinariat, et absolverit, (tanquam penso completo) dormire et quiescere videatur, nec alias amplius Species moliri, tentare, aut parare.

G₂ CHAP.

CHAP V.

Concerning FORM—An imperfect Description of it—Primary Forms, united with Matter, make Body—Body Mathematical—Body Physical—how they differ—Esential Forms—Transition to Forms of a Character Superior to the passive and elementary.

Ch. V. PORM is that elementary Constituent in every composite Substance, by which it is DISTINGUISHED and CHARACTER-IZED, and known from every other (a). But to be more explicit.

THE first and most simple of all Extensions is a Line. This, when it exists united with a second Extension, makes a Superficies; and these two, existing to-

gether

⁽a) See the first Note in the preceding Chapter, and page 91.

gether with a third, make a Solid. Now Ch. V. this last and complete EXTENSION we call the first and simplest Form; and when this first and simplest Form accedes to the first and simplest Matter, the Union of the two produces Body, which is for that reason defined to be Matter triply extended. And thus we behold the rise of pure and original Body (b).

IT

Hence it is, that Ammonius, speaking of the first Matter, says—αυτη το, εξωκωθείσα κατα τας τρείς διας άσεις, ωοιεί το δεύτερον αποιον σωμα—Fbis [that is, the first Matter] being embulked with three extensions, makes the second Matter or Subject, that is to say, Body void of Quality.

After having shewn how natural Qualities and Attributes stood in need of such a Subject for their existence, he adds (which is worth remarking)—ex other worte every sia in und assumates, in suma anomal and anomal and the extension with a superior of the superior of the

⁽b) Original Body, when we look downwards, has reference to the primary Matter, it's Substratum; when we look upwards, becomes itself a υλη, or Matter to other things; to the Elements as commonly called, Air, Earth, Water, &c. and in consequence, to all the variety of natural Productions.

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It must be remembered however, that Body under this character is something indefinite and vague, and scarcely to be made an Object of scientific Contemplation. 'Tis necessary to this end, that it's Extension should be bounded; for as yet we have treated it without such regard. Now the Bound or Limit of Simple Body is Figure; and thus it is that Figure, with regard to Body, becomes the next Form after Extension.

In Body thus bounded by Figure, every other of it's Attributes being abstracted and withdrawn, we behold that Species of Body, called Body MATHEMATICAL; a name so given it, because the Mathematician, as such, considers no other At-

τη ἐπινοία διαιρᾶντες ταῦτα, τὰ τη Φύσει ἀχώριςα—
not that there ever was IN ACTUALITY either Matter
without Body, or Body without Quality; but we say so,
as we contemplate the quell ordered Generation of things,
dividing these things in Imagination, which are by Nature
injeparable. Animon in Præd. p. 62. See below, p.
90, 91.

tributes of Body, except it be these two Ch. V. Primary, it's Extension and it's Figure (c).

But though the bounding of Body by Figure is one step towards rendering it more definite and knowable, yet is not this sufficient for the purposes of Nature. 'Tis necessary here, that not only it's External should be duly bounded, but that a suitable regard should be likewise had to it's Internal. This internal Adjustment, Disposition, or Arrangement

G 4

(deno-



⁽c) In Body Mathematical all Qualities being abstracted but Figure and Extension, we may hence perceive the reason why the Contemplation of such Body (which Contemplation makes so large a part of the Mathematical Sciences) is more accurate and certain, than that of any other Body. It is, because of all Bodies, Mathematical Body has the fewest, the most obvious, and the most precise Attributes.

Hence too we may perceive the difference between a Mathematician, and a natural Philosopher. They differ, as their Subjects differ; as the Subject of the first is simple; of the last is complicated; as the Attributes of Mathematical Body are few and known; of Physical Body are unknown and infinite. Vid. Arist. Phys. 1. ii. c. 2.

Gh. V. (depominate it as you please) is called ORGANIZATION, and may be confidered as the third Form, which appertains to By it's accession we behold the rife of Body Physical or Natural, for every fuch Body is some way or other organized,

> AND thus may we affirm that these three, that is to say, Extension, Fi-GURE, and ORGANIZATION, are the three original Forms to Body Phy-SICAL OF NATURAL, Figure having respect to it's External; Organization to it's Internal; and Extension being common both to one and to the other. 'Tis more than probable that from the Variation in these universal, and, as I may fay, Primary Forms, arise most of those fecandary Forms usually called QUALI-TIES SENSIBLE, because they are the proper Objects of our several Sensations. Such are Roughness and Smoothness, Hardness and Softness, the tribes of Colours,

ARRANGEMENTS.

lours, Savours and Odours, not to men. Ch. V. tion those Powers of Character more fubtle, the Powers Electric, Magnetic, Medicinal, &c.

HERE therefore we may answer the Question, how natural Bodies are difinguished. Not a single one among them confifts of Materials in Chaos, but of Materials wrought up after the most exquifite manner, and that conspicuous in their Organization (d), or in their Figure, or in both.

As therefore every natural Body is diftinguished by the Differences just described; and as these Differences have nothing to do with the original Matter, which being every where similar, can afford no distinctions at all: may we not

hence

⁽d) No where perhaps is the force of Organization more conspicuous, than when we perceive different Grafts, upon the fame Tree, to produce different Species of Fruit.

Ch. V. hence infer the expediency of Essen-TIAL FORMS, that every natural Substance may be essentially characterized? 'Tis with deference to my Contemporaries, that I surmise this affertion. I speak perhaps of Spectres, as shocking to some Philosophers, as those were to Eneas, which he met in his way to Hell:

Terribiles visu Formæ.

Yet we hope to make our peace, by declaring it our opinion, that we by no means think these Forms SELF-EXIST-ENT; things, which Matter may slip off, and fairly leave to themselves,

Ut veteres ponunt tunicas æstate cicadæ (e.)

They rather mean fomething, which, though differing from Matter, can yet never fubfist without it (f); something,


⁽e) Lucr. iv. 56.

⁽f) See Note the fecond of this Chapter. Tis a uniform Polition in the Phylics of the old Peripatetics,

which, united with it, helps to produce Ch. V, every compessive Being, that is to say in other words, every natural Substance in the visible world.

IT must be remembered however (as we have said before) that it is the Form in this Union, which is the Source of all Distinction*. 'Tis by this, that the Ox is distinguished from the Horse, not by that Grass, on which they subsist, the common Matter to both. To which also may be added, that as Figures and sensible Qualities are the only objects of our Sensations, and these all are Parts of natural Form; so therefore (contrary to the

fentiment



tetics, ὅτι ἀχώρις κ τὰ τὰθη, that the Affections [of Body] are inseparable from it. See Arift. Phys. l. i. Tis one thing to be a Cube, another thing to be Iron, or Silver, or Wood, or Ivory. The Cube is most evidently and certainly no one of these, yet is it absurd and impossible to suppose the Cube should ever exist without one of these, or something similar to support it. See before, pages 77, 78.

^{*} P. 63. 84.

Ch. V. sentiment of the Vulgar, who dream of nothing but of Matter) 'tis Farm which is in truth the whole, that we either hear, see, or feel; nor is mere Matter any thing better, than an obscure imperfect Being, knowable only to the reasoning Faculty by the two methods already explained, I mean that of Analogy, and that of Abstraction (g).

> HERE therefore we conclude with respect to Sensible Forms, that is to say, Forms immerged in Matter, and ever inseparable from it. In these and Matter we place the Elements of (h) Na-

TURAL

⁽g) See before p. 76, 77, 78.

⁽b) ELEMENTS are ta inumaexerla airia, the inberent, or (if I may use the expression) the in-existing Caufes, fuch as MATTER and FORM, of which we have been treating. There are other Causes, such as the Tribe of Efficient Causes, which cannot be called Elements, because they make no part of the Substances, which they generate, or produce. Thus the Statuary is no part of his Statue; the Painter, of his Picture.

TURAL SUBSTANCE, and thus finish the Ch. V. first part of the Inquiry we proposed.

We are now to engage in Speculations of another kind, and from the Elements of Natural Substance to inquire after it's EFFICIENT CAUSE (2), that is to say, that

Picture. Hence it appears that ALL ELEMENTS are Coufes; but flot ALL CAUSES, Elements.

(i) Aristotle having reduced his three Principles of matural Productions to two, which two we have treated in this, and the preceding Chapter, adheres not so strictly to this Reduction, but that he still admits the Three.—Thus in his Metaphysics, he tells us-ors aie ais tesis, to sid , n , fephois n n unn that the Form, the Privation, and the Matter, are three PRINCIPLES. He calls them ELEMENTS, because they have no Existence, but in the Substance to which they belong. To these he adds the Efficient Cause, which as it exists externally, that is, without the Subject, he will not for that reason allow to be an Element. — Hence be observes, wes Etolysia mir toia, aitial de majeyai riscapis - that the ELEMENTS were THREE; the CAUSES and PRINCIPLES were Pour. His instances are-Heath, the Form; Disease, the Privation; the human Body, the Subject. In these three Causes we have the ELEMENTS: Add to these Causes the fourth, that

Ch. V. that Cause, which associates those Elements, and which employs them, when associated, according to their various and peculiar Characters.

that is, the Efficient, the Art of Medicine; and them we have THE FOUR CAUSES required.—Again—call the Plan of the House, the Form; the previous want of Order, the Privation; the Bricks, the Materials; add to these the fourth Cause, the Architect's Art, and again we have THE FOUR CAUSES required. Metaph. A. p. 198, 199. Edit. Sylb.

"Tis this Efficient Cause, that will make the Subject of the following Chapter.

E. Print

CHAP.

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H A P. VÍ.

Concerning FORM, confidered as an EF-FICIENT ANIMATING PRINCIPLE-Harmony in Nature between the living and the lifeless-Ovid, a philosophical Poet-Farther Description of the animating Principle from it's Operations, Energies, and Effects-Virgil-The Active and the Passive Principle run thro' the Universe-Mind, Region of Forms -Corporeal Connections, where necesfary, where obstructive - Means and Ends-their different Precedence according to different Systems-Empedocles, Lucretius, Prior, Galen, Cicero, Arifotle, &c .- Providence.

ET us suppose an artificial Sub- Ch.VI. I stance, for example a musical Pipe, and let us suppose to this Pipe the Art of the Piper to be united, not separated

as now, but vitally united, so that the Pipe by it's own Election might play, whenever it pleased.—Would not this Union render it a kind of living Being, where the Art would be an active Principle, the Pipe a passive, both reciprocally fitted for the purposes of each other? -And what, if instead of the Piper's Art, we were to substitute that of the Harper?—Would this new Union also be natural like the former? Or would not rather the Inaptitude of the Constituents prevent any Union at all? It certainly would prevent it, and all Melody consequent; so that we could now by no analogy confider the Pipe as animated.

'Tis in these and other Arts, considered as efficient Habits, we gain a glimpse of those Forms, which characterise not by visible Qualities, but by their respective Powers, their Operations and their Energies. As is the Piper's Art to the Pipe, the Harper's to the Harp,

Leonine, the Soul of Man to the Body
Human; because in neither case 'tis possible to commute or make an exchange, without subverting the very End and Constitution of the Animal (a).

AND thus are we arrived at a new order of Forms, the tribe of animating Principles (b); for there is nothing which distin-

⁽a) See Arist. de An. 1. i. c. 3. p. 13. Edit. Sylb.

The Stagirite uses upon this occasion the following Similitude— παραπλήσιον γαρ λίγωσιν, ωσπερ εί τις Φαίη την τεκιονικήν είς αὐλυς ενδύεσθαι δεί γαρ την μεν τεχνήν χρησθαι τοῖς δργάνοις, την δε ψυχήν τω σώματι—They [who adopt the Notion of placing any Soul in any Body] talk the same, as if a Person was to say the Carpenter's Art might enter into a Musician's Pipe: now 'tis necessary that every Art should use it's proper Instruments, and every Soul it's proper Body.

⁽b) Alexander Aphrodisiens has an express Differtation to prove, on its if it is in the soul is a Form. Alex. p. 124. B. Edit. Ald. Ven. 1534. It was so called, not with the least view to it's having a H

Ch.VI. distinguishes so eminently as these; and 'tis, on the power of Distinction, that we rest the very Essence of Form.

Tis here we view Form in a higher and nobler light, than in that of a paffive elementary Constituent, a mere inactive and sensible Attribute. 'Tis here it assumes the dignity of a living motive Power, of a Power destined by it's nature to use, and not be used. 'Tis to the Diversity of Powers in these animating Forms, that the Diversity of the Organizations in the corporeal World has reference. That strong and nervous Leg, so well armed with tearing

Fangs,



Figure, as if, for example, it were a Spherical Body; but because it was able not only by it's perceptive Powers to secrete Forms, but by it's productive Powers to impart them; whence, being considered as full of them, it was elegantly described to be $\tau \circ \pi \odot \to \text{Eidon}$, the Region of Forms. Arish. de Anim. 1. iii. c. 4.—See also 1. ii. c. 1.

[:] See Hermes, p. 310, 311, 312, &c.

Fangs, how perfectly is it correspondent Ch.VI. to the fierce Instincts of the Lion? Had it been adorned, like the Human Arm. with Fingers instead of Fangs, the natural Energies of a Lion had been all of them defeated. That more delicate structure of an Arm, terminating in Fingers fo nicely diversified, how perfectly does it correspond to the pregnant Invention of the human Soul? Had these Fingers been Fangs, what had become of poor Art, that by her Operations procures us fo many Elegancies and Utilities? 'Tis here we behold the Harmony between the Visible World and the Invifible: between the Passive and the Active; between the Lifeless and the Living. The whole Variety in Bodies as well natural as artificial, is folely referable to the previous Variety in these their 'Tis for the fake of animating Forms. these they exist; 'tis by these they are employed; and without them they would H 2 be

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Ch.VI. be as useless, as the Shoe without the Foot.

'Twas perhaps owing to this use of the word Form, in order to denote an animating Principle, that the Poet Ovid (who appears by his works not unacquainted with Philosophy) opens his Metamorphosis with those lines, so perplexing to his Commentators.

In nova fert Animus mutatas dicere.
Formas

CORPORA

"" My Mind (says he) carries me to tell of Forms changed into NEW BODIES;" not of Bodies changed into new Forms, but of Forms, that is to say, Souls, transferred into NEW BODIES. The Bodies it seems were new, but the Souls or Forms remained the same, of which throughout his Work we have perpetual testimony. Thus, when he speaks of Callisto,

Ch.IV.

Mens antiqua tamen facta quoque manfit in ursa. Metam. ii. 485.

Of Arachne,

Antiquas exercet Aranea telas. İbid. vi. 145.

Of the Ants, that became Men,

Mores, quos ante gerebant, Nunc quoque habent; parcumque genus, patiensque laborum. Ibid. vii. 656.

And so in many other places (e), which those who favour this Conjecture, may easily discover.

organização oxíle

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⁽c) Ovid appears by these quotations to have used the word FORMA, when he opens his Poem, in a sense truly Philosophical. His Doctrine, that this Form or Soul might be transferred from one Body into another was PYTHAGOREAN, but which the PERIPATETICS rejected from the reasons above alleged, in the sirst Note of this Chapter.

Ch.VI.

As nothing can become known by that, which it has not, so it would be abfurd to attempt describing these animating Forms by any vifible or other Qualities, the proper Objects of our Sensations. The Sculptor's Art is not Figure, but 'tis that, through which Figure is imparted to fomething else. The Harper's Art is not Sound, but 'tis that, through which Sounds are called forth from fomething elfe. They are of themselves no objects either of the Ear or of the Eye; but their nature or character is understood in this, that were they never to exert their proper Energies on their proper Subjects, the Marble would remain for ever shapeless, the Harp would remain for ever filent (d).

'Tis

⁽d) See Maximus Tyrius, Diff. I. who eloquently applies this Reasoning to the Supreme Being, the Divine Artist of the Universe—Εί δι κρ νῦν πόνη μαθείν ἐρᾶς τὰν ἐκείνε Φύσιν, πῶς τίς κυτὰν διηγήσηται; καλὸν μὲν γὰρ είναι τὸν θεὸν, κρ τῶν καλῶν τὸ Φανώ-

"Its the same in natural Beings (e). Ch.VF. The Animating Form of a natural Body is neither it's Organization, nor it's Figure, nor any other of those inferior Forms, which make up the System of

τατον αλλ' ε σώμα καλόν, αλλ' όθεν κή το σώματε έπιβρεί το κάλλο. εξέ λειμών καλός, άλλ όβεν κό ό λειμών καλός κ ω ωριαμέ κάλλο, κ θαλάτης, κ έρανε, κὶ τῶν ἐν έρανῷ Βέῶν, τῶν τὸ κάλλον τέτο ἔ-นะเชียง per, olov in ซากากิร ฉัยงงณ์ชา ห) ฉันทอล์ซช หลิย์เรื่อง αυτέ μετέχεν έκαςα, καλά, κ έδραία, κ σωζόμενα κ) καθόσου αὐτε ἀπολείπεται, αίχρα, κ) διαλυόμενα, 2 Φθειεόμενα.—But if even now you wish to learn the nuture of this Sovereign Being, after what manner shall any one be able to explain it? DIVINITY itself is furely beauteous, and of all Beauties, &c. &c.

Those, who chuse to see the remaining part of this elegant original, elegantly translated, may find it in the second Volume of Lord Shaftesbury's Characteristics, p. 295.

(e) Here an attempt is made to explain the three great Principles of the Sour, anciently called to νοητικου, το αίσθητικου, το θρεπικου, the Intellective, the Sensitive, and the Nutritive. The Nutritive is treated first, then the Sensitive, then the Intellective.

See below, note on the word Intellective, p. 106,

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it's



Ch. VI. it's visible Qualities; but 'tis the Power, which, not being that Organization, nor that Figure, nor those Qualities, is yet able to produce, to preserve, and to em-'Tis therefore the Power, ploy them. which first moves, and then conducts that latent Process, by which the Acorn becomes an Oak, the Embryo becomes a Man. 'Tis the Power, by which the Aliment of Plants and Animals is digested, and by such digestion transformed into a part of themselves. Power, as oft as the Body is either mutilated or fick, that co-operates with the Medicine in effecting the Cure. 'Tis the Power, which departing, the Body ceases to live, and the Members foon pass into putrefaction and decay.

FARTHER still, as putrefaction and decay will necessarily come, and Nature would be at an end, were she not maintained by a supply; it is therefore the Power, that enables every Being to produce

duce another like itself, the Lion to pro-Ch.VI. duce a Lion, the Oak to produce an Oak; so that, while Individuals perish, the Species still remains, and THE Cor-RUPTIBLE, as far as may be, PARTAKES OF THE ETERNAL AND DIVINE (f).

IN

(f) This ETERNAL and DIVINE is what, as Ariftotle says, all Beings desire, and for the sake of which they att whatever they att agreeably to Nature. Πάντα γαρ ἐκείνε (scil. τε ἀεὶ κὸ τε θείε) ὀρέγελαι, κακείνε ἔνεκα ωράτλει ὅσα κατὰ Φύσιν ωράτλει. De Anim. l. ii. c. 4. p. 28. Edit. Sylb.

Immediately afterwards he subjoins the sollowing remarkable passage, by which he appears to refer the whole System of natural Production or Generation to that one great Principle.—ἐπεὶ ἐν κοινωνεῖν ἀδυνατεῖ τὰ ἀεὶ κὴ τὰ βείν τὰ συνεχεία, διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἐνδέχεσθαι τῶν Φθαρτῶν τὸ αὐτὸ κὰ ἐν ἀριθμῶ διαμένειν, ἢ μετί-χειν δύναται ἔκαςον, ταύτη κοινωνεῖ, τὸ μὲν μᾶλλον, τὸ δι πτίον κὴ διαμένει ἐκ αὐτὸ, ἀλλ' οἶον αὐτό ἀ-ριθμῷ μὲν ἐχ ἐν, είδει δι ἔν.—In as much therefore as these Beings (meaning the subordinate and inferior) cannot participate of the ETERNAL and the DIVINE in uninterrupted Continuity, from it's being impossible that any thing perishable and transfent should remain the same and one numerically; hence it follows that as far as each ἐs capable of sharing it, so far it participates, one thing

Ch.VI.

In all the Energies here enumerated it extends through Vegetables as well as Animals. But with Animals, taken apart, it is that higher Active Faculty, which, by employing the Organs of Sense, peculiar to them as Animals, distinguishes them as Beings sensitive from Vegetables and Plants. Farther than this, with Man alone above the rest it is that still superior and more noble Faculty, which by it's own divine Vigour, unassisted perhaps with Organs, makes and denominates him a Being Intellective and Rational (g).

AND

in a greater degree, and another in a less; and that each thing remains not precisely the same, but as it were the same, not NUMERICALLY ONE, but ONE IN SPECIES.

To this Virgil alludes,

At GENUS IMMORTALE manet-

Georg. iv.

See Plat. Conviv. p. 1197. C. Ed. Fic.

(g) Των δε δυνάμεων της ψυχης αι λεχθείσαι τοςς τιεν ενυπάρχεσι πασαι, καθάπερ είπομεν, τοίς δε τιAND so much for the description of Ch.VI: those Forms, which, being purely invi-

vès auron, iviois de mia morn.—As to the Powers of the Soul here described, they exist all of them in some Beings; some of them only in other Beings; and in some Beings only one of them. Arist. de An. 1. ii. c. 3. p. 26. Edit. Sylb. That is to say, Man possesses all; Brutes possess some; Plants, one only—Man has the Vegetative, the Sensitive, and the Intellective Faculty; Brutes only the Vegetative and the Sensitive; Plants, the Vegetative alone.

See soon after, p. 28-aven met yag vu Spenling u. r. d.

Ideoque ob confortium corporis est inter homines, bestiosque, et cetæra vità carentia, Societas communicque corpercorum proventuum. Siquidem NASCI, NUTRIRI, CRESCERE commune est bominibus cum cæteris; SEN-TIRE vero BT APPETERE, commune demum hominibus et mutis tantum, et ratione carentibus animalibus. Cu-PIDITAS porro atque IRACUNDIA vel agressium vel manfuetorum, APPETITUS IRRATIONABILIS eft : Hominis vero, cujus est proprium rationi mentem applicare, RATIONABILIS: RATIOCINANDI enim atque IN-TELLIGENDI, SCIENDIQUE VERUM APPETITUS preprius est Hominis, quia a cupiditate atque iracundia plurimum distat. Illa quippe etiam in mutis animalibus, et multo quidem acriore, cernuntur: BATIONIS autem PERFECTIO et INTELLECTUS, propria DEI et Ho-MINIS tantum. Chalcid. in Plat. Tim. p. 345. Edit. Fabric.

fible,



Ch.VI. fible, and (it may be faid) totally insenfible, are no otherwise to be known, Consciousness alone excepted, than by sensible Operations and Energies (h), perceived in things corporeal.

(b) See the Passage just before quoted from Maximus Tyrius. Nothing can be of greater importance, than a due attention to this Distinction; I mean the Distinction between Effects and Causes; between Effects which are visible, and Causes which are invisible; between Effects, the natural Objects of all our Sensations; and Causes, which are Objects of no Sensation at all.

'Tis with reference to this Diftinction that Cyrus is made to reason in his last moments by Xenophen, his philosophical Historian, who thus describes him addressing his Children.

Οὐ γὰρ δήπε τετό γε σαφῶς δοκεῖτε εἰδίναι, ὡς ἐδὶν ἔσομαι ἐγω ἔτι, ἐπειδαν τε ἀνθρωπίνε βία τελευτήσω:
ἐδὲ γὰρ νῦν τοι τήν γ' ἐμην ψυχην ἐωρᾶτε, ἀλλ' οῖς
διεπράτετο, τέτοις αὐτην ὡς ἔσαν κατεφωρᾶτε—
Thus excellently translated by my honourable Relation, Mr. Affley.—You ought not to imagine you certainly know, that, after I have closed the period of Human Life, I shall no longer exist. For neither do you
NOW see my Soul; but you conclude FROM IT'S OPERATIONS, that it DOES EXIST. Cyropædia, l. viii.

Cicero has translated the same passage with great elegance, but in a manner less strict, less confined to the original.

As in their very Essence they imply Ch.VI. Activity, as much as Matter, upon which they operate, implies Passivity; hence in every natural Composite, we may discern the influence of two fuch Principles, while, under different Proportions, and in different Degrees, THE ACTIVE enlivens the Passive, and THE PASSIVE depresses the Active.

'Tis to this that VIRGIL nobly alludes, when he tells us, that to every enlivened fubstance, every animated Being, there was something appertaining of etherial

Vigour,

Nolite arbitrari O! mihi carissimi filii, me, cum a vebis discessero, nusquam aut nullum fere; nec enim, dum eram vobiscum, animum meum videbatis, sed cum esset in hoc corpore, EX IIS REBUS, QUAS GEREBAM, intelligebatis : eundem igitur effe creditote, etiams; nullum videbitis. De Seneet. c. 22.

Nothing is more certain than that many things, which have no sensible Qualities, may be described accurately, and comprehended adequately, by their Energies and Operations upon sensible Objects.

Ch.VI. Vigour, and heavenly Origin, as far forth as not retarded by it's mortal and earthly Members.

IGNEUS eft ollis VIGOR, et CÆLESTIS

Seminibus, quantum nox noxia corpora TARDANT,

Terrenique hebetant Artus, moribundaque membra. Æn. VI.

Could we penetrate that Mist, which hides so much from human Eyes, and sollow these Composites to their different and original Principles, we might gain perhaps a glimpse of two objects worth contemplating; of that which is First, and that which is Last, in the general Order of Being; of pure Energy in the Supreme Mind, the sirst Mover of all Efficients; of pure Passivity in the lowest Matter, the ultimate Basis of all subjects (i).

⁽i) Thus the Stoics—dones δ' αυτοίς άρχας είναν των όλων δύος το ποιών κό το πάχου. το μέν έν πά-

Bur lest these should be esteemed Ch.VI. Speculations rather foreign, 'tis sufficient

צפי בנימו דחי מדים בסומי בסומי, דחי טאחי, דם לב שפוצי, דפי έν αυτή λόγον, του Stov.—Their opinion is, that the Principles of all things are two, THE ACTIVE Principle and THE PASSIVE; that the Passive Principle is that Substance void of all Quality, MATTER; the Active Principle, that Reason, which exists within it, GoD. Diog. Laert. vii. 134.

The following Passage from Ammenius is remarkable, and well applies to the present Subject.-Διο Φασί την ύλην το θείω ανομοίως ωμοιώσθαι ωμοιώσθαι μέν, ότι δι' αποΦάσεως των άλλων σημαίνεται εκάτερου, ανομοίως δε, ετι τε μέν, κρείτθου οντ 🕒, ล κατα σάντα τὰ δυτα, ἐποΦάσκομεν σάντα, της δε υλης, χείρου 🕒 έσης η κατά ωάντα, ταυτα άποΦάσκομεν.—For this reason they say that MATTER is DISSIMILARLY SIMILAR to the DIVINITY; is SIMI-LAR, because each of them is explained by a Negation of all other things; DISSIMILARLY so, in as much as we deny all things of the Divinity, by it's being better than all things; we deny them of Matter, by it's being worse. Ammon, in Prædic. p. 50. B.

Archetas thus expresses himself in his Doric Dialect.

Το μέν έντι ωσιέου, το δε ωάχου οίου έν τοις Φυσικοίς ωριέον μέν ο θεός, ωάχον δε ά ύλα, κ ωριέον ×

Ch.VI. to mark the Analogy between things Nda tural and Artificial; how, that as there are no Forms of Art, which did not pre-exist in the Mind of Man, so there no Forms of Nature, which did not pre-exist in the Mind of God. through this we comprehend, how MIND or Intellect is the Region

> n) wayor, τα ςοιχεία.—There is something, which is AGENT; and something, which is PATIENT; thus among natural Beings GOD is the AGENT; MATTER the PATIENT; but the ELEMENTS are both Agent and Patient united.


> Upon this Simplicius observes- Σαφές δε οντω τέ λεγομένε, ωαραδείγματα άρχηΓικώτατα ωαρέθετο, काराहाँ महेर परेर प्रहार हांसक्षेत्र, के मी पर्व वैतेत्रव पर्व काली सर्व क्रीमाळ उपमध्यस्यता, क्रबंबुद्धाः वैदे मारे प्रथमा, वी मेर मे मेरे αλλα μετέχει τε υάχειν, κ ωσιείν δε κ ωάχειν τά σοιχεία, ώσαν δη μετέχουτα κο υλης κο είδυς.-The' what has been faid is evident, he has adduced (to explain himself) the two bighest and most leading Inflances, faying, that GOD is AGENT, whom all other Active Causes follow; and MATTER PATIENT, thre' which other Beings partake of Passion; and that the ELEMENTS are both AGENTS and PATIENTS, in at much as they participate both of Matter and of Form. Simpl. in Prad. p. 84. Edit. Bafil. 1551.

> > FORMS.

FORMS (k), in a far more noble and ex-Ch.VI. alted sense, than by being their passive Receptacle through Impressions from Objects without. It is their Region, not by being the Spot into which they migrate as strangers, but in which they dwell as auroxboves, the original Natives of the Country. Tis in Mind they first exist, before Matter can receive

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them;



⁽k) See Aristotle already quoted, p. 98, in his Tract De Anima iii. 4. p. 57. Edit. Sylb. In the eighth Chapter of the same Book, p. 62, he calls the Soul EIAOS EIAON, THE FORM OF FORMS, and that not only from it's being that fupreme characterising Power, which gives to subordinate Beings their peculiar Form or Character, but as it uses them, when made, agreeably to their respective Natures. In this last acceptation it is the Form of Forms, as the Hand appears to be the Organ of Organs; to be that superior Instrument, which u/cs the rest, the Chissel, the Pencil, the Lyre, &c. all which inferior Organs or Instruments, without this previous and superior one to employ them, would be inefficacious, and dead, and incapable of producing any fingle Effect.—ή ψυχή μοπερ ή χείρ έςι η γαρ ή χείρ βρανόν έςιν δργάνων. Arift. in loc.

Ch.VI.

them (1); 'tis from Mind, when they adorn Matter, that they primarily proceed: fo that, whether we contemplate the works of Art, or the more excellent Works of Nature, all that we look at, as beautiful, or listen to, as harmonious, is the genuine Effluence or EMANATION OF MIND (m).

AND

And

⁽¹⁾ In the Scriptural account of Creation, Light, previously to it's existence, is commanded to exist—
And God faid, LET THERE BE LIGHT, AND THERE WAS LIGHT. So also Vegetables and Animals, previously to their existing, are commanded to exist. Now, whether by these Commands we suppose certain verbal Orders, or (what seems far more probable) only a Divine Volition, respect must need have been had to certain PRE-EXISTING FORMS, else such Words or such Volitions must have been devoid of all Meaning.

⁽m) A proof, that these transcendent Objects are of an Origin truly mental, is, that nothing but MIND or INTELLECT can recognize or comprehend them. And hence it follows that, if this intellective Faculty be wanting, as it is to inserior Animals, or be unhappily debased, as too often happens to our own Species; tho' their sensitive Organs may be exquisite to a degree, yet are such Beings to such Objects, as if they had no Organs at all. Eyes have they, and see not, &c.

And now to recapitulate what we Ch.VI. have said concerning Form. We have traced it's Variety from the Lifeless and Inanimate up to the Living and Animating; from Figures, Colours, and sensible Qualities, up to the Powers only knowable through their Energies and Operations; in other words, from those Forms, which are but passive Elements, up to those, which are Efficient Causes.

EVEN in these active, animating, and efficient Forms, besides the Differences which we have remarked, there is still another worth regarding. Some of them

And hence the meaning of that fine Trochaic Verse in the Sicilian Poet and Philosopher, Epicharmus;

Νες όρα κ νες ακέει τ' άλλα κωφα κ τυφλά.

^{&#}x27;Tis MIND ALONE, that fees, that hears; all things beside are deaf and blind.

Clem. Alex. t. i. p. 442. Edit. Pott. Man. Tyr... Edit. 8vo. p. 12. Edit. 4to. p. 203.

Ch.VI. cannot act without corporeal Connections, while to others such Connections appear to be no way requifite. What for example is the vegetative Power in Plants, without a natural Body for it to nourish and enliven? What the sensitive Powers of hearing or of feeing, without the corporeal Organs of an Ear, or an Eye? These are animating Forms, which though themselves not Body, are yet so far inseparable from it, that were their Connection diffolved, they would be as unable to exert themselves, as the Painter, deprived of his Pencil, or the Harper of his Harp. 'Tis not so with that perceptive Power, UNMIXED AND PURE IN-TELLIGENCE, the Objects of which being purely intelligible, are all congenial with itself. Corporeal Connections appear fo little wanted here, that perhaps 'tis then in it's highest Vigour, when it is wholly separated and detached. 'Tis in this part of our animating Form, that we must look for the Immortal and Di-

VINE :

vine (n); 'tis this indeed is all of it, Ch.VI. that a rational Man would wish to preferve,

(n) O of Nes foiner eysiverθαι, esia τις έσα, n' è φθείρεσθαι—MIND seems to be implanted [into the Body] being a peculiar Substance of itself, and not to be corrupted or to perish (as the Body does). Arist. de An. l. i. c. 4. p. 15—And soon after, when he has told us that the Passions perish with the Body, to which they are inseparably united, he adds—O of Nes iσως θειότερου τι n' απαθές. But the MIND perhaps is something more divine, and free from Passion, or being asted upon.

In another part of the same Work he distinguishes between the original Capacity of the sensitive Part, and that of the Intellective Part: Sensation (he tells us) is impaired by the Violence of Sensible Objects: Excessive Sounds, excessive Light, excessive Smells, prevent us from hearing, from feeing, or from fmelling.-Αλλ' ὁ Νές, όταν τι νοήση σφόδρο νοητόν, έχ ήτλον νοεί τὰ ὑποδείσερα, ἀλλὰ κὸ μᾶλλον το μέν γάρ αίσθητικόυ ώκ ανευ σώμαθο, ο δε Νώς χωρισός.-But MIND, when it contemplates any thing clearly and frongly intelligible, does not for that reason LESS comprebend inferior Objects of Intellection, but even MORE; the Cause is, the SENSITIVE Principle exists not WITH-OUT A BODY (it's Organs being all Bodily); but MIND on the contrary is SEPARABLE AND DETACH-ED. Ibid. 1. iii. c. 4.

Ch, VI. ferve, when he would be rather thankful to find his Passions and his Appetites extinct.

AND

Cyrus, in the Speech attributed to him by Xenephen, and quoted before, p. 108, speaks as follows.

Οὐτοι ἐγωῖε, ὧ ωαιδες, ἐδὲ τῶτο ωώποῖε ἐπείσθην, ώς ἡ ψυχὴ, ἔω μὲν ἄν ἐν Ͽνητῷ Σώμαῖι ἢ, ζἢ ὅταν δὲ τῶτε ἀπαλλαγἢ, τέθνηκεν. Ὁςῷ γὰς, ὅτι κỳ τὰ Ͽνητὰ σώμαῖα, ὅσόν ἄν ἐν αὐτοῖς χρόνον ἢ ἡ ψυχὴ, ζωνία ωαρέχεῖαι. Οὐδέ γε, ὅπως ἄφρων ἔςαι ἡ ψυχὴ, ἐπειδὰν τἔ ἄφρον، σώμαί β δίχα γένηῖαι, ἐδὲ τῶτο ωέπεισμαι ἀλλ ὅταν ἄκραί β κὰ καθαρὸς ὁ τῶς ἐκκριθῆ, τότε κὰ φρονιμώταῖον εἰκὸς αὐτὸν εἶναι. Διαλυομένε δὲ ἀνθρώπε, ὅπλά ἐςιν ἔκαςα ἀπίονῖα ωρὸς τὰ ὁμοφύλον, ωλῆν τῆς ψυχῆς: αὐτη δὲ μόνη ἔτε ωαρῶσα ἔτε ἀπιῶσα ὁρᾶται. Ξενοφ. Κύρε Παιδ. Η. p. 655. Edit: Hutchinfen. 4to. Oxon. 1727.

Thus translated by the abovementioned excellent Translator.

No! Children! I can never be persuaded, that the Soul lives no longer than it dwells in this mortal Body, and that it dies on Separation. For I see that the Soul communicates Vigour and Motion to mortal Bodies, during it's continuance in them. Neither can I be persuaded, that the Soul is divested of Intelligence, on it's Separation from this gross senseles Body; but it is probable, that WHEN THE SOUL IS SEPARATED, it becomes pure and intire,

AND thus having traced the various Ch.VI. order of Forms from the lowest and basest

intire, and is then MORE INTELLIGENT. It is evident, that, on Man's dissolution, every part of him returns to what is of the same nature with itself, except the Soul: THAT ALONE IS INVISIBLE, BOTH DURING IT'S PRESENCE HERE, AND AT IT'S DEPARTURE. Cyropad. p. 326, 327.

Thus translated by Cicero—Mihi quidem nunquam persuaderi potest animos, dum in corporibus essent mortatibus, vivere; cum exissent ex iis, emori: nec vero tum animum esse inspientem, cum ex inspienti corpore evasisset; sed, cum, OMNI ADMIXTIONE CORPORIS LIBERATUS, purus et integer esse cæpisset, tum esse sapientem. Atque etiam, cum hominis natura morte dissolvitur, cæterarum rerum perspicuum est quo quaque discedant; abeunt enim illuc omnia, unde orta sunt: Animus autem 30lus, nec cum adest, nec cum discedit, apparent. De Senestute, cap. 22.

These Speculations of Cyrus may more properly be called the Speculations of Xenophon, who derived them without doubt (as he did the rest of his Philosophy) from his great Master, Socrates. They passed also into other Systems of Philosophy, derived from the same Original; such for example as the Philosophy of Aristotle, who was a hearer and a disciple as well of Socrates as of Piato.

Befides

Ch.VI. basest up to the highest and best, and considered how, though differing, they all agree in this, that they give to every Being it's peculiar and distinctive Character, we shall here conclude our Speculations concerning FORM, the second Species of Substance, and which appears in

Besides what has been offered in the beginning of this Note, the following Remark and Quotation may perhaps inform us farther in the Sentiments of the Stagirite, and his School.

The Human Intellect was supposed by the Peripatetics to be pure and absolute Capacity; to be no particular thing, till it began to comprehend things; nor to be blended with Body, because, if it were, it would have some Quality of Body adhere to it (such as hot, cold, and the like), which Quality would of course obstruct it's operations. On the contrary they held it to receive it's impressions, ωσπερ ἐν γραμματείω, ω μποῦν ὑπάρχει ἐντελεχεία γείραμμένον, as impressions are made in a writing Tablet, where nothing as yet is in actuality written. Aristot. de Animâ, lib. iii. c. 4. p. 58. Edit. Sylb.

But this in the way of digression—'Tis only the short Specimen of an ancient Speculation, which gives us reasons, why the human Intellect can have up Innate Ideas.

part

part to be an Element, in part an Es- Ch.VI. FICIENT CAUSE (0).

AND yet we cannot quit these Speculations, the latter part of them at least, without a few observations on their dignity and importance.

THEIR principal object has been to shew, that in the great intellectual System of the Universe, Means do not lead to Ends, but Ends lead to Means; that it was not the Organization of the Sheep's Body, which produced the gentle instincts of the Sheep; nor that of the Lion's Body, which produced the ferocious Instincts of the Lion (p); but, because in the Divine Oeconomy of the whole, such respective animating and active Principles were wanting, it was

therefore

⁽⁰⁾ See the two last Notes of the preceding Chapter.

⁽p) See before, in the beginning of this Chapter, page 99.

Ch.VI. therefore necessary that they should be furnished with such peculiarly organized Bodies, that they might be enabled to act, and to perform their part, agreeably to their respective natures, and their proper business in the World.

THE ancient System of Atheism supposed the Organs to come first * before any thing farther was thought of; which Organs, being all of them formed fortuitously, some of them luckily answered an end, and others answered none: those that answered, for a while subsisted; those that failed, immediately perished.

greater

^{*} Sec Hermes, p. 392.

greater part of them MADE BY CHANCE. Ch.VI. Soon after this Aristotle proceeds in explaining this strange System—οσε μέν έν άπαν]α συνέξη, ώσπερ κάν ει ένεκα τε εγίγνέ]ο, ταῦτα μὲν ἐσώθη, ἀπὸ τῷ αὐτομάτα συςάντα. επιτηδείως. όσα δε μη έτως, απώλετο κ) απόλλυται, καθάπερ Έμπεδοκλής λέγει τα βυγενή κ ανδρόπρωρα - When therefore these Limbs all co-incided, as if they had been made for the purpose, they were then saved and preserved, having been thus aptly put together by the Operation of CHANCE; but fuch as co-incided not, these were lost, and still [as fast as they arise] are lost; according to what Empedocles says concerning [those monstrous Productions] the Bull Species with Human Heads. Arift. Phyfic. 1. ii. c. 4. 8.

LUCRETIUS advances the same Doctrine, which was indeed suitable to his Ideas of the World's production. The Earth, he tells us in his account of Creation, aimed at the time to create many

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Ch.VI. many portentous Beings, some with strange Faces and Members; others desicient, without either Feet or Hands; but the endeavours were fruitless, for Nature could not support, and carry them on to Maturity.

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Multaque tum Tellus etiam portenta creare

Conata est, mirâ facie, membrisque coorta;
Orba pedum partim, manuum viduata vicissim:

Nequicquam, quoniam Natura absterruit auctum,

Nec potuere cupitum ætatis tangere florem, Nec reperire cibum, &c.

LUCRET. V. 835, &c.

'Tis more expressly in contradiction to the Doctrines inculcated through this whole Tract, that he denies Final Causes; that he holds Eyes were not made for seeing, nor Feet for walking, &c. &c. that he calls such explanations a Ch.VI. preposterous and inverted order, the existence of the Use (according to him) not leading to the production of the Thing, but the CASUAL PRODUCTION of the Thing leading to the existence of the Use.

LUMINA ne facias oculorum clara creata,

Prospicere ut possimus, et, ut proserre viai Proceros passus, ideo, &c.

Cætera de genere boc inter quæcunque pretantur,

Omnia perversa PREPOSTERA sunt ra-

Nil adeo quoniam natum'st in Corpore,

Possimus; sed quod natum'st, id procreat Usus.

LUCRET. IV. 822, 30.

An elegant Poet of our own states this doctrine with his usual humour.

Note:

Ch.VI.

Note here, Lucretius dares to teach
(As all our Youth may learn from CREECH)
That Eyes were made, but could not view,
Nor Hands embrace, nor Feet pursue;
But HEEDLESS Nature did produce
The Members FIRST, and THEN the use:
What each must act, was yet unknown,
Till all was moved by CHANCE alone.

A Man first builds a Country seat,
Then finds the Walls not sit to eat;
Another plants, and wond'ring sees
Nor Books, nor Medals on his Trees.
Tet Poet and Philosopher
Was He, who durst such whims aver.
Blest, for his Sake, be Human Reason,
Which came at last, tho' late, in season.
PRIOR'S Alma, Canto I.

THE Poet had cause to be thankful, that a time came, when Men of Sense opposed Reason to such Sophistry; but the Opposition was not so late, nor so long

long in coming, as he imagined. Galen, Ch.VI. many Centuries ago, in his excellent Treatise De Usu Partium; Cicero, in the best and most conclusive part of his Treatise De Natura Deorum: and before them both, as well as before Lucretius, Aristotle, through every part of his Works, and above all in those respecting the History of the Members, and the Progression of Animals, had inculcated with irrefiftible strength of Argument the great Doctrine of FINAL CAUSES; which if we allow with regard to ourfelves, but deny to Nature, we totally annihilate through the Universe any DI-VINE OF INTELLIGENT PRINCIPLE. For nothing can be Divine, which is not Intelligent; nor any thing Intelligent, which has not a Meaning; nor any Being have a Meaning, which has no Scope, or Final Cause, to govern and direct it's Energies and Operations.

A PAINTER

Ch.VI. A PAINTER, painting a hundred Portraits, succeeds in ninety-nine, and fails in one. We may possibly impute the fingle Failure to Chance; but can we possibly impute to Chance his success in the ninety-nine? How then can we dream of Chance in the Operations of Nature; Operations so much more accurate, tho' withal so much greater, and more numerous, than those of the Painter? Chance is never thought of in that which happens always; nor in that which happens for the most part; but, if any where, in that which happens

unexpectedly and rarely (q).

AND

Twas

⁽q) See Vol. i. p. 267, 8, 9, where the Doctrine of Chance and Fortune is discussed at large upon the Peripatetic Principles, and where an attempt is made to explain that most subtle and ingenious Argument of the Stagirite, by which he proves that Chance and Fortune are so far from supplanting MIND, or an intelligent Principle, that the Existence of the two former necessarily infers the Existence of the latter.

AND so much for those Philosophers, Ch.VI. recorded for having hardily denied a Providence.

THERE are others, who, the' they have not denied one, have yet made Sy/tems, that would do without one; seeming to think concerning the trouble of governing a World, as Queen Dido did of old.

Scilicet is superis labor est; ea cura quietos Sollicitat ?--- (r).

A THIRD fort, with more decency, have neither denied a Providence, nor

Twas confonant to the Reasoning there held, that PLATO, long before, is faid to have called FORTUNE σύμσθωμα Φύσιως ή σροαιρίσιως, a SYMPTOM, er THING CO-INCIDENT either with Nature, or the Human Will. See Suidas in the Word, Einaguern. Plato's Account will be better understood perhaps, by recurring to the Quotation in the former part of this note.

⁽r) Virg. En. iv.

Ch.VI. omitted one; yet have seldom recurred to it, but upon pressing occasions, when difficulties arose, which they either happened to find, or had happened to make. They appear to have conducted themselves by *Horace's* advice;

Nec Deus intersit, nisi dignus vindice nodus (s).

A FOURTH Philosopher remains, and a respectable one he is, who supposes Providential Wisdom never to cease for a fingle moment, and who says to it with reverence, what Ulysses did to Minerva,

<u>żdi</u> σε λήθω Κινύμεν**©**. (t)

—Nor

⁽s) Hor. Art. Poet.

⁽t) Hom. Iliad. 10. v. 279. See Arrian's Epittotus, lib. i. c. 12, both in the Original, and in Mrs. Carter's excellent Translation. See also the Comment of my worthy and learned Friend Upton, on this Chapter, in his valuable Edition of that Author, tom. ii. p. 40, 41. See also Pjalm exxxix.

—Nor can I move, and 'scape
Thy Notice—

Ch.VI.

But to quit Philosophers and Poets, and return from a Digression, to which we have been led insensibly by the latent connection of many different ideas.

THERE remains nothing further, in the treating of SUBSTANCE, than to say something of those characters, which are usually ascribed to it by Aristotle and his followers, when they consider it not in a physical, but in a logical view.

K₂ CHAP.

C H A P. VII.

Concerning the Properties of Substance, attributed to it in the Peripatetic Logic.

C.VII. HE ancient Logicians, or rather ARISTOTLE and his School, have given us of Substance the following Characters.

They inform us that, as SUBSTANCE, it is not susceptible of more and less (a). Thus a Lion is not more or less a Lion, by being more or less bulky; a Triangle is not more or less a Triangle, by being more or less acute-angled. The Intensions and Remissions are to be found in their Accidents; the Essences remain simply and immutably the same, and either absolutely are, or absolutely are not.

AGAIN,

⁽a) Δοκεῖ δὶ ἡ τοία μη ἐπιδίχεσθαι το μᾶλλου κὸ τὸ ῆτου.—Arist. Prad. p. 28. Edit. Sylb. See Hermes, p. 201.

AGAIN, SUBSTANCE, they tell us, C.VII. admits of no Contraries (b). 'Tis to this that Milton alludes, when, after having personified Substance, he tells us,

To find a Foe it shall not be his hap,

And Peace shall lull him in her flow'ry lap (c).

THE Affertion is evident in compound Beings, that is to say, in substances natural; for what is there contrary to Man considered as Man, or to Lion considered as Lion? This is true also in the Relation borne by MATTER to FORM; for while Contraries by their co-incidence destroy each other, these two, Matter

K 3

and



 ⁽b) Υπάρχει δε ταῖς ἐσίαις κὸ τὸ μπόξο αὐταῖς ἐναντίου εἶναι. Arift. Præd. p. 28. Edit. Sylb.

⁽c) Milt. Poems, No. II.

C.VII. and Form, coalefce so kindly, that no Change to either arises from their Union. Thus the Marble, when adorned with the Form of a Statue, is as precisely Marble, as it was before; and the Oak, when fashioned into the Form of a Ship, is as truly Oak, as when it flourished in the Forest. If there be any Contrariety in Substance it is that of Form to Privation, where Privation nevertheless is nearly allied to Non-entity.

LASTLY, SUBSTANCE they tell us is Something, which, though it have no Contrary, yet is by nature susceptible of all Contraries, itself still remaining one and the same (d).

WE cannot forget that description, given by VIRGIL, of the Cumean Prophetess.

⁽d) Μάλιςα δε ίδιου της υσίας δοκεῖ είναι το ταυτου κ) εν αριθμῷ δυ τῶν εναυτίων είναι δεκτικόυ. Arift. Præd. p. 29. Edit. Sylb.

Subito

Non comptæ mansere comæ; sed pectus anhelum,

Et rabie fera corda tument (e).

Here we see her countenance and complexion perpetually changing, her hair dishevelled, her breast panting, and a transition too in her manners from so-briety to distraction. How different is all this from the appearance of that Sibyl, who first so courteously received Eneas at Cuma, and afterwards so prudently attended him to the Shades? Yet, amidst all these Contrarieties, was she still the same Sibyl; she was susceptible of them all, without becoming another woman.

This last Character of Substance appears to be the most effential: for what is the Support of Contraries, or indeed of every Attribute, but Substance? Motion

⁽e) En. VI.

C. VII. and Rest, Heat and Cold, Health and Sickness, Vigour and Decay, are all to be found at times in each Individual of the human race. Most of the same Contraries are to be found among Brutes, and some of them descend even to the race of Vegetables.

Ir we descend from these minuter Substances to our terraqueous Globe, here Tempest and Calm, Frost and Thaw, Rain and Drought, Light and Darkness, have each their turn; yet leave it, when they depart, after all their seeming Contest, the same individual Globe, and not another. Thus the Poet, we have already quoted, still considering Substance, as a Person—

Yet he shall live in strife, and at his door Devouring War shall never cease to roar: Yea, it shall be his nat'ral property,
To harbour those that are at enmity (f).

⁽f) Milt. Peems, No. II.

If we extend our views beyond the C. VII. Spot which we inhabit, what is the whole visible Universe, but the comprehensive Receptacle of every Contrary conceivable? Within this immense Whole they all distributively exist, while each of them by succession fulfils it's allotted period, without disturbing the general Order, or impairing the general Beauty.

But if we ascend from passive and material Substances up to such as are active and immaterial, here we shall find no Distribution, no succession of Contraties; but Motion and Rest, Equality and Inequality, Similarity and Dissimilarity, Identity and Diversity, will appear, each pair co-existing within the same Being in the same instant, and that by an amazing Connection of both together under One.

'Tis by virtue only of this combining, this unifying Comprehension (and which for

C. VII. for that reason can only belong to a Being unextended and indivifible) that the Mind or Intellect pronounces that A is not B, that C is unequal to D, that E is unlike to F. Were fuch Propositions, instead of being comprehended at once by something Indivisible and One, to be comprehended in portions by the different parts of something Divifible; or were they to be comprehended by a Power indivisible, yet not at once, but in a Succession; 'twould be as impossible either way to comprehend the real Propositions, 'as it would, if they were to be recognized in part by a Man in England, in part by one in China; or elfe in part by a Man in the present Century, in part by one of the fucceeding. It may be asked in such instances, who is it that comprehends THE WHOLE (g)?

LASTLY,

⁽g) See Hermes, 1. iii. c. 4. Note (f). See also Ariflot. de Anima, 1. iii. c. 2. p. 52. Edit. Sylb. Themist. Paraph. p. 85. a. b.

MIND may we find such Coincidence, fince here not only Contraries, but all things whatever co-exist, and that too aster a manner peculiarly transcendent; not by a Knowlege which is partial, but by one which is universal; not with occasional remissions, but in one uniform unremitting Energy (h); not by subsequent Impressions from things already pre-existing, but by that original Cansality, through which it makes all things to exist.

A NOBLE field for speculating opensupon this occasion; which, tho' arising out of our Subject, yet naturally leading us beyond it, we shall omit, and return to our Logical Inquiries, concluding here what we have to ad-

vance



⁽h) See the Chapter on Quality, where the Verses of Empedocles are quoted.

C. VII. vance in our Theory concerning Sub-STANCE (i).

WE are now to consider the remaining GENERA, PREDICAMENTS, or AR-RANGEMENTS, that is to say Quality, Quantity, Relation, Site, &c.

Some of these are at all times no higher than Accidents; such for example as Site or Position, the Time When, and the Place Where. Others upon occasion characterize, and essentiate; such for example as Magnitude, Figure, Colour, and many Qualities. Thus a triply extended Magnitude is essential to Body; Angu-

larity

⁽i) The Author, in the representing of ancient Opinions, has endeavoured, as far as he was able, to make all his Treatises consistent, and explanatory one of another. Those, who would see what he has already written on the two great Elements of Substance, discussed in this and the three preceding Chapters, may search the Index of Hermes for the Words, MATTER and FORM; and the Index of his first Volume, for the Word CAUSE.

larity to a Cube; Heat to Fire; and Co- C. VII. lour to every Superficies not transparent. In all fuch Instances, they make a part of the Characteristic Form, and in that Sense are to be considered rather as Substances than as Accidents. However as this holds not always, and that they are fometimes as merely and as strictly Accidents, as any of those which are so always, we choose under that common Denomination to speculate upon them all, beginning according to Order first from the first.

CHAP.

CHAP. VIII.

Concerning QUALITIES—corporeal and incorporeal—natural and acquired—of
Capacity, and Completion—Transitions
immediate, and through a medium—
Dispositions, Habits—Genius—Primary
and imperfect Capacity—Secondary and
perfect—where it is, that no Capacities
exist—Qualities, penetrating, and supersicial—Essential Form—Figure, an
important Quality—Figures intellectual,
natural, artificial, phantastic—Colour,
Roughness, Smoothness, &c.—Persons
of Quality—Properties of Quality—
Some rejected, one admitted, and why.

C.VIII. A S SUBSTANCE justly holds the first rank among these Predicaments, or universal Arrangements, by being the single one among them that exists of it-self,

felf, so the next in order, as some have C.VIII. afferted (a), is QUALITY, because Quality is said to be an Attribute, from which no Substance is exempt.

THERE may be Substances, they tell us, devoid of Quantity; such, for example, if we admit them, as the intellective, or immaterial. But that there should be Substances devoid of Quality, is a

thing

⁽a) This was the Opinion of Archytas-Quera per rétaulai edia-deutéea de à woióras-the first in Order is Substance; the second, QUALITY. Simplic. in Præd. Quantitat. p. 31. Edit. Basil. Simplicius adds-- မီကေး၉ ရဲ ပြဲဂုံေက အိ Посій ထင္များခဲ့ရသူ။, ရှိနိုင္ငံေ क्ले होंग्या क्ले कल्ले बेस्रे क्लेड वेदांबर हंग्लेंदिनका वर्षा स्रो महीले το Ποιον αν είν το Ποσον, έπειδή τον χαρακτήρα αυ-र्ण, भी रमें छिलंदमीय बेमले रमेंद्र क्यालंदमरिक देश्या-As SUBSTANCE PRECEDES Quantity, because Being is imparted to Quantity from Substance, so also must Quantity succeed and COME AFTER QUALVTY, in as much as it derives from Quality its very Character, and difinctive Peculiarity. — Ibid. — To words heyelar i dia-Popa The Boias -The DIFFERENCE, which attends each Substance, is called QUALITY. Arist. Metaph. A. c. 14. He explains it immediately—Man is a Biped Animal; Horse, a Quadruped. .

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C.VIII. thing hardly credible, because they could not then be characterized, and distinguished one from another.

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On this reasoning it is maintained, that, altho' we have no Idea of Quantity suggested to us in that animating Principle, THE SOUL, yet can we discern that this Principle has many different Qualities, and that Animals from these Qualities derive their distinct and specific Characters. There is for example a social Sympathy in the Soul of Man, which prompts the individuals of our Species to congregate, and form themselves into Tribes.

Homo sum, humani nihil a me alienum puto, (b).

WE can trace the same congregating Quality in the Bee, in the Beaver, and

even

⁽b) Terent. Heauton. Act. L.

even in the ferocious Wolf. It is C.VIII. however less frequent in those of ferocious character; the greater part of whom, if we except those seasons while they breed and nurture their young, seem to feel no other instincts, but such as lead them to be folitary. Twas under this unseeling and gloomy character that Homer describes Polypheme, and his giant-brethren—

Παίδων, πό' αλόχων τό' αλλήλων αλέγεσι.

His children and his wives; NOR CARE
THEY OUGHT
ONE FOR ANOTHER (c).

IT is no less obvious on the other hand, that there are QUALITIES which may be considered as peculiar to Body.

⁽c) Odyf. l. ix. v. 114.

C.VIII. If we admit Figures, Colours, and Odours for Qualities, and such undoubtedly they are; we must admit of course, that among Animal Bodies there is one Figure to the Serpent, another to the Horse; one Colour to the Swan, another to the Parrot. Even in the vegetable Race, the Rose has one Odour, the Jessamine another; there is one Figure to the Orange, another to the Fig.

IT follows, therefore, that as QUA-LITIES help to distinguish not only one Soul from another Soul, and one Body from another Body, but (in a more general view) every Soul from every Body; it follows (I say) that QUALITIES, by having this common reference to both, are naturally divided into CORPOREAL and INCORPOREAL.

'Twas the judgment of Shakespear to unite them in the character of Richard the third, when he makes Bucking-ham

ham relate, in what manner he recom- C.VIII. mended him to the Citizens of London:

Withal I did infer your lineaments,

Being the right Idea of your Father,

Both in your FORM, and NOBLENESS OF

MIND (d).

Virgil does the same with respect to Eneas, when he makes his heroic Virtue and his graceful Person have so powerful an effect upon the unfortunate Dido.

Quis novus hic nostris successit sedibus hospes?

Quàm sese ore ferens, quàm forti pectore et armis? (e)

THE Qualities abovementioned admit of another division, and that is into NA-TURAL and ACQUIRED. Thus in the

Mind.

⁽d) Shakef. Rich. III.

⁽e) En. iv. 10, 11.

C.VIII. Mind, Docility may be called a natural Quality; Science, an acquired one: in the human Body, Beauty may be called a natural Quality; Gentility, an acquired one. This distinction descends even to Bodies inanimate. To transmit Objects of Vifion is a Quality natural to Crystal; but to enlarge them, while transmitted, is a character adventitious. Even the fame Quality may be natural in one Substance, as Attraction in the Magnet; and acquired in another, as the same Attraction in the Magnetic Bar.

> All the above Qualities have not only their Completion, but their Capacity (f). Thus not only the Grape, when com-

plete

⁽f) Thus we translate the Words Εντελέχεια and Δύναμις. Sometimes we read τὰ μὲν Δυνάμει, τὰ δε Ευεργεία. Δύναμις, Power, is feen in Thy, MAT-TER; Έντελέχεια, COMPLETION, in Είδω, FORM.

The Division abovementioned into Corporeal and Incorporeal, is taken from Plotinus, as we learn from Simplicius in Prad. p. 69. B.

plete (that is to say, when mature) possesses a delicious Flavour; but there is a Capacity also to produce it, residing in a simple Grape-stone. Even in artificial Substances, there are in like manner Capacities. A Grain of Gun-powder has the Capacity of explosion; a musical Instrument, that of rendering Harmony. If, leaving these artificial and vegetative Substances, we go still higher; we shall in Animals find Capacities, commonly known by the name of Instincts, to which the frame of every Species is peculiarly accommodated, and which Frame such Instincts internally actuate.

Dente lupus, cornu taurus petit; unde nissi INTUS Monstratum?—(g)

IN MAN there is a Capacity to Science and Virtue; and well would it be for

L 3

him,

⁽g) Horat. Sat. ii. 1. 52.

C.VIII. him, if not also to their Contraries. Yet such is our Nature, such the peculiar character of the Reasoning Faculty, belonging to us as Men; it is capable of either Direction (h_j, and may be employed, like the same Weapon, as well to Evil as to Good.

Nor are there such Qualities only as Capacities, but there is a contrary and ne-

gative

⁽b) Ἐπαμβοτερίζει κάσα π λογοειδής [δύκαμις]—
Ευστη Power of the Rational kind has a Capacity
either way, that is, a double Capacity. Ammon in Præd.
p. 127. Ai μεν ἔν μετὰ λόγκ δυνάμεις, αὶ αὐταὶν
πλειόνων κὰ τῶν ἐναντίων—The Powers, that are conn &ed with the Reasoning Faculty, are the same
with respect to various and contrarr Operations.
Arist. de Interpr. p. 75. Edit. Sylb.

^{&#}x27;I is thus Medicine, as an Art, can cause Sickness, as well as Health; Music, as an Art, can cause Discord, as well as Harmony—And why this?—Because they are both founded in Reoson; and 'tis the same Reason, in all instances, which shews us the Thing, and shews us also it's Privation.—O δὶ λόγω ὁ αὐτὸς δηλοῖ τὸ πρᾶγμα, κὸ τὸν είρπουν. Arist. Metaph. ix. 2. p. 143. Edit. Sylb. Lee also pages 147, 153, of the same Work.

gative Sort, which may be called INCA- C.VIII. PACITIES (i); and these also of different Kinds, some for better, some for worse; so that where the Capacities do honour, there the Incapacities debase; where the Capacities debase, there their Opposites do honour. Thus to the Power of being taught, an honourable Capacity, is opposed the Incapacity of being taught, a debasing one; and hence is Man distinguished from an Insect, and the one called docil, the other indocil. Again, to the Power of dying, a debasing Capacity, is opposed the Inability of dying, a superior one; and thus are superior Beings called immortal (k) in the way of excellence,

L 4 whilft

⁽i) Δυνάμεις, 'Aδυναμίαι. Arift. Præd. p. 41. Edit. Syb.

⁽k) Sappho, the celebrated Poetels, has a fingular Sentiment upon this Subject.—Το ἀποθνήσκειν κακόνοι δεω γάρ ἄτω κεκρίκκουν ἀπεθνήσκου γάρ ἄν—Το die, is an Evil; the Gods have so determined it, or else they would die thomselves. Arist. Rhet. 1. ii. c. 22. S. 27.

C.VIII. whilst Man is called mortal, with a view to subordination.

The Transition from Qualities of Capacity to those of Completion, is sometimes immediate, sometimes through a Medium. Thus in a Grain of Gunpowder, the Transition from the power of exploding, to actual explosion, is immediate; so from the power of hearing, to actual hearing; from the power of seeing, to actual fight; and the same in the other Senses (1), all which we seem to possess

All this holds with regard to the INTELLECT or MIND, but by no means with regard to the SENSES, for

⁽¹⁾ The Peripatetics made two Sorts of Capacity, both of which have a foundation in Nature, and yet are evidently distinguished the one from the other. Man, as a rational Being, is capable of Geometry.— This is the first Capacity.—After he has acquired the Science of Geometry, he possesses it, even when he does not geometrize.—This is the second Capacity; a Capacity acquired indeed by Labour, but when once acquired, called forth in an instant; a Capacity founded on the original one, but yet in every view of it far superior and more valuable.

possess in a sort of perfection from the be- C.VIIL ginning. But there are other Capacities, and those none of the meanest, where

for these are perfect, or nearly so, from the beginning, and require neither Time, nor Teaching, for their Maturity.

Όταν δε γεννηθή, έχει ήδη ώσπερ έπιςήμην κζ το αἰσθάνεσθαι, κὸ τὸ κατ' ἐνέρδειαν ὁμοίως λέγεθαι τῷ Sewesiv-As soon as any one is born, be immediately posfeffes Sense, as he would actual Science; and the Energy of Sensation has a similar meaning with that of actual scientific Speculating. Arist. de An. ii. 5. He means by this, that every Man originally fees with the same ease, as an able Geometrician goes thro' a Theorem. There is none of the fatigue and labour and delay of a Learner: Seeing and Hearing have no need to be taught us.

Animum autem reliquis rebus ita perfecit, at Corpus: Sensibus enim ornavit ad res percipiendas idoneis, ut nibil aut non multum adjumento ullo ad suam conformationem indigeret. Quod autem in homine praftantissimum et optimum eft, id, &c. Cic. de Fin. 1. v. c. 21.

And here, by the way, we may perceive a capital Distinction between those two Powers or Faculties of the Soul, SENSE and INTELLECT, which Faculties in vulgar Speculations are too often confounded. In INTELLECT there is an Advance to better and more complete; a Progression wholly unknown to the Powers of SENSE, which is complete from the very beginning, through all it's Operations.

the

PHILOSOPHICAL

C.VIII. the Transition to Completion is necessary farily through a Medium.

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Qui studet optatam cursu contingere metam, Multa tulit, fecitque puer——— (m)

IF an Art be our End, there are many Energies to be practised; if a Science, many Theorems to be understood; if Moral Virtue, many Appetites to be curbed, many Opinions to be eradicated, before we can attain the wished for Goal. The Qualities, which distinguish any Being, during this changeable period, may be called TENDENCIES, DISPOSITIONS, or Progressive Qualities. They are too, as well as Capacities, of a different colour, some good, some bad. There is a kind of laudable Progression, before we arrive at perfect Virtue; as there is a kind of degenerating Interval, before we fink into perfect Vice.

OUR

⁽m) Hor. Art. Poet. v. 412.

Our Tendencies during these intervals C.VIII. are easy to be interrupted. As the Wiles of Pleasure, and an ill-directed Shame, are often satal Checks to a young Prosicient in Virtue; so are Conscience and a better Shame to young Beginners in Vice. And hence we may perceive the true character of these Tendencies; which is, that of all Qualities they are the keast steady and permanent. Horace well describes this state of sluctuation:

upon

⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻ Si toga disfidet impar,

Rides: Quid, mea cum pugnat fententia fecum;

Quod petiit, spernit; repetit, quod nuper omisit;

ÆSTUAT, ET VITÆ DISCONVENIT OR-DINE TOTO (n).

Tis to the same mutable Condition that Epictetus alludes, where, having spoken

⁽n) Horat. Epist. 1. i. 96.

C.VIII.

upon Proficiency, he subjoins the following advice—" That after a certain time "his young Philosopher should exhibit himself, to see how far the Fancies overpowered him, as they did before; and how far he was now able to resist their influence. He advises him, however, to sly at first such Conslicts, as would put his Virtue to a trial teo seever; and quotes the proverb on the cocasion, that the Metal Pot and the Stone Pot do not with safety accord (0)".

Such therefore is the character of these Tendencies, or Dispositions (p). But different is the case, when their course is finished, and when they may be said to have attained their Maturity and Completion. The Man completely virtuous

dreads

⁽a) Arrian. Epielet. 1. iii. c. 12.

⁽p) Διάθεσις, Disposition; Eξις, Habit. Arist. Cat. p. 40. Edit. Sylb.

dreads no allurements; the Man completely vicious feels no compunctions. Like sturdy Oaks, they defy that force, which could easily have bent them, while they were but saplings.

And hence, as we are not said to have an Estate, because we are walking upon it, or to have a Picture, because we are holding it; but to have them, implies a superior, a more permanent possession, such as either cannot be deseated, or at least not easily; hence I say these Completions, whether virtuous or vicious, are called, from their steadiness and permanence, Habits (q). They are Possessions, which their

⁽a) Διαφέρει Εξις Διαθέσεως τῷ τὴν μὲν εὐκίνητον εἶναι, τὴν δὲ ωολυχρονιώτερον, κὰ δυσκινητότερον. HABIT differs from Disposition, as the latter is eafily moveable, the former is of longer duration, and more difficult to be moved. Arift. Præd. p. 40. Edit. Sy.b.

And just after, having spoken of Warmth and Cold, of Health and Sickness, and shewn how far these, when

C.VIII.

their owner may properly be said To HAVE, and by which we call him habitually good, or habitually bad. The Professors of Medicine sind this Distinction in human Bodies. 'Tis not any Health, (such as health just recovered, or with difficulty preserved) but 'tis confirmed and steady Health, which they call a GOOD HABIT OF BODY. They have reference in Diseases to the same Permanence, when they talk of Hectic Coughs, and Hectic Fevers, Complaints not casual, but which make a part (as it were) of the Constitution.

when they are mutable and shift easily, may be called Dispositions, he subjoins, that so it is—πο μή τις κρατων τύτων τυξχάνει δια χρόνει ωληθω πόη συμαπεφυσωμένη κρατων (legitur ακίνητω), η ωάνυ δυσκίνητω δαν, ην άντις ισως ΕΞΙΝ ηδη προσαδορεύοι—
Unless any one of these very affections should by length of time become naturalized, and grow either immoveable, or only to be removed with difficulty; which perfection then perhaps we may call a HABIT. Arish. Præd. p. 41. Edit. Sylb.

AND

AND thus besides the Distinctions of C.VIII. CORPOREAL and INCORPOREAL, of NATURAL and ACQUIRED, may all QUALITIES be considered as CAPACITIES, as TENDENCIES, and as HABITS; as Capacities only and Habits, where the transition is immediate; as all three successively, where the transition is through a Medium.

IT is worth while to observe in the human Mind the fuccessive appearance of these Qualities, where during the Transition there exists a Medium or Interval. The original Power, which the Mind possesses of being taught, we call NATURAL CAPACITY; and this in some degree is common to all Men. The superior Facility of being taught, which some possess above the rest, we call Genius. The first transitions or advances from natural Power, we call Proficiency; and the

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C.VIII. the End or Completion of Proficiency we call HABIT.

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If such Habit be conversant about Matter purely Speculative, it is then called Science; if it descend from Speculation to Practice, it is then called Art; and if such Practice be conversant in regulating the Passions and Affections, it is then called Moral Virtue.

Even all these *Habits*, after having been thus acquired, can return at times into Capacity, and there lie dormant and for a time unperceived.

Alfenus vafer, omni
Abjecto instrumento artis, clausaque taberna,
Sutor erat——— (r)

WIDE however is the difference between this habitual, fecondary Capa-

city,



⁽r) Horat. Sat. i. 3. 130.


96 Ja 14

city (s), and that which is natural and C.VIII. original. The habitual can pass AT ONCE, when it pleases, into perfect Energy; the natural, only thro' the Medium of Institution and REPEATED PRACTICE.

THE several Qualities thus variously distinguished are to be found only in Beings of subordinate Nature. But if there be a Being, whose Existence is all-perfect and complete, and such must that Being necessarily be, the Source of Perfection to all others; with the nature of such Being this Variety will be incompatible. In Him are no Powers or dormant Capacities, no Prosiciencies or Transitions from worse to better, and still

M

much -



⁽s) See before Note, p. 152—εχ ἀπλε ὅντις το δυνάμει λειομένε, ἀλλὰ τε μεν εκπερ ᾶν είπομεν τον παιδα δύνασθαι ερατηγείν, τε δε ώς τον εν πλικία ὅντα — CAPACITY or Power is not a simple Term of one Meaning only, but there is one Sort, when we say of a Child, he has a Capacity to be a military Leader; another, when we say so of a Man, who is in complete Maturity. Arist. de An. l. ii. c. 5. p. 33. Edis. Sylb.

C.VIII. much less from better to worse; but a full and immutable Energie thro' every part of Space. 'Twas concerning this divine Principle that Empedocles sung of old.

Ούτε γαρ ανδρομέη κεφαλή κατα γυΐα κέκας αι, Οὐ μὲν ἀπαὶ νώτων γε δύο κλάδοι ἀΐσσυστη, Οὐ πόδες, ἐ θόα γῶνα, ἐ μάδεα λαχρήεθα, ᾿Αλλὰ Φρην ἱερη, κὰ ἀθέσφατ Επλετο μῦνον, Φροντίσι κόσμου ἄπανία καταίσσυσα θοῆσι.

No Limbs hath he, with human head a-dorned;

Nor from his Shoulders branch two sprouting Arms;

To him belong nor feet, nor pliant knees;
But MIND ALONE he was; ineffable,
And HOLY MIND; that rapidly pervades
With providential cares the mighty
World (t).

⁽t) See Ammon. in Lib. de Interpret. p. 199. B. and Poef. Philosoph. Hen. Step. p. 30, where, instead of ετε γας ανδρομέη, we read ε μέν γας βροτέη.

And here it may be observed by way of digression, that in this part of Ammonius, a part truly valuable, and

THE Speculations of this Genus, or C.VIII.

Arrangement, having now carried us to the sublimest of all Objects, ought here to end. But as there still remain a few observations, and besides these a disquisition into the Properties of the Genus,

and deeply philosophical, we meet in the printed text two Chass, which much impair the meaning. The first occurs p. 199. B. line 19, between the words τῶν—κỳ τῶν. Here a MS. Collation supplies the word ἀΦανῶν. The second occurs p. 200, line 2, after the word συνιέντων. Here the same MS. supplies the following valuable Reading, which lies far beyond the reach of the most acute Conjecture. The words are—κ' συνιέντων [ὅτι περιπετάσμα]α τῆς ἀληθείας εἰσι.]

There is a third Reading from the same Authority, in the fourth line of the same page, which is an instead of in instead of in instead of inste

The Edition of Amnanius, here referred to, is that of Venice, in 12mo. in the year 1545. The fame places may be found in the Edition of Aldus at Venice, in 12mo. in the year 1546, page 172, B. p. 173, and in the Fol. Edition of the fame Aldus, in the year 1503, where the pages are not marked, but where the above Chasms easily shew themselves to the Reader's eye.

M 2

and



C.VIII. and that the apparent, as well as the real; we cannot quit the subject, till these inquiries have been first satisfied.

Thus then the Treatise proceeds.

WITH respect to QUALITIES PURELY CORPOREAL, they may be considered either as penetrating Body, such as Gravitation, Heat, Flavour, and the like; or else as confined to the Surface, such as Figure, Colour, Smoothness, Roughness, &c. Those internal Qualities which pervade the whole, (whether they arise merely from Organization, or include that, and fomething more) constitute what we call essential Form or natural Essence. And hence the just Idea of natural Essence, or essential Form (u), which consists in giving a Character to the subject, which it pervades. 'Tis thro' this internally pervading Character, that Substances are what they are; that they become not

⁽u) See before, p. 89, 90, 91.

only distinguished from one another, but C,VIII, from the nicest Mimicries of Art; the real Orange from the Orange of Wax, the living Lion from the Lion painted,

INDEED one of the capital Distinctions between Operations Natural and Artificial, is, that Nature penetrates, while Art stops at the furface. 'Tis the Surface of the Canvas, which the Painter covers: the Surface of the Gem. which the Jeweller polishes; the Surface of the Steel, to which the Smith gives a Figure; and the Surface of the String, to which the Musician applies his Bow. There is hardly any deviation from this rule with respect to Arts, if we except those only, (such as Cookery and Medicine) the business of which consists principally in compounding natural Materials. Here indeed the Proportions pass thro' the whole Composition, and the more accurate these Proportions, the greater of course the merit of each Artist.

 M_3

IT



C.VIII.

that the artificial Qualities are mostly superficial, yet are not all natural Qualities to be considered as internal. The Form or Essence of every natural Substance (that is to say, in other words, it's System of internal Qualities) extends itself outwardly (x) every way from within; and, as it must necessarily stop somewhere, (every individual being finite) so according to the different points, at which it stops in it's Evolution, it communicates to each Substance a different and peculiar Figure. And hence the

true

⁽x) Δοπερ δε της διας άσεως το τέλο ές ι το Σχημα, ἄτως ή τὰ ὅλα είδας ἀποτελεύτησις ἄχρι της ἐπιΦανείας την Μορθην ἀπεγέννησεν, ἐσαν αὐτην το Φαινόμενον ἴχνο τὰ Είδας, κὰ τελευταίαν ἔκτασιν της τὰ
λόγα ἐπὶ τὰ ἐκτὸς ωροόδα—Simplic. in Præd. p. 69.
Β. Edit. Bafil.—For as the End or Extremity of any
Extension is the Figure, so the Ending of a complete
Form, at it's Surface, produces SHAPB; Shape being
itself the apparent Vestige of that Form, and the ultimate
Extent of that Progression, which the internal Ratio
makes outwards.

true character of every NATURAL and CVIII.

Specific Figure, which ought not to
be confidered merely as a Surface, but
as a Bound; the Bound, to which the
internal Effence or Form every way extends itself, and at which, when it is arsived, it finally terminates.

For this reason it is, that of all the external Qualities there is none so capital, so characteristic, as Figure. 'Tis a kind of universal Signature, by which Nature makes known to us the several Species of her Productions; the primary and obvious test, by which we pronounce this a Vegetable, and that an Animal; this an Oak, and that a Lion; so that if we neither suspect fraud, nor the fallibility of our own Organs, we commonly rest here, and inquire no farther.

If we pass from these natural Subjects to contemplate FIGURE in works of Art, we shall discover it to be almost all, that

M 4

Art

C.VIII. Art is able to communicate. 'Tis to this that the Painter arrives by Addition; the Sculptor by Detraction; the Founder by Fusion; and the Stucco-Artist by Moulding. Even when we contemplate the Tools of Art, it will appear that as 'tis by virtue of their Figure alone the Saw divides, the Hammer drives, and the Pincers extract; so is it from these feveral Figures, that they derive their Character and their Name, not from their Matter, which Matter is often the same, when the Tools are totally different, and distinct one from another ?.

> Non are these artificial the only Figures, with which Man is found converfant. Among the various possibilities, which the Mind suggests, there is a more accurate tribe of Figures, which it recognizes and defines, and which, it may be justly questioned, whether Matter

^{*} See before, Chap. IV.

ever possessed; for example, the perfect C.VIII. Triangle, the perfect Circle, the perfect Pyramid, the perfect Sphere, with the rest of those Figures commonly called MATHEMATICAL . These are not sought out by Experiments, nor are the Truths dependent on them derived from Experiments, being in fact the result of a more authentic Knowledge, that is to fay in other words, of the purest Demonstration. On these Figures, and their dependent Truths, rests the whole of Mechanics, so highly useful to human life; rest Astronomy and Optics, and a large part of Phylics, some of the noblest subjects among the corporeal for contemplation.

THE industry of Man stops not even here, but prompts him to search for Figures, not only in his Intellect, but in a lower faculty.

^{*} See the third Treatife of Vol. first, p. 220, 370, 371.

CVIII. The Poet's Eye in a fine Phrenzy rolling

Doth glance from Heav'n to Earth, from

Earth to Heav'n,

And as IMAGINATION bodies forth

THE FORMS OF THINGS UNKNOWN, the

Poet's Pen

Turns them to Shape, and gives to airy nothings

A local Habitation and a Name (z).

And hence that tribe of FIGURES, which are neither natural, nor artificial, nor intellectual, but which make a fourth fort, that may be called PHANTASTIC, or IMAGINARY; such as Centaurs, Satyrs, Sphinxes, Hydras, &c.

And so much for Figure, that most capital Quality of all the superficial.

THE next Quality of this fort after Figure is Colour, the Source, like Fi-

⁽²⁾ Shakef. Midf. Night's Dream, Act V. Sc. I.

gure, of many Varieties and Distinctions. C.VIII. Yet that it is inferior to Figure, is obvious from this: in the Sketches of a Painter, we know things by their Figures alone, without their Colours; but not by their Colours alone, when divested of their Figures.

As for Roughness, Smoothness, Hardness, Sostness, tho' they may be said perhaps to penetrate farther than the Surface, yet are they, to Man's Sensation at least, so many Qualities Superficial.

AND now with respect to all kinds of QUALITIES whether corporeal or incorporeal, there is one thing to be observed, that fome degree of Permanence is always requisite; else they are not so properly Qualities, as incidental Affections (a). Thus

⁽a) These Aristotle calls Πάθη.—Οὖτε γὰρ ὁ ἔρυθριῶν διὰ τὰ αἰχύνοσθαι, ἐρυθρίας λέγελαι, ἔτε ὁ ἀχριῶν διὰ τὸ Φοθεῖσθαι, ἀχρίας ἀλλὰ μάλλον ωεπουθίναι τι ، ὧςε ωάθη μὰν τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγελαι, ωνιότηλες δὲ ἔ.
—Neither

C.VIII. we call not a man passionate, because he has occasionally been angered, but because he is prone to frequent anger; nor do we say a man is of a pallid or a ruddy Complexion, because he is red by immediate exercise, or pale by sudden fear, but when that Paleness or Redness may be called constitutional.

We have said already, that it was the Essence of all Qualities to CHARACTERIZE and DISTINGUISH. And hence the Orizin of that Phrase, a Person of Quality; that is to say a Person distinguished from the Vulgar by his Valour, his Wisdom, or some other capital Accomplishment. As these were the primary Sources of those external Honours, paid to eminent

Men

[—]Neither is the Man, who blushes from being assumed, called of a Reddish Complexion; nor is he, who turns pale from being frightened, called of a Palish Complexion, but they are rather said to have been particularly affected; for which reason such Events are called incidental Affections, and not QUALITIES, Aristot. Prad. p. 43. Edit. Sylb.

Men in Precedencies, Titles, and various C.VIII. other Privileges; it followed that these Honours by degrees grew to represent the things honoured; so that as Virtue led originally to Rank, Rank in after days came to infer Virtue; particular Ranks, particular Virtues; that of a Prince, Serenity; of an Ambassador, Excellence; of a Duke, Grace; of a Pope, Holiness; of a Justice or Mayor, Worship, &c. &c.

As to the GENERAL PROPERTIES of QUALITY, they may be found among the following.

Contrariety appertains to it (b). Thus in the corporeal Qualities, Hot is contrary to Cold, and Black to White. So too in mental Qualities, Wisdom is contrary to Folly, and Virtue to Vice: subordinate Virtues to subordinate Vices; Liberality to Avarice, Courage to Cowardice. Even Vices themselves are con-

trary

⁽b) Υπάρχει δι Έναντιότης κατα το ωοιος, κ. τ. λ. Arift. Prad. p. 44. Edit. Sylb.

merity; Avarice to Profusion. It may be doubted, however, whether this character of Quality be universal; for what among Figures is there Contrary in one Figure to another, either in the Square to the Circle, or in the Circle to the Square?

Another Property of Qualities is to ADMIT OF INTENSION AND REMISSION (c). Thus of two Persons handsome, there may be one the handsomer; and among many handsome, one the handsomest.

Πασάω δ' ਹੈπες ત્રેγε κάςτι દχει, त्रेक μέτωτα, 'Ρεΐα δ' άςιγιώτη τείλεται, καλαί δέ τε πάσαι (δ).

Far above all she bears her tow'ring head, With ease distinguish'd, tho' they all are fair.

So Sir John Falftaff, speaking to his Companion, the young Prince—I am

not

⁽d) Hom. Odyf. Z. 107.

not John a Gaunt, your Grandfather; and C.VIII.
yet I am no Coward (e).

IT appears, however, that the abovementioned Species of Quality called Figure no more admits this Property, than it did Contrariety. The Figures, which are Triangles, are not more so one than another; no more are the Circles, Circles; the Squares, Squares, &c. which seems indeed to arise from their definitude and precision *.

But there is a Property to be found, which may justly deserve the name, by being common at least to the whole Genus, if not peculiar to that only: and this Property is, that BY VIRTUE OF THEIR QUALITIES THINGS ARE DENOMINATED LIKE and UNLIKE (f). 'Tis thus that

⁽e) Shakef. Hen. IV.

^{*} See Hermes, p. 200.

⁽f) "Ομοια δὶ δ ἀνόμοια κατὰ μόνας τὰς ποιέτης τας λέγελαι διμοιον γκρ ἔτιρον ἱτίρω ἄκ ἐςι κατ' ἄλλο κδῖν, ἢ καθ' δ ποιόν έςιν. Arift. Præd. p. 45. Edit. 8γιδ.

CVIII the Swan by his Quality of Whiteness resembles the Snow; that Achilles by his Quality of fierceness resembles a Mastiff; and that the Earth by her Quality of Figure is like to a Bowl.

> From this Property we see the reason, why there is no Arrangement, to which the Poets are so much indebted, as to this; fince hence they derive those innumerable Images, which so strongly distinguish Poetry from every other Species of Writing. For example: let us suppose a young Hero just slain; let us suppose him lying, with a drooping head, a face divested of life and bloom, yet still retaining traces both of beauty and of youth. The Poet would illustrate this pathetic Image by finding something that resembles it. And where is he to search, but where he can discover similar Qualities? He finds at length an affemblage of them in a flower just gathered: the same drooping head, the same lifeless fade,

fade, the same relicts of a form that was C.VIII. once fair and flourishing.

Thus then Virgil, speaking of young Pallas—

Qualem virgineo demessum pollice storem
Seu mollis violæ, seu languentis hyacinthi,
Cui neque fulgor adhuc, necdum sua forma
recessit;

Non jam mater alit tellus, viresque ministrat (g).

AGAIN, what would Milton have us conceive, when he describes the tremendous Shield of Satan?—Those conspicuous Characters of Brightness, Vastness, and Rotundity. To what subject then ought he to refer, that we may comprehend what he would describe? It must be to one, that eminently possesses an assemblage of the same Qualities. Let the Poet in his own Words inform us what this Subject is:

⁽g) Æn. xi. 68.

C.VIII. — The broad Circumference

Hung on his Shoulders, LIKE THE MOON (h).

THE reason of this Property may be perhaps as follows. To be like is something less than to be perfectly the same, and fomething more than to be perfectly different. And hence it is, that when swo things are called like, there is implied in their nature something of Sameness, and something of Diversity. be asked what the Sameness is, we answer, it must be something more definitive than those transcendental Samenesses, which run thro' all things. We say not that a piece of Ebony is like a Swan, because they both are; or that a Crow resembles a. Snow-ball, because each of them is One. and not two. The Identity must be fought from among the number of those Qualities, the nature of which is less.

exten-

⁽b) Per. Loft, 1. i. 286.

extensive, and more confined to particular Species. Let Blackness, for example, be a Quality of this character in that union of Qualities, which constitutes Ebony; and let the same Quality be one also in that union, which constitutes a Crow. So far then the Ebony and the Crow are the same; thro' every other Quality perhaps they are different; and thro' Sameness, thus temper'd by Diversity, they become, and are called LIKE (i).

THE same happens to the Earth and a Bowl, from their common Rotundity; to the Hero and the Massiff, from their common Ferocity.

AND so much for the second universal Genus, Arrangement, or Predicament, the Genus of QUALITY, it's various SPE-cies, and it's different PROPERTIES.

N2 CHAP.

⁽i) See Note, p. 90. and Note, p. 190.

C H A P. IX.

Concerning QUANTITY—it's two Species—their characters—Time, and Place—their characters—PROPERTY of Quantity, what—Quantities relative—Figure and Number, their Effect upon Quantity—Importance of this Effect—Sciences Mathematical appertain to it—their use, according to Plato—how other Beings partake of Quantity—Analogy, found in Mind—Common Sense and Genius, how distinguished—Amazing Efficacy of this Genus in and thro' the World—Illustrations.

Ch.IX. HE Attribute of Substance, standing in Arrangement next to Quality, is QUANTITY; the former having precedence, as being supposed more universal; while the latter, at least in appearance,

pearance, feems not to extend beyond Ch.IX. Body.

Out of natural Bodies is the visible World composed, and we may contemplate them in different manners; either one Body taken by itself and alone; or many Bodies taken collectively, and at once. When Virgil says of the Oak,

—— QUANTUM vertice ad auras

Ætherias, TANTUM radice ad Tartara

tendit——— (a)

or when Milton informs us, that

Behemoth, biggest born of Earth, upheaved His VASTNESS——— (b).

in these instances we have only one Body, taken by itself and alone, and this naturally suggests the Idea of MAGNITUDE. But when in Virgil we read,

N 3

Lyans



⁽a) Geor. ii. 291.

⁽b) Par. Loft. vii. 471.

Ch.IX. Quam MULTA in sylvis autumni frigore
primo

Lapsa cadunt folia- (c).

or when in Milton,

THICK as autumnal leaves, that strew the brooks

In Vallombrosa- (d).

in these instances we have many Bodies taken collectively and at once, and this naturally suggests the Idea of MULTITUDE.

HORACE gives the two Species together in his fine address to Augustus:

Cum TOT sustineas et TANTA negotia—(e).

Now in MAGNITUDE and MULTI-TUDE we behold these two primary,

these

⁽c) En. vi. 309.

⁽d) Par. Loft, i. 302.

⁽e) Horat. Epift. 1. ii. 1.

these two grand and comprehensive Spe- Ch.IX. cies, into which the Genus of Quantity is divided; MAGNITUDE, from it's Union, being called QUANTITY CONTINUOUS; MULTITUDE, from it's Separation, QUAN-TITY DISCRETE (f).

OF the Continuous kind is every Solid; also the bound of every Solid, that is, a Superficies; and the bound of every Superficies, that is, a Line; to which may be added those two concomitants of every Body, namely Time and Place. Of the Discrete kind are Fleets, Armies, Herds, Flocks, the Syllables of Sounds articulate, &c.

WE have mentioned formerly (g), when we treated of Time, that every Now

⁽f) $T_{\vec{s}}$ de $T_{\vec{o}}$ $T_{\vec{o}}$ de $T_{\vec{o}}$ $T_{\vec{o}}$ de $T_{\vec{o}}$ $T_{\vec{o}}$ de $T_{\vec{o}}$ νεχές. Ariflot. Præd. p. 30. Edit. Sylb.

⁽g) See Hermes, lib. i. c. 7. p. 103, 104.

Ch.IX, or present Instant was a Boundary or Term, at which the Past ended, and the Future began; and that 'twas in the Perpetuity of this Connection, that Time became continuous. In like manner within every Line may be assumed infinite such Connectives, under the character of Points: and within every Superficies, under the character of Lines; and within every Solid, under the character of Superficies; to which Connectives these Quantities owe their Continuity. And hence a Specific Distinction, attending all Quantities continuous, that their several Parts every where coincide in a common Boundary or Connective (h).

It is not so with Quantities discrete: for here such Co-incidence is plainly impossible. Let us suppose, for example, a

Multi-

⁽b) See Arift. Prædic. p. 31. Edit. Sylb.—n ele γεμμα συνεχής ές ιν, κ. τ. λ. This Character is deferibed to be—πρός τινα κοινον δρον συνάπθειν.—Ibid.

Multitude of Squares;
$$x, y, z, &c : C.VIII.$$

Here if the Line AB, where the Square x ends, were the same with the Line CD, where the Square y begins, and EF in like manner the same with GH; they would no longer be a *Multitude* of Squares, but one continuous Parallelogram, such as the figure KMNL.

ANOTHER Specific Character belonging to the Solid Body, the Superficies, and the Line, (all of which are Quantities Continuous) is, that their Parts have a definite Position within some definite Whole (i); while in Quantities discrete,

that

⁽i) Ετι, τὰ μὲν ἐκ θέσιν ἐχόντων ωρὸς ἄλληλα τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς μορίων συνέςηκε οἶον τὰ μὲν τῆς γραμμῆς μόρια θέσιν ἔχει ωρὸς ἄλληλα, κ. τ. λ. Ατίβ. Præd. p. 31. Edit. Sylb.

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that is in Multitudes, such Position is no way requisite. In the most perfect continuous Quantities, such as Beams of Timber, Blocks of Marble, &c. 'tis with difficulty the Parts can change Position, without destruction to the Quantity, taken as continuous. But a herd of Cattle, or an Army af Soldiers, may change Position as often as they please, and no damage arise to the Multitude, considered as a Multitude.

It must be remembered however, that this Character of Position extends not to TIME, tho' Time be a Continuous Subject. How indeed should the Parts of Time have Position, which are so far from being permanent, that they say as fast as they arrive? Here therefore we are rather to look for a Sequel in just Order (k); for a

Continuity

⁽k) $^{\circ}$ Ο δε μή ές ιν ὑπομένου, $^{\circ}$ τῶς αν τῶτο Θέσ ιν τινα ἔχοι; αλλα μαλλου τάξιν τινα εἴποις αν ἔχειν, τῷ τὰ μὲν ωρότερου εἶναι τῶχρόνω, τὸ δὲ ὕς ιρου. Arift. Prad. p. 32. Edit. Sylb.

Continuity not by Position, as in the Ch.IX. Limbs of an Animal, but for a Continuity by Succession;

velut unda supervenit undam (l).


And thus are the two Species of Quantity, THE CONTINUOUS and THE DISCRETE distinguished from each other.

Besides this, among the Continuous themselves there is a farther Distinction. Body and it's Attributes, the Superficies and the Line, are continuous Quantities, capable all of them of being divided; and by being divided, of becoming a Multitude; and by becoming a Multitude, of passing into Quantity Discrete. But those continuous Quantities, Time and Place, admit not, like the others, even the possibility of being divided. For grant Place to be divided,

⁽¹⁾ Horat. Epist. ii. 2. 176.

Ch.IX. as Germany is divided from Spain: what interval can we suppose, except it be other Place?—Again, suppose Time to be divided, as the Age of Sophocles from that of Shakespeare: what Interval are we to substitute, except it be other Time? Place therefore and Time, tho' continuous like the rest, are incapable of being divided, because they admit not, like the rest, to have their Continuity broken (m).

In this Sense of potential Division, they may be divided infinitely, as appears from the following Theorem.



Let A and B be two Spheres, that are moving, and let A be the quicker moving Sphere; B, the flower; and

⁽m) They cannot be divided ACTUALLY, from the reasons here given:—but they may be divided IN POWER, else they could not be CONTINUOUS; nor could there exist such Terms, as a Month, a Year, a Cubit, a Furlong, &c.

But to proceed. Let us imagine, as Ch.IX. we are walking, that at a distance we view a Mountain, and at our feet a Mole-hill. The Mountain we call Great, the Mole-hill Little; and thus we have two opposite Attributes in Quantity Con-

and let the flower have moved thro' the Space 28 in the Time (n. 'Tis evident that the quicker will have moved thro' the same Space in a less Time. Let it have moved thro' it in the Time (0. 'Tis thus the Sphere A divides the Time. Again, in as much as the quicker A has in the Time (b) past thro' the whole Space 28, the flower B in the same Time will have past thro' a smaller Space. Let this be yx. 'Tis thus the Sphere B divides the Space. Again, in as much as the flower Sphere B in the Time (8 has past thro' the Space 2x, the quicker Sphere A will have past thro' it in a less Time; so that the Time (8 will be again divided by the quicker Body. But this being fo divided, the Space yx will be divided also by the flower Body, according to the fame Ratio. And thus it will always be, as often as we repeat successively what has been already demonstrated : for the quicker Body will after this manner divide the Time ; and the flower Body will divide the Space; and that, in either case, to Infinite, because their Continuity is infinitely divisible in power. See the Original of this Theorem in Ariftotle's Physics, lib. vi. cap. 2. p. 111. Edit. Sylb. "Εςω το μὶν ίφ' ω α, **χ.** τ. λ.

tinucus.

Ch.IX. tinuous. Again, in a meadow we view a Herd of Oxen grazing; in a field, we fee a Yoke of them ploughing the land. The Herd we call Many, the Yoke we call Few; and thus have we two fimilar

Opposites in Quantity Discrete.

Or these sour Attributes, Great and Many sall under the common name of Excess; Little and Few under the common name of Defect. Again, Excess and Defect, tho' they include these sour, are themselves included under the common name of Inequality. Farther still, even Inequality itself is but a Species of Diversity; as it's Opposite, Equality, is but a Species of Identity. They are subordinate Species confined always to Quantity, while IDENTITY AND DIVERSITY (their Genera) may be found to pass throi all things (n).

Now

⁽n) The following Characters of the three first great Arrangements, or universal Genera, are thus described by

Now 'tis here, namely in these two, Ch.IX.

Equality and Inequality, that we are to
look for that PROPERTY, by which this

Genus is distinguished. It is from QUANTITY ONLY that things are denominated

EQUAL or UNEQUAL (a).

FARTHER still—Whatever is Equal, is equal to fomething elfe; and thus is Equality a RELATIVE Term. Again, if we resolve Inequality into it's several Excesses and Defects, it will be apparent that each of these is a Relative Term also. 'Tis with reference to Little that Great is called Great; with reference to Few, that

Many

By Aristotle.—Ταυτα μίν γαρ, ων μία ή εσία σμοια δ', ων ή ποιότης μία το δε, ων το ποσον εν.— Things are the BAME, of which the SUBSTANCE is one; SUMILAR, of which the QUALITY is one; EQUAL, of which the QUANTITY is one. Metaph. Δ. Χεφ. ιέ. p. 88. Edit. Sylb.

^{(0) —} idion de máxica ru woon, to ison re m an-

Ch.IX. Many are called Many; and 'tis by the fame habitudes inverted exist Little and Few. And thus is it that, thro' the Property here mentioned, the Attribute of QUANTITY passes insensibly into that of Relation (p); a fact not unusual in other Attributes as well as these, from the universal Sympathy and Congeniality of Nature.

NAY so merely relative are many of these Excesses and Desects, that the same subject, from it's different Relations, may be found susceptible of both at once. The Mountain, which by it's Relation to the Mole-hill, was great; by it's Relation to the Earth, is little: and the Herd, which were many by their Relation to

⁽p) Aristotle says expressly of the Things here mentioned, that no one of them is Quantity, but exists rather among the Tribe of Relatives, in as much as nothing is Great or Little of itself, but merely with reference to something else.—Τάτων δὲ ἀδίν ἐςι Ψοσον, ἀλλα μᾶλλον τῶν Ψρός τι, ἀδίν γὰρ αὐτὸ καθ αὐτὸ κ, τ, λ. Arist. Præd. p. 33. Edit. Sylb.

the single Yoke, are few by their Relation to the Sands of the Sea-shoar (q).

And hence it appears that the Excesses and Defects, which belong to Quantity, are not of a relative Nature only, but of an indefinite one likewise. The truth of this will become still more evident, when it is remembered, that every Magnitude is infinitely divisible; and that every Multitude is infinitely augmentable.

WHAT then is to be done? How is it possible that fuch Attributes should become the Objects of Science? 'Tis then only we are said to know, when our Per-

0

ception



⁽q) Aristele's Instance goes farther, and shews how a finaller Number may be called Many; a larger Number be called Few.—iv μèν τῆ κώμη woλλως ἀνθρώπως Φαμὲν είναι, ἐν ᾿Αθήναις Ϝ ὀλίγως, woλλαπλασίως αὐτῶν είντας κολλῷ whiv τῆ οἰκία woλλως, ἐν ἐν τῷ Θεάτρῷ ὀλίγως, woλλῷ wheis aὐτῶν εντας—We say there are MANY Men in a Village; and but FEW in Albens, the the Number in this last be many times larger; so too we say there are MANY Persons in a House, and but FEW in the Theatre, the the Number in this last the saft may be many times more. Ibid.

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ception is definite (r); fince whatever falls short of this, is not Knowlege, but Opinion. Can then the Knowlege be definite, when it's Object is indefinite? Is not this the same, as if we were to behold an Object as strait, which was in itself crooked; or an Object as quiescent, which was in itself moving? We may repeat therefore the question, and demand, what is to be done?—It may be answered as follows: Quantity Continuous is circumscribed by FIGURE, which, being the natural boundary both of the Superficies and the Solid, gives them the distinguishing Names of-Triangle, Square, or Circle; of Pyramid, Cube, or Sphere, By these Figures not only the Infinity of Magnitude is limited, but the means also are furnished for its most exact Mensuration. Again, the Infinity of Quantity Discrete is ascertained by NUM-BER, the very Definition of which is MAJ-

⁽r) See before, page 19, 20, 21, and Hermes, p. 368, 369.

for ωρισμένον, that is, Multitude circumforibed or defined. Thus, if, in describing a Battle, we are told that many of
the Enemy were slain, and but few
saved; our Knowlege (if it deserve the
name) is perfectly vague and indefinite.
But if these indefinite Multitudes are
defined by Number, and we are told that
the slain were a thousand, the saved a
hundred; in such Case our Knowlege becomes adequate and complete.

Tis in the contemplation of these two Quantities thus defined, the Continuous by Figure, the Discrete by Number, that we behold them rendered subjects for the two noblest of Sciences, the first of them for Geometry, the second for Arithmetic (1); from which two (and not from mere Experiments, as some have hastily asserted) both the Knowlege of

⁽¹⁾ See Hermes, page 351, 352. 367.

Ch.IX. Nature, and the Utilities of common Life, are in the greatest part derived.

'Tis here we see the rise of those Mathematical Sciences, Arithmetic, Geometry, Music, &c. which the Ancients esteemed so essential to a liberal Education. Nor can we believe there is any one now, but must acknowlege, that a Mind properly tinged with such noble Speculations (supposing there be no want of Genius, or of Courage) is qualified to excel in every superior Scene of Life. Far more honourable they furely are, than the Arts of riding a Horse, or of wielding a Sword, those Accomplishments usually affigned to our Youth of Distinction, and for the Take of which alone they are often sent into distant Countries, as if there were nothing to be taught them at thome, nor any thing in a Gentleman worth cultivating, but his Body. We would not undervalue these bodily Accomcomplishments (for Perfection of every Ch.IX. fort is certainly worth aiming at); but we would wish them to be rated as much below the mental, as the Body itself is inferior to the Mind.

THERE is an elegant account of the Sciences abovementioned in the Republic of Plato. Glaucus (one of the Perfons in the Dialogue) takes pains to recommend them from their Usefulness in human life: Arithmetic for accounts and distributions; Geometry for incampments and mensurations: Music for solemn festivals in honour of the Gods; and Aftronomy for agriculture, for navigation, and the like. Socrates, on his part, denies not the truth of all this, but still infinuates, that they were capable of anfwering an end more sublime. are pleasant, says he, in your seeming to " fear the multitude, lest you should be " thought to enjoin certain Sciences, that " are useless. 'Tis indeed no contemptible

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"" matter, tho' a difficult one, to believe, that
"thro' these particular Sciences the Soul
"has an Organ purified and enlightened,
"which is destroyed and blinded by Studies
"of other kind; an Organ better worth
"saving than a thousand Eyes; in as much
as TRUTH becomes visible thro' THIS
"ALONE (t).

THESE, that we have here mentioned, appear to be the only Species of Quantity; in as much as other things are called Quantities, not from themselves, but with reference to these. Thus we say that there is much White, because the Superficies,

which

⁽¹⁾ The above is an attempt to translate the following elegant Passage of Piato.— Ἡδὺς εῖ, ὅτι ἔοικας δεδιότι τὰς πολλᾶς, μὰ δοκῆς ἄχρηςα μαθήμαθα προςάτθειν Τὸ δ΄ ἐςὶν ὁ πάνυ Φαῦλου, ἀλλὰ χαλιποὺν πιξεῦσαι, ὅτι ἐν τάτοις τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἐκαςοῖς ὅργανόν τι ψυχῆς ἐκκαθαίρεθαι, κὰ ἀναζωπυρεῖται, ἀπολλύμενον κὰ τυψλέμενον ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηθευμάτων, κρεῖτον ὅν σωθῆναι μυρίων ὁμμάτων μόνω γὰρ αὐτῷ ᾿Αλίθεια ὁρᾶται. Plat. de Repub. lib. vii. p. 527. Edit. Serran. Hermes, 294, 5.

Which it covers, is much; and that an Ch.IX. Action was long, because the Time was long, during which it was transacted. And hence it is, that, if any one is to explain the Quantity of an Action, as for example the length of the Trojan War, he explains it by the Time, saying it was a War of ten Years. So when we give the Quantity of any thing White, we define it by the Superficies, because, as that is in Quantity, so also is the White (u).

WE farther observe that Quantity Continuous and Discrete may be said to blend themselves with all things. Thus in Substances, let Mount Athos represent the former; the Army of Xerxes, the latter.

^(*) Κυρίως δε Ποσά ταῦτα λέγελαι μόνα τα εἰρημένα, τα δε άλλα ωάντα κατά συμβεβηκός εἰς ταῦτα γαρ ἀποβλέπουλες, κὰ τα άλλα Ποσά λέγομεν οἶον ωολύ τὸ λεῦκου λέγεται, τῷγε τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν ωολλὴν εἶναι κὰ ἡ ωράξις μακρά, τῷγε τὸν χρόνον, κ. τ. λ. Ariflot. Præd. p. 32. Edit. Sylb.

Ch.IX. In Colours, let us view the former in the uniform Blueness of a clear sky; the latter, in the many and diversified Tints of a Rainbow. In Sounds we find Quantity Discrete belonging to Speech or Language, it being the Essence of Articula-, tion, that every Syllable should be distinct. The Continuous, on the contrary, naturally suggests itself to our Ears, when we hear Yellings, Howlings, and heavy. Psalmody. In Motions, when a Grashopper moves by leaps, we behold Quantity discrete; when a Ship sails smoothly, we behold Quantity Continuous. The motion of all Animals, that have feet, (whether they leap or not) by being alternate, is of the discrete kind: but 'tis fabled of the Gods, that, when they moved as Gods, 'twas under one continued progreffion of their whole frame together; to which Virgil they say alludes in speaking of Venus,

Et vera incessu patuit Dea- (x)

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THE MIND, tho' devoid of Corporeal Extension, admits what is analogous to these two Species of Quantity, and recognizes their force even within the sacred recesses of itself. For what can be more truly united in perfect Continuity, than the Terms which compose a Selfevident Truth? And how is this Continuity still farther extended, when by the Union of two such Truths there is produced a third, under the indiffoluble Connection of a Demonstrative Syllogism? If there was not this Syllogiftic Continuity, there might indeed be other Continuities, but it would never be in our power to prove any thing concerning them. Again, when we consider either many Propositions, without reference to a Syllogism; or many independent Terms,

without



⁽x) En. I. 411.

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without reference to a Proposition; what have we then but Quantity discrete? Philosophical Arrangements? Treafures, as capable of being number'd, estimated, and recorded, as those which the Miser commits to his coffers.

'Tis indeed by the help of an innate power of Distinction, that we recognize the Disterences of things, as 'tis by a contrary power of Composition, that we recognize their Identities (y). These powers, in some degree, are common to all Minds; and as they are the Basis of our whole Knowlege (which is of necessity either assirtative or negative) they may be said to constitute what we call Common Sense (z). On the contrary, to possess for as to be able to perceive

Identity

^{&#}x27; (y) See Hermes, p. 362, Note (f).

⁽²⁾ See Vol. I. Treatise the third, in the Notes, p. 287.

Identity in things widely different, and Ch.IX. Diversity in things nearly the same; this 'tis that constitutes what we call GENIUS, that Power divine, which thro' every sort of discipline renders the difference so conspicuous between one learner and another.

IT was from Speculations of this kind, that some of the Ancients were induced to consider QUANTITY in a far higher rank than is usual in common Specula-"tions. "They confidered both Species " under the common character of a Bound " or MEASURE, and as such to be con-" fpicuous throughout the whole Uni-" verse; the nature of the Continuous, " called MAGNITUDE, being seen in "Union and Connection; that of the " Discrete, called MULTITUDE, in Ac-" CUMULATION and JUXTAPOSITION;-" that by virtue of Magn tude the WORLD " or Universe was ONE: was extended sand connected every where thro' its of most

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es most distant Parts;—that by virtue of " Multitude it was Diversified with of THAT ORDER AND FAIR ARRANGE-" MENT, feen in the amazing variety of "Stars, of Elements, of Plants, of Ani-" mals; of Contrarieties on one fide, and " of Similarities on the other:-that if " these Quantities were thus distinguish-" able in the Copy or Image, (for such " was this World, when compared to it's " Archetype) much more so were they in -" those pure and immaterial Forms. " the invariable and immediate Objects " of the SUPREME INTELLECT. "whole Production of Quantity (as of " every thing else) they referred with " reason to this Primary Intelligent Cause; "-whose virtual Efficacy, as far as it " passes thro' all things without dividing "itself or stopping, they supposed to " generate Continuity and Union;-" as far as it flops in it's progress at every " particular, and communicates to each " a peculiar Form of its own, they held

" to generate Distinction and Mul- Ch.IX.

of TITUDE; --- and as far as it perpetually

"exerts at once these two distinct and

" opposite Energies, they considered as for

e ever rendering the Universe both

"Many and One; Many, thro' it's

" Order and fair Variety; One, thro' it's

" Connection and general Sympathy." (a)

AND

⁽a) The Authors, from whom the preceding Sentiments are taken, are *Plotinus* and *Jamblichus*, in the Commentary of *Simplicius* upon this Predicament of *Quantity*.

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AND so much for the third Univer-SAL GENUS, or PREDICAMENT, that of QUANTITY, it's various Species, and it's peculiar Properties (b).

ἐν τοῖς καθ' αὐτὰ ἀὐλοις εἴδεσι διές κε, κοινον ἔχονία, ὡς εἴρπίαι, τὸ μέτρον κὰ τὸ ωέρας. Simplic. in Prad. p. 32. B. Edit. Bafil. 1551.

Ο δὶ Θεῖω Ἰαμολιχω ἐπειδη γαρ η τε ἐνος δύναμις, ἀφ' ἐ ωᾶν το ωοσον ἀπογενναται, διατείνεται δι ὅλων ἡ αὐτη, κὴ ὁρίζει ἔκαςον ωροϊέσα ἀφ' ἐαυτης, ἡ μὲν δι ὅλων διήκει ωαντάπασιν ἀδιαιρέτως, τὸ συνεχὲς ὑΦίςησι, κὴ ἢ την ωρόσοδον ωοιεῖται μίαν, κὴ ἀδιαίρετον κὴ ἄνευ διωρισμέ. ἡ κὴ ωροϊέσα ἴς αται καθ' ἔκαςον τῶν εἰδῶν, κὴ ἢ ὁρίζει ἕκαςον, κὴ ἔκαςον ἐν ωοιεῖ, ταυτή τὸ διωρισμένον ωαράγει. Επεὶ δὲ ἄμα κὴ μένει κὴ ωρόεισι, τὰ δύο ἀπογεννα. ωτριέχει γὰρ ἡ τῶν νοητῶν μέτρων δύναμις ἄμα ἀμφότερα τὰ μένουτα κὴ ωροίοντα ἐν ἐνὶ τῷ αὐτῷ. Simplic. in Præd. p. 34. Edit. Bafil. 1551.

As the above Sentiments are expressed in the Text, a verbal Translation of them is omitted. It may however be acceptable to the curious to see them in their Originals, and for that reason they have been subjoined.

(b) See befare Note (o) of this Chapter, p. 190.

We

We cannot however quit this and the Ch. IX. preceding Predicament (I mean the Predicaments of Quality and Quantity) without observing that, as they are diffused in a conspicuous manner throughout the Universe, so Writers both sacred and profane, both poetic and prosaic, appear to have expressed their force, and that often at the same time, as the Predicaments themselves often exist so in nature.

O! Lord, how MANIFOLD are thy Works? In Wisdom hast thou made them all (c).

HERE [manifold] denotes the Quantity of the Divine Works; [made in Wisdom] denotes their Quality.

Quinctilian—Nam et QUALIS in cujusque rei natura, et quæ forma, quæritur:

⁽c) Pfalm civ. v. 24.

Ch.IX. an immortalis anima, an humand Specie

Deus: et de MAGNITUDINE et NUMERO:
quantus, Sol; an unus, Mundus (d).

WHERE the Critic not only delineates the two great *Predicaments* here mentioned, but divides also *Quantity* into it's two capital Species, I mean *Magnitude* and *Number*.

CICERO goes farther in his Tusculan Disputations, not only producing QUA-LITY and QUANTITY, but SUBSTANCE also, their support; which he places first, according to it's proper order. Si QUID sit hoc, non vides; at QUALE sit, vides: si ne id quidem; at QUANTUM sit, prosecto vides (e).

Even comic writers have expressed the force of these two Predicaments.

QUANTUM

⁽d) Infit. Orat. 1. vii. c. 4.

⁽e) Tufc. Difp. 1. i. 25. .

QUANTAM et quam veram laudem capiet Ch.IX.

Parmeno (f)?

How GREAT, and How TRUE praise will

Parmeno acquire?

Great indicates QUANTITY; True indicates QUALITY; for what QUALITY in praise is more valuable, than Truth?

THE Poets, who dealt in Subjects more exalted than Comedy, appear many of them to have employed the same Language.

THUS Tibullus, speaking of Bacchus-

-Qualis Quantusque minetur (g).

Ovid, of Jupiter-

P

QUAN-

⁽f) Terent Eunuch v. 4. 3.

⁽g) Tibul. 1. 31i. Eleg. vi. v. 23.

Ch.IX. —QUANTUSQUE et QUALIS ab altà
Junone excipitur—— (h)

VIRGIL, of Venus

—— QUALISQUE videri Calicolis, et QUANTA folet—— (i)

THE same, of POLYPHEME—

mus in antro (k).

Homer (whom 'tis probable the rest all copied) speaking of Achilles—

"Ητοι Δαρδανίδης Πρίαμ& Βαύμαζ" 'Αχιλήα, ΟΣΣΟΣ έην, ΟΙΟΣ τε Θεοίσι γαρ ανία εψαει (/).

Nor less the royal Guest the Hero eyes, His godlike aspect, and majestic size (m).

⁽b) Metam. iii. 204.

⁽i) En. ii. 589.

^{. (}k) En. v. 641.

⁽¹⁾ Iliad. xxiv. 629.

⁽m) Pope's Homer, B. xxiv. v. 798. The Translation we see renders the words of and of by 2

Peri-

THESE Attributes, given by Poets to Ch.IX. Gods and Heroes, have been found by Euclid in Figures Geometrical. a Problem, to teach us how to describe a rectilineal Figure, which to one given rectilineal Figure shall be SIMILAR, to another shall be Equal (n).

SIMILAR is a Property of QUALITY; EQUAL, of QUANTITY (0).

But 'tis time to finish, and proceed to the Arrangement next in order.

Periphrasis, and it should seem with some propriety, as the God-like aspect of Achilles is clearly among his Qualities, and his Majestic Size evidently respects his Magnitude, that is to say, his Quantity. It must be confessed however, that much of the force of the Original will necessarily be lost in the Translation, where fingle words in one Language cannot be found corresponding to fingle words in the other.

- (n) Euclid vi. 25.
- (e) See before page 175, and page 191.

CHAP.

ontantly Grooy (le

S12

CHAP. X.

Concerning RELATIVES (a)—their Source—Relatives apparent—real—their Properties, reciprocal—Inference, and Coexistence—Force of Relation in Ethics—in matters Dramatic—in Nature, and the Order of Being—Relations, amicable and hostile—Evil—Want—Friendship—Strife—Relation of all to the Supreme Cause—extent and use of this Predicament, or Arrangement.

Ch. X. Predicaments, or Arrangements already described, subordinate Beings may be said to attain their Completion; thro' Substance

⁽a) The Title of this ARRANGEMENT is exprossed by a Plural, and not a singular (like Quality and Quantity) because all Relation is necessarily between Two.

Substance they exist; thro' Quality they Ch. X. are distinguished; and thro' Quantity they acquire a Magnitude, and become a certain Multitude.

YET when Beings are thus produced, we must not imagine them to exist, like Pebbles upon the Shoar, dispersed and scattered, without Dependence or mutual Sympathy. 'Twould be difficult out of such to compose a Universe or perfect Whole, because every perfect Whole has a respect to it's Parts, as well as the Parts a respect both to such Whole, and to each other. Hence then the rise of that Genus called RELATION, a Genus which runs thro' all things, holding all of

Two.—n δε Σχέσις τουλάχισον εν δυσί ωράγμασι Θεωρείται. Ammon. in Cat. p. 94. B.—ίδιον γὰρ τῆς χέσεως μόνης, τὸ ἐν ωολλοῖς ὑΦεςάναι μόνως, ὅπερ ἐδεμιᾶ ωρόσεςι τῶν ἄλλων καθηγοριῶν.—'Tis a Peculiarity of Relation only, to have it's existence in Many, which is the case with no one else of the Predicaments, Simpl. in Præd. p. 41. B. Edit. Basil. 1551.

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Ch. X. them together, in as much as there is no Member of the Universe either so great or so minute, that it can be called independent, and detached from the rest.

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Now in all RELATION there must be a Subject whence it commences, for example Snow; another, where it terminates, for example a Swan; the Relation itself, for example Similitude; and lastly the Source of that Relation, for example Whiteness (b); the Swan is related to Snow, by being both of them White.

THE

⁽b) This Source may be fought for among the Differential Characters of Being, in whatever Predicament or Arrangement they happen to exist, be it in Quality, as the Character of Whiter; in Quantity, as that of Greater, that of more Numerous; in Time, as that of Older; in Place, as that of Upper, &cc.

This is what Simplicius means, when he faysανάγκη αὐτην (scil. την χίσιν) ἐν τῷ κατὰ διαφοράν
χαρακτηρι ἐνυπάρχειν. Simpl. in Cat.

Hence too we may see why RELATION stands next to Quantity; for in strictness the Predicaments which sollow are but different Modes of Relation, marked by some

THE Requisites to Relation being in Ch. X. this manner explained, it will appear that those only are the true Relatives, which express in their very Structure the relative Source, and whose very Essence may be found in this their reciprocal Habitude (c). But this perhaps will be better understood by a few examples.

THE

fome peculiar Character of their own, over and above the relative Character, which is common to them all.

Even in the two Predicaments that precede this of Relatives, I mean QUALITY and QUANTITY, tho' they have an existence void of Relation, we cannot say so of their characteristic Peculiarities; for LIKE is a Relative Term, and so is EQUAL. Hence Simplicius—αλλο γας το ίσου παςα το ποσού, κό άλλο το όμοιου παςα το ποιόν—ΕQUAL is something else beside QUALITY. Simpl. in Præd. By something else he means they are Relatives.

(c) Πρός τι τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεται, ὅτα, αὐτὰ ἄπερ ἐςὸν, ἐτέρων εἶναι λέγεῖαι ἢ ὁπωσεν ἄλλως ωρὸς ἔτερον.

—Such things as these are said to be RELATIVES, namely as many as are said to be, WHAT THEY ARE,

P 4

Ch. X.

THE Swan ('twas said before) was in Whiteness like Snow. Here the Swan and the Snow were produced, as Relatives. We produce others of like kind, when we affert that London is larger than York, a Lemon equal to an Orange, &c.

But the truth is, these Subjects are none of them properly Relatives of them-selves, but then only become such (as indeed may every thing else) when a Relation is raised between them through the Medium of a Relative Attribute. London, we say, is larger than York. The Relation subsists in Larger, which being attributed to London, makes it a Relative to York, which is in fact something less. The same holds in the Lemon and Orange, and in all possible instances. To whatever Subject we assorted

ciate

by being THINGS BELONGING TO OTHER THINGS, or which in any other sense have reference to something also. Arist. Præd. p. 34. Edit. Sylb.

ciate any of the Relative Attributes, we Ch. X. immediately render the Subject by such Association a Relative. Such a Subject therefore is only a Relative incidentally.

But the true and real Relatives are those Attributes themselves, the Terms Larger, Equal, Like, &c. for these in their very Structure express the relative Source, and only exist in a joint and reciprocal Habitude one to another.

THERE are also relative Substances, as well as relative Attributes; that is to say, Terms which indicate at once both a Substance and a Relative. Such are Master and Servant, Preceptor and Disciple: Master implies a Man; and not only that, but a Man having Dominion: Servant implies a Man, and not only that, but a Man rendering Service; and the same may be said of the other example alleged.

Now

Ch. X.

Now a distinguishing Property of these real Relatives, is, that they reciprocate in their Predication (d). Every Master is the Master of a Servant, and every Servant the Servant of a Master: every Preceptor the Preceptor of a Disciple; and every Disciple, the Disciple of a Preceptor. The same holds in the relative Attributes as well as in the Substances, Greater being always Greater than Less, and Less being always Less than Greater. That this is a Property, which never fails, will better appear, if from any relative Substance we subtract the relative Attribute, and substitute in it's room the Substance alone. For example, from the relative Substance, Master, let us subtract the relative Attribute. Dominion, so that Man only shall remain, divested of that Attribute.

· cannot

⁽d) Πάντα δὶ τὰ ωρός τι ωρὸς ἀντιςρίΦοντα λίγεται. Arift. Præd. p. 35.

cannot affirm of every Man, as we can Ch. X. of every Master, that merely as a Man, he is the Master of a Servant (e).

From this necessity of reciprocal Predication, another Property of Relation follows, that we cannot understand one Relative, without understanding it's companion; and that in proportion as our Knowlege of one Relative is more precise, so is that likewise of the other (f). I cannot know

⁽e) Aristotle finds an instance in the same Term, Servant.—οιον ο δέλω, εάν μη δισπότε ἀποδοθή δελω, άλλα ἀνθρώπε, η δίποδω, η ότεων των τοιέτων, κα ἀντιερίωρει ε γαρ οικεία η ἀπόδοσις ές εν-For example, the Term Servant, if he be not described as the Servant of a Master, but of a Man, or of a Biped, or of any other such thing, does not reciprocate, because the Description returned is not necessary and essential—that is, we cannot say, the Man of a Servant, or the Biped of a Servant, as we say the Master of a Servant. Arist. Præd. p. 37, where much more is subjoined, worth reading.

⁽f) Relata sunt simul COGNITIONE. Cognito proinde alterutro, cognoscitur alterum; (idque BODEM plane MODE

Ch. X. know for example that A is greater than B, without knowing that B is less than A; and if with more precision I know that A is double, I necessarily know withal that B is half; and if with still farther precision I know the measure of A to be eight, I know with equal precision the measure of B to be four (g).

AND

MODO, et MENSURA COGNITIONIS) et ignorato ignoratur. Logic. Compend. Saunderson, p. 41. Edit. Oxon. 1672.

I have quoted Saunderson, as he was an accurate Logician, but Aristotle's own words are, as follows—
ἐάν τις εἰδη τι ωρισμένως τῶν πρός τι, κὰκεῖνο, πρὸς
ἢ λίγεται, ωρισμένως εἴσεται—If any one know with precision any one of two Relatives, he will know also the other Relative which it refers to, with equal precision. Arist. Prædic. p. 39. Edit. Sylb.

(g) And here by the way it is worth observing, that as all Relatives are recognized in combination, while every Object of Sense is perceived distinct and independent; it follows that all Relatives are properly Objects of the Intellect, and that, if it were not for this faculty, we should know nothing concerning them. Let A for example be supposed the master of B, and let A be tall, well-proportioned, ruddy, &c. These last

And this naturally leads to that fundamental Property of Relation, on which the rest all depend, namely, the necessary and universal Co-existence of Relatives (h), which always commence together, subsist together, and cease together. Ulysses, in his Speech to Thersites, says in anger,

last characters only are visible to the Eye, nor does the Eye see more, while the Relation subsists, or less, when the Servant dies, and the Relation is at an end-Were there a change in the Master's person, were he to become deformed from being well-shaped, or pale from being ruddy, then would the Eye be able to recognize what had happened. But 'tis a fingular property of this Genus, that a Relative may change, or lose it's Relations, without change or loss within itself. Let the corresponding Relative but vary, or cease to exist; let the Master lose his Servant, or the Preceptor his Disciple; let those, who stood on my right remove themselves to my left, or those, who flood above me, place themselves below; and 'tis easy to conceive a Subject, after having lost or varied every one of these Relations, still to remain itself invariably the fame.

May

⁽b) Δοκει δὶ τὰ ωρός τι ἄμα τῆ Φύσει είναι.
Arift. Prad. p. 37.

Ch. X. May I lose my son Telemachus, if I do not seize, &c. And how does he express this sentiment?

Μηδέτι Τηλεμάχοιο πατής κεκλημένου είπι.

May I no longer be called THE FATHER OF TELEMACHUS (i).

He well knew he could only lose that Relative Denomination, by losing his Son, with whose birth and duration it was indisfolubly connected. It was not that Ulysses might not have survived Telemachus, or Telemachus, Ulysses; the Co-existence being only attached to the Relative Characters, those of Father and Son.

And hence we may collect that the Co-existence here mentioned is not like that of Substance and it's essential Pro-

perties

⁽i) Iliad, B. v. 260.

perties (as Rationality for example co- Ch. X. exists with Man, or Sensation with Animal); but a Co-existence less intimate by far than that is, because it subsists between Beings actually distinct one from another.

AND hence it has followed, that some Logicians have treated it as possessing less of the *real*, than any one of the other Genera. They tell us, Relatio est Ens minimæ Entitatis (k).

YET we must be careful how we undervalue it (1), in consequence of such a notion;

⁽k) Fell's Logic, p. 92.

⁽¹⁾ Thus Simplicius in his Comment on this Categoric—Δια ταυτα δε, ως ωαραφυσμένην ταις άλλαις κατηγορίαις, την τε ωρός τι επεισοδιώδη νομίζεσε καί τοι ωροηγεμένην έσαν, κ) κατα διαφοράν οἰκείαν θεωρεμένην. Αυτη γαρ κοινότης ες ει δια ωάντων διήκεσα, τώντε έναντίων, κ) των όποσεν διαφιρόντων, κ) των δλων γενών, κ) των υπ' αυτα τεταγμένων ήτις ει μη ωαρήνο

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Ch. X. notion; fince with those, who well attend to it's amazing efficacy, it is more likely

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waeñv, διεσπάσθη αν wavrn (l. wavra) aπο wavren.

— And bence some conceive the Predicament of Relation, by it's growing on as it were to the rest, to be something episodic and adventitious, altho it be in fast truly principal, and an Object of Contemplation from it's own distinctive Character. 'Tis this indeed is that Band of Community which passes thro' all things; thro' Contraries, thro' things in any way different, thro' whole Genera, and thro' the several Beings, arranged beneath them—that Principle, which, were we to suppose away, all things in that instant would be distipated and torn from all things. Simplic. in Pradic. p. 44. B. Edit. Basil. 1551.

See also the same Author in the same Comment:

Οὐτε γὰρ τὰ γένη, ἔτε τὰ ὑπὰ αὐτῶν ὅντα, κοινωυίαν ἔξει τινὰ πρὸς ἄλληλα, εὶ μή τις χέσεως ἢ λόγῶν ἐν τοῖς ἔσιν. ᾿Ατοπου δὲ τὴν κρινωνίαν ἀναιρεῖν τῶν
διαφερόντων πρὸς ἄλληλα. ἄτοπου δὲ κὰ τὴν ἀρμονίαν
ἀναίρειν, ἐν τὴν ἐν τοῖς Φθόγδοις μόνην, ἐδὲ τὴν ἐν τοῖς
ἀριθμοῖς, ἀλλὰ κὰ τὴν ἐν ταῖς ἐσίαις κὰ δυνάμεσι πάσαις κὰ ἐνεργείαις, ἤτις ἐγδινομένη τοῖς ἔσι, συνήγαθεν
εἰς ταυτὸν, κὰ χέσιν ἔχειν πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀπειργάσαλο.
ἀναιρεθήσεται δὲ κὰ τὸ σύμμετρου κὰ ἴσου, κὰ ἐπιςητὸν,
κὰ ἐπιςήμη. Εἰ δὲ κὰ γεωμετρία κὰ μυσικὴ περὶ χέσεις
ἔχυσιν, ἀνυπός ατοι δὲ αὐταί · καταγέλας οι ἀν εἶεν ἐκεῖ-

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ıαı

likely to acquire a rank perhaps above Ch. X. it's real merit.

WHAT ought we to think, should it appear the Basis of Morality?—" MORAL OUTIES (says Epictetus) are in general

υαί ωτερί τα αυυπός αλα καλατριδόμεναι. Πώς δε κ εΦετον Εάσιν ο θεος λέγεται, εί μπδεμία χέσις έςὶ ωρος το εφετον τῷ εφιεμένω. - For neither the Universal Genera, nor the things included under them, can have any Connection one with another, if there exist not in things the Ratio of HABITUDE or RELATION. But 'tis abfurd to take away the Connection of things that differ one from another: absurd also to take away Harmony, not that only which exists in Sounds, nor that which exists in Numbers, but that also which exists in Substances, and in all the variety of Capacities and Energies; that, which baving been implanted in Beings, has brought them together, and effected, that they should have the Relation here spoken of to each other. [Farther than this, by taking away Rélation] there will be taken away the Proportionate, the Equal, the Knowable, and Knowlege. If Geometry and Music are employed about Relations, and thefe last have no Existence; then will those Sciences be ridicu'ous, in being employed about Non entities. How also can God himself be called AN OBJECT OF DESIRE TO ALL BEINGS, if there be no Relation between the Thing defired, and that which defires ? Simplic, in Præd. p. 43.

" mea-

Ch. X. ** measured by Rebations. Is he a Fa
"ther?—The Relation ordains, that he

"ther?—The Relation ordains, that he

"must be taken care of; that thou yield to

"him in all things, bear with him, when

"he reproaches, when he strikes, &cc.—

"But he is a bad Father—And wert thou

"then by nature connected with a good

"Father?—No, but with a Father—

"Thus therefore out of Neighbour, out of

"Citizen, out of Magistrate wist thou

"TRACE THE MORAL DUTY, if thou

"make it a Custom to Contemplate

"The Relations (m)."

THE Stoic Emperor Antoninus inculeates the same doctrine. There are (says he) three RELATIONS; one to the proximate Cause, which immediately surrounds us; one to the divine Cause, from which all things happen to all; and one to those, along with whom we live (n). So import-

⁽m) Epiet. Ench. cap. xxx.

⁽n) M. Ant. vili. 27.

ant is the Knowlege of Relations (ac- Ch. Xabording to these Philosophers) in a subject, which so much concerns us, I mean an upright and a virtuous conduct.

'Tis to a subordinate end, that Horace applies this Knowlege, when he makes it an effential to Dramatic Poets; and as a Philosophical Critic, teaches them, that 'tis thro' this Knowlege only they can truly delineate Characters. The verses are well known:

Qui didicit, patriæ quid debeat, &c.

Tis thus too that Shakespeare, either by Knowlege acquired, or (what is more probable) by the dictates of an innate superior Genius (6), makes Macbeth shudder

⁽e) The Author has in this place considered Shake-speare, as Aristotle did Homer, and has left it uncertain, to what Cause his transcendent merit should be asserbed. Aristotle, speaking of Homer's superiority,

Ch. X. der at the thoughts of murdering Dancan, when he reflects on the many Duties he owed him, arifing from the many Relations he stood in, all of which Duties he was then basely going to violate.

—— He's here in double trust;

First, as I am his Kinsman, and his Subject,

Strong both against the deed: then, as his Host,

Who should against his Murtherer shut the door,

Not bear the Knife myself-

And here I cannot help remarking upon this excellent Tragedy, that it is not only admirable as a *Poem*, but is perhaps at the same time one of the most *moral* pieces existing. It teaches

fays in like manner, that it was, ñτοι δια τέχνην, η δια Φύσιν, either thre' Art, or thre' Nature. Vid. Arift. Paet. C. viii.

us the danger of venturing, tho' but for Ch. X. once, upon a capital offence, by shewing us that 'tis impossible to be wicked by halves; that we cannot stop; that we are in a manner compelled to proceed; and yet that, be the success as it may, we are sure in the event to become wretched and unhappy (p).

But to return to our Subject, I mean that of Relation.

If we quit Mankind, and view it's more general extent, we shall find, that, where Continuity fails, there RELATION supplies it's office, connecting as it were all things the most remote and heterogeneous. Were they indeed combined under an Union more intimate, were it the same with that Continuity, seen in a living Body and it's Limbs, the whole Uni-

Q_3

verse



⁽p) See the Remarks on this Tragedy in that elegant Book, the Essay on the Writings and Genius of Shakespeare.

Ch. X. verse would be no more than one immense Animal. But 'tis not so: and those, who have explained it's Nature, have rather called it one City, or one Commonwealth (q); a very different Species of Monad from one Animal, or living Being. 'Tis here then (as we have faid) Relation intervenes, and under a thousand different ties connects all things together.

> THE ties indeed are many, tho' the Sources are few. Every subordinate Being, as it is by nature subject to wants, (indigence and imperfection being effential to it's constitution) has a connection with those Beings, thro' whom such wants may be supplied. Hence then one Source of Relation. Again, every Being whatever, that has power to supply such wants, has a Connection with those Beings, ta whom it can thus become subservient. Hence

⁽⁹⁾ See Val. First, Treatise the third, p. 225, 341. then

then another Source of Relation. Now Ch. X. in the Divine Oeconomy of the whole it is so admirably contrived, that every Being in different degrees possesses this double character, and not only needs assistance, but is able in it's turn to afford it. Nothing is so mighty, as to subsist without help; nothing so minute, as not at times to have it's use. Thus as Connections reciprocate, and are every where blended, the Concatenation of Relations grows in sact universal, and the world becomes (as above described) one City or Commonwealth.

INSTANCES of this double Relation occur (as we have faid) in every particular Being. The Ewe is related to the Grass, as to the Being which supplies her wants; to her Lamb, as to the Being whose wants she herself supplies. The Grass again is related to the Earth, as to the Being, which affords it aliment; while it is related to the Ewe, by be-

Ch. X. coming itself aliment to her. The Earth is related to Vegetables, as she is both their parent and their nurse; while she is related to the Sun, as to the fountain of her genial warmth. The Relations of the Sun are finely represented by Epictetus, who makes the Sovereign of THE UNIVERSE thus address that noble Luminary. " Thou (faith he) art SUN: "Thou art able by going round, to form 4 the year and the Seasons; to enlarge and so nourish the fruits; to raise and still the Winds; to warm in due degree the bo-" dies of men: Arise, go round, and beeginning from the greatest, extend after this manner thy influence to the most mies nute (r)."

> Nor when we mention the Earth ought we to forget that equitable discharge of her Relations, for which Virgil well distinguishes her by the character of most Yust;

Fundit

⁽r) Arrian. Epict. l. iii. c. xxiv. p. 444. Συ ήλι Φ εί δύνασαι, κ. τ. λ.

Fundit humo facilem victum justissima Ch. X.
TELLUS (1).

THE Attic Historian and Philosopher will be found the best Commentator on this elegant passage of the Roman Poet.

"THE EARTH too (says Xenophon) be"ing a Divinity, teacheth those that can
"is learn it of her, Justice: for such as "cultivate her best, she requiteth with most to goods (t)".

WHEN we view the Relation of the Male to the Female, and of the Female to the Male, and add to this the Common Relation extending from both to their Offspring, we view the rise of Families thro' the whole animal race. Among

⁽s) Virg. Georg. ii. 460.

⁽¹⁾ Eti de fi TH, Deds Fora, the duvaments nata
mardáreir, m AIKAIOETNHN didágneir the yaig a
pisa Departivolas autir, wheisa ayada artiroisi.

Xenoph. Occorom. p. 35. Edit. Oxon.

the

the, these Families by fresh Relations are combined into larger multitudes, under the name of Flocks and Herds. Among those of higher order still (such as the Bee (u), the Ant, the Beaver, and above all the social and rational Being, Man) these herds and slocks by relations more excellent are improved into civil Polities, where there is a general Interest or common Good, a Good to which either willingly or unwillingly (x) every indivi-

dual co-operates.

See Vol. I. Treatife the third, p. 235, 349.

⁽u) Firgil speaks of the Bee, as he would of Man;
Mores et studie et populos et prælia dicam. Georg. iv.
Aristotle, distinguishing these Animals from those, which do no more than barely herd together, elegantly calls them ζωα προλιτικά, Political or Civil Animals, Animals formed for a Like of Civil essociation, where the Business is one, and that common to the whole Tribe; ων εν τι, κ. τ. λ. Histor. Anim. p. 5. Edit. Sylb.

⁽x) ——— A & mi Piau. Kands yerbuer , idir Tilor Thomas. Epitt. Embirid. c. Iii.

Is we descend below Animals down Ch. X. to Vegetables, we shall discover in the Vine, the Ivy, the Woodbind, and all the Plants of slender Stalk, a manifest relation to those of a trunk more solid, such as the Oak, the Elm, and the several trees of the Forest. Tis with a Power, which appears almost a conscious one, that the former of these tribes, recognizing their Relation, apply to the latter for a support, and spontaneously twine their bodies, or at least their tendrils, appund them (y).

WHEN

⁽y) Τὰ τίλη, ἐΦ' ὰ τῶν Φύσει γιΙνομένων ΕΚΑΣΤΑ
ξεται, ὰ κὰ τὰν ἀρχὰν εὐθυς Φυσμένοις πάρες να αὐτεῖς,
κλλ' ὕςατα ἀἡπυ παραγίγνεται. Σκοπῶμεν δ' αὐτὸ
ἐΦ' ἐνὸς τὰθι' τῆ ἀμπύλυ ἔλιμι τύλΟν ἐςὶ, τὸ ἐτέρα
Φυτὰ πθορθῷ περιελιχθεῖσαν, ἐπείνῳ τὰν ἄμπελον ἀναἤῆσαι τῷ Φυτῷ, ταύτην ἐν τοῖς Φυτοῖς τὰν Φύσιν εἰληχυίαν, ἐπαλλόκαυλον εἶναι. Οὐκῶν τὸ ἔτέρα Φυτὰ πθορβῷ τὰν ἔλικα περιελιχθεῖσαν ἀναδῆσαι τὰν ἄμπελον, ἔτε
τὰ ἀμπέλο φυσμένη, ἔτε τὰ ἔλικι εὐθυς πάρες ν, ἀλλ'
ἔςατόν γε παραγίγνείαι ἀδζυ μέντοι ἤτίον τῶ Φύκαθαο

Ch. X. WHEN therefore we contemplate the various Relations already hinted, and mark in

εσθαι όλως έλικα τη αμπέλω αίτιου τελικου ή εφ' ετέρω Φυτῷ ἀνάδεσες αὐτης ἐςιν. 'Αμήχανου δὲ τὸ μπδέπω ὅν, μπδ' ἐν τοῖς ἔσει τεΓαγμένου, ὅντῷν τὰ ἤδη αἴτιου γίγνεσθαι: είναι γὰρ δεῖ τὸ αἴτιου τὰ γείνομένα, ἀχὶ μπὰ ἐναι. Προειληθαι ἄρα δεῖ ἔν τινι νῷ τὴν τῆς ἀμπέλα ἐψ' ἐτέρῳ Φυτῷ ἀνάδεσεν, ὅς αὐτῆ ἐπιςατῶν, ῶσπερ ὅπμιαργός ἀνὰρ σκευαςοῖς, κὰ τὴν ἔλικα αὐτῆ τῆς τοιαύτης ἔνεκα ἀναδέσεως Φύσει ἢ κὰ Θαυμασίως, ἐαν μὲν ἐπ' εὐθύ ωως Φαίνελαι Φερομένη: ἐαν δὲ ωλορθός τις ωαρῆ, ἐὐθύς ωεριειλιχθῆ. Οὐτ ἔν τὴν ἔλικα τῆ ἀμπέλω μπὰ ἐ τάτα ἔνεκα Φύεσθαι, ὅπως ἐτέρω αὐτὴν Φυτῷ ἀναδήση, τάτα ἔχοι ἀν κὰ ὀυτινᾶν λόγον.

The Ends, to which the several vegetable Productions tend, are not instantly present to them, as soon as they begin to grow, but some way or other accrue to them subsequently. We may perceive this in a single instance. The End to the Vine's Tendril, is, by twining round the Branch of another Vegetable, to bind the Vine to that Vegetable; which Vine, among the vegetable Tribe, possesses this natural Character, that it should rest upon another for it's support. Now that the Tendril, by twining round the Branch of another Vegetable, should bind the Vine on, neither belongs to the Vine, when it sirst begins

in how friendly a manner they bring the Ch. X. most distant Beings together, we may

be

to grow, nor yet to it's Tendril; but is something which accrues subsequently: and yet nevertheless, the binding of it to another Vegetable is the FINAL CAUSE why the Tendril should grow at all, and belong to the Vine. But it is impossible that what AS YET IS NOT, and has no Arrangement in the order of things, (I mean the binding) should be the Cause of something WHICH NOW IS, (I mean the Tendril of the Vine, when it first appears). The Cause of any thing produced must have an actual Existence, and not be a nonentity. This Binding therefore of the Vine to some other Vegetable must have been PRECONCEIVED IN SOME MIND OR INTELLECT, who presiding over it (as any Man, being an Artist, presides over bis Works) makes the Tendril grow to it for the fake of fuch Binding: which Tendril also wonderfully, if there be nothing adjoining of a nature for it to twine round, appears in some fort to shoot upwards; but if any Branch be near, instantly deviates and twines round it. It is therefore irrational to suppose that the Tendril did not grow to the Vine, that it might hereafter bind it to another Vegetable; nor can there be any degree of Reason for asferting, that some MIND or INTELLIGENCE did not preside over such Operations.

The force of this Argument is, as follows— THINGS exist before their ENDS; that is, before that the Ends of their Existence take place. The Tendril exists, before it binds the Vine; the Minute-hand exists, Ch. X. be tempted to say with the Philosopher;
that " all things are full of FRIENDLY
" PRIN-

exists, before it indicates the Minutes. And yet is this Binding, and this Indicating so necessary, that the Things themselves would never have existed, but for the sake of these only. Where then were these Ends, when the Things themselves first appeared?—In external and visible nature?—This from the Hypothesis is impossible, for the Hypothesis makes them subsequent.—No other place then remains, but either the Sovereign Mind, or a Mind subordinate, according as the Work itself is a Work of Nature of of Art. See before, p. 112, 113.

I have taken the preceding Extract from a Manufeript of that able Scholar and Philosopher George Comifius, otherwise called Pletho, who flourished it the fifteenth Century, both before and after the taking of Conflantinople. If it apply not immediately to the Subject, it has at least the merit of being something rare and ingenious. It is a morfel of that Controverly among the learned Greeks of this Persod. whether the Preference in Philosophy was due to Plate or to Aristotle. Scholarius, among others, was for Ariftotle; Plathe for Plate; from whose Work on this Subject (which was an Answer to Scholarius) this Extract is taken. There is another small Work of Plethe's upon the fame Subject, intitled, II sol is Approtect whos Alatuna diafferen, printed at Paris, 1541; and Beffaris (a learned Greek of that age, who went over to the Latin Church, and became a Cardinal)

not suffer this sentiment to carry us too far. Things are not only sull of FRIENDLY PRINCIPLES, but of HOSTILE likewise.

Cardinal) wrote a large Tract to defend the Platonis Doctrine, intitled Contra Calumniatorem Platonis. The printed Edition is in Latin, but the whole Work is extant in Greek among the Manuscripts of St. Marc's Library at Venice, to which Library Bessario bequeathed his own. There is too a fine Letter remaining of the same Bessario, addressed to Michael Apostolius, who, tho' he took Bessario's side, and defended Plato, yet appears to have done it, according to Bessario's Letter, with a zeal and bitterness not becoming him; a zeal and bitterness too frequent in Controversy, and (unfortunately for the Cause of Letters) no where more, than among learned meny and those in particular, whom we call Profesors of Humanity.

The Epistle above mentioned may be found in Greek and Latin, published by the learned Bivinus, in the second Tome of L'Histoire de l'Academie Royale des Inscriptions, &c. p. 455; and it is well worth perusal, for it's Temper and Elegance.

See also Cicero de Senectute, c. xv. Vitis quident, &c.

(2) Пачта бі Фідыч рега. Arrian Epith. 1. iii. s. vaiv. p. 486. Edit. Upt.

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a source of hostile relation; if to Desence, then is he the object of injury from some other; so that hostility in either

Ch. X. THE Fangs of the Lion are as muchi the work of Nature, as the tendrils of the Vine, or the nurturing Teats of the Ewe. To what then have these formidable weapons Relation; for Nature; we are assured, makes nothing in vain (a)? If to Offence, then is the Lion himself

(a) This was an axiom, inculcated every where by Aristotle; and more especially, when he is speaking of Final Causes, which, tho' now they make a small part of Philosophy, were never omitted by the Stagirite, as often as they could be introduced. His own words deserve attention—ή Φύσις εθέν ωσιεί μάτην, αλλ' αι εί εκ των ενδεχομένων τη εσία ωερί εκασον γέ-B Cus to apisor-Nature makes nothing in VAIN, but with respect to each animal Genus, out of the several ways practicable she always makes that which is best. De Animal. Ingressu, p. 28. Edit. Sylb .- And again, in the same Tract-ή Φύσις εθλε δημικργεί μάτην, ώσπερ είρηται ωρότερον, αλλά ωάντα ωρός το βέλτιου έκ των ένδεχομένων-NATURE CREATES NO-THING IN VAIN, but (as has been faid already) all things for the best, out of the several woys that are practicable. Ibid. p. 141. Edit. Sylb.

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case is necessarily implied. Were it possible to doubt as to the offensive here, we could never doubt as to the Structure of the Spider's Web; a Structure clearly taught her by Nature for offence alone.

These and the like Preparations, such as the Boar's Tusk, the Eagle's Talons, the Viper's Venom, &c. are all founded on fach wants, as can never be satisfied amicably. The Wants therefore of this character naturally rouse up similar Instincts, and thus the World becomes filled as well with HOSTILE RELATIONS, as FRIENDLY.

Torva leæna lupum sequitur, lupus ipse capellam (b).

IT appears to have been these Relations of Hostility, that first gave rise to the phenomena of NATURAL and MORAL EVIL. Now whether REAL EVIL exist

⁽b) Virg. Ed. ii.

at all, or whether we should confine it with the Stoics to Evil purely moral, are Questions beyond the Scope of this Treatise to examine. It will be sufficient to say, that much Evil is imaginary, and sounded merely on false opinion; that of the Evils More real, there are many, which have their END, and so may be said to partake ultimately the nature of Good. Many of the difficulties and distresses, which befal the human Species, conduce to save it from Sloth, and to rouse it up to action; to action, which is in fact the very life of the Universe.

Haud facilem esse viam voluit, primusque per artem

Movit agros, curis acuens mortalia corda, Nec torpere gravi passus sua regna veterno *.

^{*} Virg. Georg. I.

If there were no dangers, then could Ch. X. there be no Fortitude; if no Temptations, then no Temperance; if no adverse Accidents, nor Loss of what we love, then no submissive Resignation, no pious Acquiescence.

Οὐκ ὰν γενοῖτο χωρὶς ἐσθλὰ κὴ κακά· ᾿Αλλ᾽ ἔςι τις σύγκρασις, ὧς᾽ ἔχειν καλὧς.

Things Good and Ill can ne'er exist apart;

But such the MIXTURE, that they WELL accord (c).

AGAIN,

⁽c) The fine Distich here translated is from Euripides, quoted by Plutarch de Isid. et Osirid. p 369. Edit. Xyland.

As to the Speculations here offered, and the Solutions suggested, we may well apply to them that just reflection of the Stagirite, tho' used by him on a different occasion.

[&]quot;Ισως δε χαλεπον κό σερί των τοιέτων σφοδρώς απο-Φαίνεσθαι, μη σολλάκις επεσχεμμένου το μέντοι διη- \mathbf{R} 2 πορηκέναι

Ch, X,

AGAIN, the Jaws of the Lion, the Poison of the Rattle Snake, the Sword of the Conqueror, and every Instrument of destruction, may be said incidentally to prepare the way for Generation; and that not only by making room for new Comers, but by furnishing fresh Materials towards their respective Production. For tho' the Theatre of the World so far resembles other Theatres, that it is perpetually filled with Successions of new Spectators; yet has it this in peculiar, that the Spectators, which succeed here, are made out of those that went before. Every particular Birth, or natural production, appears an act, if not of hostility, at least of Separation; a Secession from the general Mass; a kind of

revolt

woonneval weel endeu autwo, in axpneon eel.—Parbaps 'tis difficult to prove any thing clearly upon Subjects fuch as these, without having often considered and examined them. And yet to have thrown out doubts concerning them, is a thing, not altogether without it's uso. Aristot. Præd. p. 40. Edit. Sylb.

revolt from the greater Bulk in favour of Ch. X. a fmaller; which smaller would detach itself, and, were it able, be independent.

IN a word as FRIENDSHIP, by cementing Multitude, produces UNION; so
STRIFE, by diffolving Union, produces
MULTITUDE; and 'tis by MULTITUDE
that the World becomes diversified and replenished.

AND hence we may perceive the meaning of what Heraclitus says in Plutarch, where he calls "WAR, the Father and "King and Lord of all things; and afferts," that when Homer prayed

- "That Strife be banished both from Gods and Men,
- " he was not aware that he was curfing
- " the Generation of all things; as in fact
- " they deduce their rife out of Contest and
- "Antipathy." The same Philosopher R 3 adds

Ch. X. adds immediately, "that THE SUN could "not pass his appointed bounds; that other-"wise, if he could,

Tongues he would find to patronize the Caufe:

meaning by this mythological way of talking, that the Sun could not defert his
Course, because so much depended on it;
or otherwise, if he could, that being
himself one of the primary Authors of Generation upon this Earth, and well knowing how much Strife co-operated in the
same work, he would surely look out for
an advocate (were such any where existing) to defend the cause of Strife against the Calumnies of Homer (d).

FROM

⁽d) Ήράκλειτ το μεν γαρ αντικρυς σόλεμον ονομάζει σατέρα κ) βασιλέα κ) κύριον σάντων κ) τον μέν Ομπρον, εύχόμενον,

Έχ τε θεών έριν, έκ τ' αυθρώπων απολέσθαις λαυθάνειν Φησί τῆ ωάντων γενέσει καταρώμενου, έκ μάχης

From all these Speculations one thing Ch. X. at least appears (whatever else may be doubtful)

τη η επερεματισματίας την λερταιν εχοριων. ηγιον αξ

Γλώτίας μιν δίκης ἐπικέρες ἐξευρήσειν.

Plutarch. de Isid. et Osir. p. 370. Edit. Xyland. Fol.

Dr. Squire, the late Bishop of St. David's, has given a fair Edition of this Tract in the original, to which he has subjoined an English Translation; but (according to a Practice too frequent with the best Critics) he has, in the Passage above quoted, attempted to mend, where no Emendation was wanting.

Chalcidius plainly alsudes to the same Sentiment of Heraclitus in the following Extract from his Commentary on Plate's Timæus.—Proptereaque Numenius laudat Heraclium (lege Heraclitum) reprehendentem Homerum, qui optaverit interitum et vassitatem malis vitæ, quòd non intelligeret mundum sibi deleri placere: si quidem Sylva, quæ malorum sons est, exterminaretur. Chal. p. 396. Edit. Meurs. 1617.

In the Greek Quotation, Homer is supposed to wish inadvertently against the Generation of all things; in the Latin, he wishes in the same inadvertent manner against the existence of Sylva, that is, of Matter. The difference is easily reconciled, if we suppose Matter to be the Basis of Generation, and to be essentially R 4

Ch. X. doubtful) that Relations of Hostility, as well as Friendship, have their use in the Universe. Both also equally arise from Want on one side, and from the Power of removing it on the other (e). The difference is, that in friends Relations the Help is communicated either with pleasure, as when the Mother suckles her Child; or at least without pain, as when we shew a traveller his way. In hostile Relations, the Help, without regard to the Communicator, is either taken by force, as when the Wolf devours the Lamb; or obtained by stratagem, as when the Spider insnares the Fly.

AMD

requisite to the existence of things Generable and Perishable, out of which this lower and visible World is wholly composed.

⁽e) How far the WANT OF GOOD leads to Arts and Action, may be seen in Vol. I. Treatise the first, p. 24; and in the Notes subjoined, p. 272, 3. 4, 5. We here perceive it to extend not only to the whole animal World, but even to the Vegetable. More will be found on this Subject in the Treatise upon Motion, 2 part of the present Work.

And thus by the reciprocal Relations Ch. X. of Want and Help (both of which under a variety of Forms exist in every individual) is there a kind of general Concatenation extended throughout the Universe; while each Being communicates what Help it can afford, and obtains in it's turn, that Help which it requires.

To all these Relations must be added that chief, the mentioned last, that of the whole Universe, and every Being in it, to the First, Supreme, and Intelligent Cause, thro' which Relation They are called His Offspring, and He Their Father. Here indeed the Relations are not blended as before; they are all purely referable to Want on one side, and all purely arise from Spontaneous Help on the other; the correspondence existing, as sar as Persect has respect to Impersect, Independent to Dependent, the Object desired

Ch. X. fired to the Beings which defire (f), the Maker to his Works, the Parent to his Children (g).

AND now to conclude with a Remark, which regards Relation in general. "As to every Continuous Being the Genus of QUALITY gives Distinctions, which help to mitigate it's Sameness, and render it as it were discrete; so to Beings discrete, however remote, the Genus of Relation gives a Connection, which ferves to mitigate their Diversity, and to render them as it were continuous.

⁽f) Πως δε κρ εφετον πάσιν ο θεος λεγείαι, εί μηδεμία ο είσις ες ες προς το εφετον τω εφιεμένω — How is God called an Object desirable to all Beings, if there be no RELATION between the Object of Desire, and the Being which desires? Simplic. in Prædic. p. 43. B. Edit. Basil. 1551. See before, Note p. 225.

⁽g) St. Paul has given his Sanction to that Verse of Aratus—Τε γας κ γένω εσμέν—For we are his Off-spring. Arat. Phan. v. 5. Acts xvii. 28.

[&]quot; Thus

Thus is the World maintained as well Ch. X.

- of in it's Union, as in it's VARIETY,
- " while both Species of Quantity run thro"
- " the whole, and thro' every Part."

And so much for the ARRANGEMENT or Genus of Relation, it's nature, it's properties, it's utility, and extent (h).

The old Logicians held that Things Intelligible, and Intellection were Relatives; so also Things Sensible, and Sensation. But then they flarted an objection-If Relatives co-exist, and always reciprocate in their existence, what would become of Euclid's Theorems, supposing there were no Geometricians? What would become of Sensible Objects, supposing there were no Beings sensitive?

One Solution of this Objection is derived from the Percipient-THE FIRST ORIGINAL AND SUPREME Percipient is every where, and always in THE FULL ENERGY OF UNIVERSAL PERCEPTION.

Another Solution is from the Objects perceived, bethey fenfible or intelligible. Every fuch Object has a double nature; an absolute nature, and a relative one. The Sound A is an Octave to the Sound B. ceases, and A continues. A is no longer an Octave, but still it is a Sound: and even tho' we should call it

⁽b) Before we quit this Arrangement, we shall fubjoin the following Note.

Ch. X.

me Sound, if there were to be no Hearers; it would fill be an *Undulation* of Air, capable of producing Sound, if there were an Ear capable of perceiving it, that is, an Organ adequate to the Smifation.

The Instance given on this occasion by the Philos sophers Perphyry and Simplicius, is eurious, because it is taken from that difficult System of Music, the Enhantenic. The following are the words of Simplicius—Κῶν γῶρ διὰ ραθυμίαν ἀποδάλωμεν ποτὶ τὰν τῶν ὅντων γνῶσιν, ὑδὶν ῆτον μένει τὰ ὄντα, ὅπερ ἰςὶ τὰ ἐπιτωντικό τὰ ἐπιτωντικό τὰ ἀνεπαίσθητοι τάτα τὰ διας πρατω ἐπρίνως, τῶν δὶ ἀνεπαίσθητοι τάτα τὰ διας πρατω ἐπρίνως, τῶν δὶ ἀνεπαίσθητοι τάτα τὰ διας πρατω ἐπρίνως, τὸν δὶ ἀνεπαίσθητοι τάτα τὰ διας πρατω ἐπρίνως, those things, which are intelligible, remain nevertheless. 'Tis thus that in Music we used in former days to hear the QUARTER-TONE, but now we are unable to distinguish this interval. Simplic. in Præd. p. 48.

B. Edit. Basil. 1551.

Porphyry, having told us that the there were no Geometry, considered as a Science, there would still be Objects Geometrical, subjoins-inel m is in til Musσική το μεν πάλαι τε διεσιαίε διασήματο παυου οί processi, usebon ge afreyageigut Luc sambronia beyaggiato मक्की के पर रोहदावांक रेविंडम्मक हेम्हरेज़रेहांपक, हर्राय पर पठाare alebaeic frai (lege ici) diarapuar 🕒 n danos ori हैं। नर्ने Φύσει हेट्टी नठे व्योजिमनक्षेत्र नहेंनठ कीर्वहम्मव्य, हां स्ट्रे में αίσθησις ἐκλέλοιπευ. For thus too in Music, Musicians used FORMERLY to hear (and distinguish) the Interval of the QUARTER-TONE : but in latter days, THE EN-HARMONIC MELODY having been neglected, by which this Interval used to be modulated, there is no longer now any Sensation of such an Interval: and get 'tis evident that this femille Interval has an Existence in nature, althe'

the for the present the Sensation of it be left. Perphyr. Ch. X. in Pradic. p. 40. Ed. Paris. 1543.

Porphyry flourished in the third Century; Simplicius in the fixth.

We may remark by the way from the above Quotations, how fast the Arts of Elegance were finking even in the more early of those two Periods.

As for the state of Philosophy in the latter Period, we may form a Judgment of it by what we learn from Simplicius in the same Treatise, with regard to the Stoics. Having in his Commentary on the Predicaments of Action and Paffion given many Quotations from the Staic Logic, he concludes the Chapter with the following words-IJohhn of i Too Toleton ifigγασία τσαρά τοῖς Στωϊκοῖς 🗳 ἐΦ' ἡμῶν κὴ ἡ διδασκαλία, κὶ τὰ Ελείςα των συγβραμμάτων ἐπιλέλοιπον-There is much elaborate Discussion of these matters among the STOICS, of whom both the DOCTRINE and MOST OF THE WRITINGS are IN OUR TIMES loft, and at Simpl. in Prad. p. 84. B. Edit. Bafil. an end. 1551.

Mahomet soon followed, whose Successor. Omer burnt the Alexandrine Library; nor did the succeeding Caliphs emerge from Barbarity, till the Race of the Abbassida, near two Centuries after.

The Barbarity of Western Europe continued much longer, and did not begin to leffen, till the fifteenth Century, that preceding the age of Lee the tenth.

CHAP.

CHAP. XI.

Concerning ACTION and PASSION—Action, it's five Species—those of Passion reciprocate—Mind Divine, Human—latter, how acted upon—Politics, Oeconomics, Ethics—Passivity in Bodies animate, and inanimate—Action, and Reaction, where they exist, where not—Self-motion, what, and where—Power, whence and what—requisite both in Action and in Passion—Power, tho' like Non-Entity, yet widely different—Double in the reasoning Faculty—Power, not first in existence, but Energy, which never has ceased, or will cease, or can cease.

Ch.XI. In treating of Relatives we have confidered principally those, which possess the Relative Character in a degree above every other. But there are things, which,

which, as they possess it blended with Ch.XI. Characters more eminent, have been formed for that reason into separate Arrangements. Such for example is the Relation between a Being, and the Place, which it occupies; that between a Being, and the Time, while it exists; the first of which Relations gives an answer to the Question, Where; the latter, to the Question, When.

THERE are also Relations of Position; Relations of Habit; and besides these there are Relations of Action and Passion, all of which are distinguished by peculiar Attributes of their own, and have therefore merited distinct Examinations from the ancient Writers upon Logic.

Thus, if we confider the two last, I mean Action and Passion, we shall find them diffused thro' every part of the Universe; and that, either united in one Subject,

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Ch.XI. Subject, or else separate, and in different Subjects.

By Horace they are united:

Qui studet optatam cursu contingere metam, Multa TULIT, FECITque puer—— (a)

So are they by Livy, in that manly Speech of Caius Mucius—Et FACERE es PATI fortia, Romanum est (b).

So are they by Shakespeare:

Whether 'tis nobler in the Mind to SUFFER The Stings and Arrows of outrageous Fortune,

Or-by opposing end them (c).

So are they by Milton:

Fal'n

⁽A) Hor. Art. Pact. v. 412.

⁽b) Liv. ii. 11.

⁽c) Hamlet. -

Fal'n Cherub, to be weak is miserable, Doing, or Suffering—— (d)

Ch.XI.

In Virgil we see them separated, and Passion given to Man, Action to the Deity:

O ! PASSI graviora, dabit Daus his que finem (e).

As therefore ACTION and PASSION are of the most extensive influence; as they partake in some degree the nature of Ryalities or Attributes, by being intimately and effentially connected with Substance; while the Relatives, When, Where, and Postion, seem rather connected accidentally: we shall give ACTION and Passion their just Precedence, and make them the Subject of the present Chapter.

S

⁽d) Par. Loft. i. 157.

⁽e) En. i. 203.

Ch.XI. THE SPECIES OF ACTION are as many, as are the different Modes of acting in the different Species of Agents.

THE FIRST SORT OF ACTION is that of mere Body Alone, considered either as void of Sensation wholly, like Fire, when it burns; or at least as void of Sensation, at the time when it operates. Such is that great and universal Power, the Power of Attraction, which all Body, animal, vegetable, and elementary, is found to possels in proportion to it's Quantity; that active Power, (if it may for the present be so called) the Effects of which modern Philosophy has scrutinized with so much penetration. Such too are those Energies peculiar to different Bodies, and arising out of them from their different Natures; as when we say the Heavens emit Light; the Trees produce Leaves; the Fields give us Corn, &e:

Cæ!um

Cælum nitescere, arbores frondescere, Segetes largiri fruges, &c. (f) Ch.XI.

Such too are those more secret Operations of Bodies, whether magnetic or electric; to which may be added the Virtues and Efficacies of Bodies Meditinal. All these Energies in a comprehensive sense may be called the Astion of Body, considered merely as Body (g).

A SE-

⁽f) Cicer. Tufc. Difp. i. 28.

⁽g) This is that Genus of Energies, which, as Jamblichus describes it, indicates no Action belonging to Soul, or to Animal Nature, or to Reasonings; or to Life, but which (on the contrary) exhibits the particular Energy of Bodies, considered as Bodies purely inanimate; and that as well with respect to all the Peculiarities which appear to surround Body, as to all those various inherent powers of Bodies, not only as they are solid and capable of resisting, but as they contain within them a multitude of Powers that are efficacious and active.

— Γίο ἐνεργειών, ὅπερ ψυχῆς κὰ Φύσεως κὰ λόγων κὰ ζωῆς ἐκέτι ἐπιδείκνυσι ποίησιν, τῶν δὲ σωμάτων, ἢ σώματο ἐςῦν ἄψυχα, Φανερῶν καθίςησι την σωματοειδη δίες εκέτι ἐπιδείκνος φανερῶν καθίςησι την σωματοειδη ἐνέργειαν

Ch.XI. A SECOND SORT OF ACTION is that which is the refult of Sensation, Instinct, and natural Appetite, and which therefore, being complicated, must necessarily be confined to Bodies of a higher Genus, to Bodies Sensitive, that is, to Animals.

Dente lupus, cornu taurus PETIT, &cc. (h)

No where are these Actions exprest with more elegance and conciseness, than by our own Epic Poet, in his Paradise Lost :

By Fowl, Fish, Beast, was Plown, was swam, was walk'd (i).

δυέργειαν κατά πάσας μέν τας περί το σώμα τας Φαννομένας ιδιότητας, κατά πάσας δε αὐτών τας δυνάμεις, της η μόνον ςερεά ές η αντίτυπα, αλλ' η η περί αὐτών έχει παλλάς δραςηρίες δυνάμας. Simpl. in Pradic. p. 81. Edit. Bafil. 1551.

⁽b) Hor. Sat. ii. 1.

⁽i) Par. Loft, vii. 502. Kai dhoor dea wert igr.

m inola tidh rus addyun Zuur, rocavra n rolavra n

THERE is A THIRD SPECIES OF Ac- Ch.XI.

TION more complicated even than the preceding, being derived not only from Sensation, Instinct, and natural Appetite, but from Reason also, superadded to these.

This is a Mode of Action peculiar to Man, because of all the Animals we see around us, Man alone possesses the Reasoning Faculty.

Widely diversified is the Share assumed by the fubordinate Faculties of the Human Soul, in Actions of this Character. Sometimes they submit to Reason, and are (as becomes them) obedient; at other times they reject her, and proceed

is we woren didpopa is in eigh nara the rolaithe informations, week we in tails week Cown is optace diagraphies dat sindamen.—'Tis evident that as are the Species of Irrational Animals in Number and in Quality, so many and such are the different Species in Asting agreeably to this [animal] mode of Energy; which several Species of Asting have been usually enumerated in the Histories of Animals. Simple in Prad. p. 81, ut supra.

Ch.XI. of themselves. And hence it is, that

Actions, produced from Causes so peculiarly complicated, derive to themselves
the Colours of Good and Evil, and are
denominated, in distinction to every other
deed of Man, Actions Moral.

WHEN VIRTUE and PLEASURE addressed the young HERCULES, VIRTUE supposed him to have a Reason, that could controul his Appetites; PLEASURE supposed him to have Appetites, that would bear down his Reason. Had he obeyed the last, he had been vicious; as he obeyed the first, he was virtuous. There was a Conslict in either case between his better part, and his worse; and in that Conslict both Species of Faculties were presumed, his Rational Faculties, and his Irrational (k).

THERE

⁽k) Sec Xenoph. Mem. 1. ii. c. i. S. 21.

The above Species of Action is thus described by Simplicius—Teiror de të woiter yere, to er to weat-

THERE IS A FOURTH SORT OF AC-Ch.XI.
TION, where the INTELLECT, operating without Passions or Affections, stays not within itself, but passes out (as it were) to some external Operation. 'Tis thus that NATURE, considered as an Efficient Cause, may be called the Energy of God, seen in the various Productions that replenish and adorn the World. 'Tis thus

σειν ἀπηρίθμηται, ὅπερ τῦ λόγε τὰς ωερὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ κὰ σύνθετα ωσιήσεις ἐπιτροπεύει, προαίρεσιν κὰ βάλην δόξαν τε κὰ σκεψιν κὰ τὰς τοιαύτας ωσιήσεις ωαρεχόμενου. Simpl. ut supra. The Genus, comprehended under the Idea of ACTING MORALLY, is the third of this Order; that Genus, which presides over the Energies of Reason with respect to the concrete Objects of Sense (that is, which presides in the affairs of common life), and which furnishes upon occasion Deliberate Choice, Volition, Opinion, Inquiry, and other Energies of the same character. Simp. in Præd. p. 80. B. Edit. Bas. 1551.

We have in this place translated wedgets to act morally, the better to distinguish it from wouth, a word of meaning more extensive, signifying simply to do, or to make.

\$ 4

that

Ch.XI. that ART, confidered as an Efficient Caufe, may be called the Energy of Man, which imitates in it's Operations the plastic Power of Nature (1).

Sort of Action is seen in Contemplation; in the pure Energy of SIMPLE In-Tellect, keeping within itself, and making itself it's own Object. This is the highest Action of which we are susceptible; and by it we imitate the Supreme Being, as far as is consistent with our subordinate Nature. Tis to this that our great Poet alludes, when speaking of his Employment, during a state of Blindness, he says—

⁽¹⁾ Turn of wold use is to Decor wold & no in the training textures, minuminate the poster, no warther was a simplic. ut supra. Of this Species of Acting THE DIVINITY has a large share—a large share also falls to Ants, that imitate Nature, and supply what she has a mitted.

Then

Then reed on thoughts, which volun- Ch. XI, tary move

Harmonious Numbers (m)

THE

(m) Par. Left. iii. 37.0

This highest Mode of Action (if it may be so called) is thus described by Simplicius in the same Comment, p. 80:

To week two ventuo no alespicus urlus intentionet per antais vonerous—That which, with fimple intellections, inquires concerning Subflances intelligible and indipifible—that is, Subflances which, having no Parts, cannot, like Body, be infinitely divided.

Archytas has enumerated these Species of Energy pr Action, but in a different manner, beginning with the last of them first, and so proceeding inversely, till he come to the first that is mentioned here, and this he omits. His words are worthy of perusal—Tais di Europeias diapopal trais to hiv yas ti is unitais in to Dempin, olor assorber to di in to measure, olor spectagie, textasiver to di in to measure, olor spectagie, textasiver to di in to measure, olor spectagie, provident procession di a his iniquia mà anu diavosas, olor in tois adoques socie. Tennas que di auta. Archyt. apud Simpl. in Pred. p. 80. There are three Distinctions of Action or Energy: One Sort of it consists in Contemplating, as when we study the Stars; another in Making, as when we

Ch.XI. The Species of Passion may be understood by their reciprocating for the most part with those of Action.

THUS tho' the DIVINE MIND, by being pure and intellectual Energy, can have nothing passive in it's transcendent

beal a Disease, or exercise the Art of a Carpenter; another [not in making but] in ACTING, as when we lead an Army, or administer a Commonwealth. There is too a sourth Energy, WHERE THERE IS NO USE OF REASONING, as in Animals irrational. These are the Forms of Action the most general and comprehensive.

Simplicius tells us, that Archytas has omitted the other Species (that which we have mentioned first, and which respects Bodies inanimate) because he did not consider it as a Species purely active, nor as arising from any internal and sensitive Principle of Motion, And yet perhaps, in an introductory Treatise, it can hardly be considered as introduced improperly, tho it must be allowed at the same time to want this Requisite.

We observe by the way that this distinction of Actions is called by Logicians Actio transiens, and Actio immanens, which corresponds in Grammar to Verbs Transitive on one side, and Verbs Neuter and Middle on the other. See Hermes, 1. i. c. 9.


theory,

which has intensions and remissions, is, for that reason, necessarily PASSIVE in two important manners, either as Truth, real or apparent, demands it's Assent; or as Falshood, real or apparent, demands it's Dissent.

It is in confequence of this Passivity of the Human Mind, which I chuse to call Passivity Intellectual, that it becomes susceptible of Discipline and Institution, and thus finds itself adorned (according as it is cultivated) with the various tribe both of Arts and Sciences (o).

As the Reason of Man is acted upon by the appearances of Truth and Falshood, so are the Appetites of Man (and not only of Man, but of Brutes also) acted upon by the approach of Pleasure

and



⁽n) See Chapter on Qualities, p. 161.

⁽⁰⁾ Vid. Arrian. Epiel. 1. iii. c. 3.

Ch.XI. and Pain (p). This therefore may be called SENSUAL PASSIVITY, in opposition to the rational above described.

'Tis to this Davus alludes in Horace,

Duci ventre levem: Nasum nidore
supinor,
Imbecillus, iners, &c. (q)

The moulding this Passivity of the human Mind into as much of the fair and honest, as it is capable of receiving, when it is applied to Nations, is called Politics; when to Families, Oeconomics; when to Individuals, Ethics (r); and is in general

⁽p) Dei de tibina no to painomenou agabou agabou agabou. Xúçau exeiu, no to sou Painomenou yaz esiu agabou. —We ought to suppose, that both GOOD APPARENT and Pleasure supply the place of Good (real); for Pleasure is Good apparent. Arist. de Animal. Motu. p. 154. Edit. Sylb.

⁽q) Hor. Sat. ii. 7. 37.

⁽r) Nicephorus Blemmides adopts this Division from the Peripatetic School—Fe de Agantuev diaspertat

the Foundation of *Moral* Principles and Ch.XI.

THE PASSIVITY PECULIAR TO BRUTES may be feen in the various purposes, to which we direct their several Powers;

εἰς πθικον, οἰκονομικον, κỳ πολιτικόν κỳ ἡθικὸς μέν ἐςι Φιλόστορο, ὁ τὰ ἐκυνῶ ἡθη κỳ ἄλλυ ρυθμάζων δυνάμειος οἰκονομικὸς δἱ, ὁ κỳ οἶκον ὅλον ἐκπαιδεύειν καλῶς ἐπιςάμενος ὁ οἰς γε πόλιν ἡ κỳ πόλεις διεξάγων κỳ διακυθερνῶν ἀρίςως, πολιτικός—The PRACTICAL Part of Philosophy is disoided into Moral, Οκουομέται, and Political. It is the Moral Philosopher, who is able to adjust his own manners, and those of any other individual: the Okconomical, who knows how to instruct well a whole Family; and he, who in the best manner conducts and governs a City, or Cities, this Philosopher is the Political one. Blem. Epitom. Logic. p. 37.

As we have been speaking just before of Passivity, it is proper to remark that the same Writer, from the same Philosophy, takes notice of two Species of it, a better Species and a morse; Passivity Corruptive, and Passivity Completive; Corruptive, as when any Being is consumed by Fire; Completive, as when a Being either learns, or is acted upon, either by it's Intellect, on it's Scales.—To maggin & ro pair or pantaine, if ro naisodai ro di reductivo, is ro naisodai ro di reductivo, is ro naisodai, prindensis, is aisodaisodai. Nic. Blem. Ep. Log. 158.

fome

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Ch.XI. feme to plow our lands, others to carry us; a third Species to hunt for us; &cc. (1)

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THE PASSIVITY OF INSENSITIVE BODIES, whether vegetable or not, is equally conspicuous in the various Ends, to which we apply them. The Earth we plow; over the Sea we fail; out of the Forest we build our Ships, &c. This insensitive Passivity, tho it submit to the Action of other Bodies upon it, yet always follows the peculiar Nature of the Being, to which it belongs; so that the Effects often differ, where the Active Power is the same.

Limus ut hic DURESCIT, et hæt ut cerd

Uno eodemque igni— (t)

LASTLY,



⁽s) See Vol. I. Treatife I. p. 40, 41. See also as to the Passivity of Bodies inanimate, p. 39, 40, of the same Treatise.

⁽t) Virg. Ecl. viii. 80.

LASTLY, all Bodies, that act by Art Ch.XI. TRACTION. are themselves RECIPRO-CALLY ACTED UPON, as modern Philosophers have clearly demonstrated.

As to Action and Passion in general, it may be observed, that the great and diversified Mixture of them, which runs thro' the World, and is conspicuous in every part of it, has a necessary reference (as all other Mixtures have) to Principles more simple, out of which it is compounded. Pure Activity we may suppose MIND; and PURE PASSIVITY, MATTER. As Mind is capable of acting whatever is possible, so is Matter of having, whatever is possible, acted upon it. The former is the Source of all Forms, Distinctions, and Beauty; the latter is the Receptacle. In THE SUPREME MIND there is nothing passive; in THE LOWEST MATTER, there is nothing active;

Ch.XI. tive (u); while all between is a Mixture of both, where in different parts the different Principles are prevalent, and from this prevalence give the Being it's proper Character.

If we call Man a Composite of Soul and Body, as a rational Being, he has a Motion of his own; as a sensitive Being, he has a Motion in common with Brutes; as a Being merely corporeal, a Motion in common with all Bodies whatever. A Dog has only the second and third of these Motions, and a Stone only the last. Thus is the Stone least active, the Man most so, and the Brute between both.

⁽u) See Chapter vi, p. 109, 110.

Thus Archytes in Simplicius—Ta nabaga you we would us mages it tois appulumentators—te plu worth it to Seg, the of wages in the Thm—The pure and simple Genera of acting, and being acted upon, exist in the primary and most original of Beings; Acting, in God; the being acted upon, in Matter. Simplicin Prad. p. 84. B. Edit. Basil. 1551.

THE Modes are different, under which Ch XI. Beings att upon one another.

Masses) only ass, because they are assed upon, and that too by something external, and perfectly distinct from themselves. Tis thus the Nail acts upon the Timber, because the Hammer acts upon the Nail; and were not the Hammer to drive, the Nail would never penetrate.

Now such Motion as this is but a Species of Passivity, because the the Beings, which possess it, have an original Power to receive Motion, they by no means possess an original Power to impart it. And hence it follows, that if something did not exist more intrinsically active than themselves, they would never act, and there would be no Motion at all.

ACTION of this kind (if it deserve the name) is the ACTION of REINGS, T which, Ch.XI. which, the Moveable, are not intrinfically Motive, that is, Causes of Motion.

Another Mode of Action may be found in the following inflances.—At Lamb acts upon the Senses of a Wolf—that Sensation acts upon his Appetite—that Appetite acts upon his Corporeal Organs—by the Action of these Organs he runs, he seizes, and he devours the Lamb.

A CHILD is seen by its Mother likely to fall from a precipice.—The Sensation acts upon her parental Affections—these Affections act upon her Corporeal Organs.

—By the Action of these Organs she runs, she seizes, and she saves her Child.

THE Instances we are going to allege, appear to be more blended with deliberation and thought. The Splendor of the Roman Empire acted upon the Imagination of Casar—that Imagination acted upon his Desire of sovereign Power—that Desire acted upon the Faculties of his Mind and Body.

—By

-By the Energy of these Faculties he passed Ch.XI. the Rubicon, conquered Pompey, enslaved Rome, and obtained the wished-for Empire.

AGAIN—The Domination of Cafar acted upon the Imagination of Brutus—that Imagination acted upon his Love for the Republic—that Love for the Republic acted upon his corporeal Organs.—His hand in consequence plunged a Dagger into Casar, and, for a time, the Republic, which he loved, was restored.

Organs act, like the Corporeal Masses before mentioned, because they are first acted upon. But then they are not acted upon, as those are, by other external Bodies, but by internal Appetites, Affections, and Desires, all which, as well as the Organs, are Parts of one and the same Being. Such Being therefore is not, like Beings of the first Order, in a manner passive and only moveable; but, as it possesses within itself the power of imparting Motion, as well

Ch.XI. well as of receiving it, the Action is that of a Being, not only Moveable, but intrinsically Motive.

WE may go farther, if we please, and suggest a third Mode of Action, the Action of the FIRST MOVER; THAT BEING, which, tho' Motive, is itself perfectly IMMOVEABLE.

In a series of Agents, where each of them imparts Motion, which it has previously received, were such Agents two, or were they ten, or were they a million, no Motion could ever begin, were there not something at their head totally different from them all; something purely impassive; something, which can move, without being moved; in other words, which can impart Motion to every thing else, and remain itself Immoveable.

'Tis to this character that Boethius alludes, in his truly sublime address to the Author of the Universe:

—Qui

— Qui tempus ab ævo

Ch.XI.

Ire jubes, STABILISQUE MANENS DAS CUNCTA MOVERI (y).

Considering Action therefore and the being acted upon with a view to Motion and the being moved, we may fay that the Peripatetic System (for 'tis hence we derive these Speculations) contemplated all Beings in three views; either as Moveable, but not Motive; or as both Moveable and Motive; or lastly as Motive alone, but not Moveable (z).

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⁽y) To operator 2 to nontor kivel, & kivemenou— The Desirable, and the Intelligible Move, WITHOUT BEING MOVED. Arift. Metaph. p. 202. Edit. Sylb. See below, p. 429, in the note.

The Latin Quotation is from the Confolation of Boezhius, and is a part of those Hexameters, which for harmony of Numbers, and sublimity of Sentiment are perhaps not inferior to any in the Latin Language.

O! qui perpetuâ mundum &c.

⁽²⁾ This Doctrine is expressed by the Stagirite, but in an inverted order. Το μεν Πρώτου, ε κινέμενου, κινεί το δοςεξις κό το δρεκτικου κινέμενου, κινεί το δε τελευταίου των κινεμένων έκ ανάγκη κινείν εδίν. De Animal. Motu, p. 154. Edit. Sylb.

Ch.KI. More is said upon this Subject in the subsequent Theory concerning Motion (a).

We shall only add, that, in the above Modes of Acting, when Bodies act upon Bodies, the Action for the greater past is reciprocal. While the Oar impels the Wave, the Wave resists the Oar; while the Axe hews the Timber, the Timber blunts the Axe; while the Earth attracts the Moon, the Moon attracts the Earth. And hence the Theory of Action and Re-Action, so accurately scrutinized in modern Philosophy.

IF we contemplate the World, as well the vegetable as the animal, we shall

perceive

⁽a) Concerning that Motion, which does not arise from the Collision of one Body with another Body, but where the Power which moves, and the Organs, which are moved; appear to be both of them vitally UNITED in ONE and the same Subject, see below, p. 408 to p. 425. Concerning the necessity of samething, different from Body, to put Body in Motion, see below, p. 437. Concerning Causative Motion, see below, p. 440. Concerning Immobility, see below, p. 449, 450; and Hermes, p. 360 in the note.

perceive Action and Passion diffused Ch.XI.

And yet it must be observed both of Action and of Passion, (such at least as those we see around us) that they are neither of them perpetual in any one particular instance. Corn only nourishes, and Hemlock only poisons, when they meet a proper Body, on which to operate: the Musician does not always perform, nor is the Ear always affected by Sounds: the Painter does not always paint, nor is the Eye always affected by Colours.

And hence the rife of that notable thing called Power; that dormant Capacity, into which both Action and Passion, when they cease, retreat; and out of which, when they return, as from their Source they flow.

THERE is nothing which appears so nearly to approach Non-entity, as this singular thing called Power; yet is there nothing in fact so truly different from it.

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PHILOSOPHICAL

Ch.XI. Or Non-entity there are no Attributes, no Affections; but every Power possesses a specific and a limited character, which not only distinguishes it from Nonentity, but from every other Power.

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Thus among the ACTIVE Powers, the Smith, when asleep, has still those Powers, which make him a Smith; the Shipwright, when asleep, has still those Powers, which make him a Shipwright. The Powers distinguish both from the rest of mankind, who purely from not having them are neither Smiths nor Shipwrights.

The same Powers help to distinguish the same Artists from one another: for the Powers, though invisible, are incommutable; nor can those of the Shipwright enable him to forge an anchor, or those of the Smith enable him to construct a Ship.

IF we pass from active to PAssive Powers, we shall find these aster the same manner to be limited in every every Subject, and different in every Ch.XI. Species. Timber has the Capacity of becoming a Ship, but not an Axe; Iron on the contrary of becoming an Axe, but not a Ship (2). And tho' different Agents, by operating on the fume Patient, may produce different Effects (as the Shipwright makes Timber into a Ship, while the Carpenter forms it into a House); yet still must each Effect correspond with the passive. Capacities; or else, where these sail, there is nothing to be done,

WERE the case otherwise, were not the Passive Powers essentially requisite as well as the Active, there would be no reason, why any thing might not be made out of any thing.

FAR distant therefore from Non-entity are Passive Powers, however latent:

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⁽²⁾ See Chapter the fourth concerning Matter, p. 64, 65; also p. 148, 149.

Ch.XI, so far indeed, that where they differ esfentially from one another, they often lead to Effects perfectly contrary, tho' the Agent, which operates, be individually the same:

> Limus ut hic durescit, et hæt ut cera Liquescit, Uno eodemque igni, &c (a).

'Tis from this Theory we perceive the reason of that ancient Axiom, Quicquid recipitur, recipitur secundum modum recipientis; than which nothing can be more true, when properly understood.

As to the Active Powers, there is an important distinction between those called Rational, and the Irrational. The Subordinate are mostly confined to the producing One Contrary out of Two. Fire can only warm, but cannot cool; Ice can only cool, but cannot warm. But

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⁽a) Virg. ut sup. p. 270.

the rational Powers imply both Contraries Ch.XI. at once, and give to their possessor the Alternative of producing either. The Musician has the Power both of Melody and Dissonance; the Physician the Power both of healing, and making sick; the Magistrate the Power of deciding both justly and unjustly.

The reason of this is, that Rational Power alone is sounded in Science, and 'tis always one and the same Science, which recognizes Contraries; that, which teaches us Harmony, teaches us Discord; that which informs us what is Health, informs us what is Disease; that which discerns Truth, discerns also Falshood. Hence therefore it is, that as every Science may be called double in it's Powers of Knowlege; so all Action founded on Science may be called double in it's Powers of Acting (b). A noble Privilege this

⁽b) Καὶ τῶν δυνάμεων αἱ μὲν ἔσονῖαι ἄλογοι, αἱ δἔ μετὰ λόγυ—κὰ αἱ μὲν μετὰ λίγυ ἐνᾶσαι τῶν ἐναντίων

Ch.XI. to Man, if well employed; a truly unfortunate one, if abused; since by this

He alone, of all sublunary Beings, is properly intitled either to Praise or Dispraise.

WITH respect to Powers in general, there is this to be observed: so important are they to the constitution of many Beings, that often, tho' latent, they are

αὶ αὐταὶ, αὶ δὲ ἄλογοι, μία ἐνός 'οἴον τὸ Θερμὸν τὰ Θερμαίνειν μόνον, ἡ δὲ ἱατρική νόσε κὰ ὑγείας αἴτιον. Αἴτιον δὲ, ὅτι λόγ τὸ ἐςὶν ἡ ἐπιςήμη, ὁ δὲ λόγ τὸ αὐτὸς δηλοῖ τὸ ἐκράγμα, κὰ τὴν ςέρησιν—Of Powers fome will be found Irrational, others are attended with Reason—and as to thise which are attended with Reason, the same Powers will extend to things Contrary; but as to the irrational, one Power will extend only to one Contrary; what is hot for example will only conduce to heating; but the Art of Medicine will become the Cause both of Disease and of Health. The Cause is, that this Medicinal Science is Reason, and the same Reason discovers both the thing, and it's Privation. Arish. Metaph. P. 143. Edit. Sylb.

See also Vol. the first of these Treatises, p. 173, 298; to these add p. 150 of the present Treatise, especially in the Note.

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more regarded than the strongest appa-Ch.XI, rent Attributes. Thus 'tis from their medicinal Powers only, that we value the several Species of Drugs; and from their generative Powers only that we value the several Species of Seed, while little regard is paid to their sensible, that is their apparent Qualities, farther than as they help to indicate those invisible Powers.

THE just Opposite to Power is Energy, which, as it's etymology (c) shews, implies the existing in Deed or Act, as opposed to that existence, which only implies Possibility.

AND here 'tis worth observing, that Every thing existing in Power is necessarily roused into Energy by something, which itself existed PREVIOUSLY in

Energy.



⁽c) Έν Έργω, In Act, in Deed. See a sketch of the difference between Act and Power, Vol. I. p. 13, 14.

Ch.XI. Energy (d). Events and Incidents never frand still; some Agents or other are perpetually energizing, tho' all perhaps by turns have their respites and relaxations, as many of them at least as are of the subordinate Tribe. It happens indeed in the World, as in a Ship upon a Voyage. Every hand at a proper seafon has his hours of Rest, and yet the Duty never ceases, the Business of the Ship is never at a stand; those, that wake, rousing those, that sleep, and

being

⁽d) 'Twas a Doctrine of the Peripatetic School,
ότι ωρότερον ἐνέργεια δυνάμεως ἐςι—τηατ Ενέπες ἐ
is prior to Power. Arift. Metaph. p. 150. 152.

— ἀεὶ γὰρ ἐχ τε δυνάμει ὅντ۞ γίγνεται τὸ ἐνεργεία.
ὅν ὑπὸ ἐνεργεία ὅντ۞ οἶον ἄνθρωπ۞ ἐξ ἀνθρώπε, μετσικὸς ὑπὸ μεσικὸ, ἀεὶ κινῶντός τιν۞ ωρώτε: τὸ ἔ
κινῶν ἐνεργεία πὸπ ἐςίν. That which exifts in Emergy is always formed out of that which exifts in Power, by something which exists (already) in Energy; for example Man is formed by Man, the Musical Artist by the Musical Artist, there being always some first (or prior) Being, which gives the Motion. Now that, which gives the Motion. Now that, which gives the Motion, is itself already in Energy. Aristot. Metaph. p. 151. Edit. Sylb.

being in their turn roused again them. Ch.XI. felves.

BUT another way to shew that ENERGY is of necessity PREVIOUS TO POWER, confists in admitting the contrary Hypothesis.

LET us suppose for example a Man placed in a part of Space, where there was, and ever had been, eternal Silence; or otherwise in a part, where there was, and ever had been, eternal Darkness: could fuch a one ever actually either have heard or feen, however exquifite his Powers both of hearing and feeing?—And why not?—Because to the evocation of one of these Powers. there is a necessity of actual. Sound; to that of the other, of actual Light; so that had not these Energies existed previously, his Powers must have remained dormant thro' the period of their existence. Suppose therefore all Energies of all Ch.XI. all kinds to stop: how could they ever revive? Were they all once sunk into one universal Sleep, where should we find a waking Cause, to rouse them from their Slumbers (e)?

And what then are the inferences from this Speculation, that Power necessarily arises from previous Energy?—One is, that all those Doctrines about Order

fpringing

⁽e) 'Tis hence that Aristotle, speaking according to the Principles of his Philosophy, fays of things eternal, unalterable, and necessary, that is, things ever in Energy—si ταῦτα μη το, εθέν αν ην, if THESE WERE NOT, THERE COULD BE NOTHING. Metaph. 153, ut suprà. 'Tis a pertinent Question, stated by the fame Author, in another part of the same Tract-Πως γαρ κινηθήσεται, εί μηθεν έςαι ένεργεία αίτιου; ε γαρ ηγε ύλη κινήσει αυτή έπυτήν—How can things ever be set in motion, if there be no CAUSE (previously) EXISTING IN ENERGY? Mere Matter itself cannot move itself. - Ibid. 201. And foon before in the same page-ενδέχεται γάς το δυνάμει ον μη είναι δει άρα είναι άρχην τοεαύτην, ης η εσία ενέργεια-It may bappen that the thing, which exists in Power only, may NOT EXIST AT ALL: there must therefore be (in the Universe) fuch a Sort of PRINCIPLE, AS THAT THE VERY Essence of it should be Energy.

fpringing from Disorder, Beauty from Ch.XI. Confusion; of Night and Chaos being the oldest of Beings; in general, of the Perfect and Actual arising from the Imperfect and Potential; however they may be true as to the material Cause of things, yet are they far from being true with respect to their real and essential Origin. There is nothing in sact more certain, than that the Actual and Perfect are previous to their Contraries; else there could never have been in the Universe any thing Actual or Perfect.

ANOTHER inference is, that the most minute and contemptible Energy, now actually existing, necessarily proves the Existence of an eternal Energy, to which, as to it's Cause, it is ultimately reserable. And what can such ETERNAL ENERGY be, but something, whose very ESSENCE is that ENERGY (f); something, which

⁽f) See the Note preceding—The founder of the Peripatetic Sect, speaking of the Deity, uses the following

Ch.XI. knows no remissions, like subordinate

Energies, no occasional retirings into

Power and dead Capacity, but is EVER

THE SAME IMMUTABLE AND PERFECT?

Without such a Principle the Universe

could never have begun; or when once
begun, could never have been continued.

And what shall we call this Principle?

lowing Expressions— π γαρ Νω Ενέργεια, ζωή· Εκείτω Το Π, π Ενέργεια— The Energy of Mind or Intellect, is Life: and HE (the Supreme Being) is that ENERGY. Metaph. p. 203. See also Ammon. in Lib. de Interpretat. p. 198, B. &c. where the Arrangement of Beings is deeply and philosophically discussed, and exhibited.— Εξής δε τύτοις επιδείξαι βυλόμευ. χ. χ. λ.

'Tis agreeably to this reasoning we are told—
Τῦ χρόνε ἀεὶ ωρολαμδάνει ἐνέργεια ἐτέρα ωρο ἐτέρας,
ἔως τῆς τῦ ἀεὶ κιῶντ، τῷ ωρώτως—that one Energy in
point of Time akways precedes another, till we arrive at
the Energy of that Being, which eternally gives Motion
in the first instance. Metaph. Θ. n. p. 152. Edit.
Sylb.

Which is as much as to affirm (in other words) that there is a gradual ascent of active efficient Principles, one above another, up to that ONE ACTIVE PRINCIPLE, which is ORIGINAL and SUPREME.

Shall

Shall we call it Body or MIND?—The Ch.XI. best way to answer this, will be to search within ourselves, where we may discover, if we attend, a portion of either Being, together with the several Attributes appertaining to each.

And so much for the two Arrangements or Predicaments of Action and Passion.

U CHAP.

C H A P. XII.

Concerning When and Where—Concerning Time and Place, and their Definitions—When and Where, how distinguished from Time and Place, how connected with them—Descriptions of When and Where—their Utility and Importance in human Life—Various Terms, denoting these two Predicaments—others denoting them not, yet made to denote them—When and Where, their extensive insluence—plausible Topics—concurring Causes—Opportunity, what—Chance, what it is not, what it is—Fate, Providence—co-operating Causes—Supreme Intelligence.

C. XII. WE have faid already, that Time and Place agree, as they both belong to Quantity Continuous (a). So

essential

⁽a) See before, p. 183 to 187.

Essential is this character, that could ei-C. XII. ther of them be separated, as we separate a piece of timber, there would then be Intervals without Time, and Distances without place. Thus far then they agree, while in this they differ, that a million of different things may exist in one instant of Time, but never more than one thing at once can occupy one Place.

And hence the Nature of Place may be called distributive, while that of Time may be called accumulative. Hence too as they agree in some respects, and differ in others, they are necessarily not simple, but compound Ideas, both belonging to one Genus, and each distinguished by specific differences. Having a Genus and a Difference, they become capable of Definition, since 'tis on these two requisites that all Definition is founded (b).

TIME

⁽b) Omnis DEFINITIO constat GENERE et DIFFE-RENTIA-Fell, 218. Termini verò essentiales (Defini-U 2 tionis

C.XII. TIME therefore is Continuity, succesfive in itself, and accumulative of it's proper subjects; Place is Continuity, co-existent in itself, and distributive of it's proper subjects.

WE have said thus much about these two Beings, because WHEN and WHERE, tho' distinct from both (c), are necessarily connected with them, and cannot well be understood without reference to this Connection.

MEN, human affairs, and univerfally all fensible and corporeal Beings, as none of them are infinite either in *Duration* or *Extent*, must have something of course

tionis scil.) Genus et Differentia. Sanderson, l. i. c. 17. See also Wallisti Logic. l. i. c. 23.—
Οί μέν γαρ όρισμοὶ ἐκ γένες κὰ τῶν συςατικῶν εἰσι διαΦορῶν, τυτέςι τῶν εἰδοποιῶν. Αππ. in 5. voces, p. 67.

⁽c) How they are distinct, see below, particularly in Note (f), also p. 297.

PLACE circumscribes their Extent, and.

TIME, their Duration; and hence the necessary connection of things corporeal with these two; and not only of things themselves, but of all their Motions, of all their Accidents, in short of all they are able to do, and of all they are able to suffer.

For example, certain persons are to meet for a certain purpose. They must be informed of the *Time* and *Place*, or their *Meeting* would not be practicable. First then for the *Time*—

When shall we three meet again
In thunder, light'ning, and in rain (d)?

The answer to this question connects their Meeting with a certain Time; and in the

⁽d) Shakef. Macbetb.

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C. XII. Relation between these two, we behold the rise of the Predicament, WHEN.

WHEN the battle's lost and won, WHEN the hurly burly's done (e).

AGAIN-

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Where's the Place?

(ε) Ου μέντοι έτε τῷ χρόνω ταυτὸν τὸ Ποτὲ, ἀλλ' είπερ άρα, έν χέσει τη ωρός του χρόνου. Nor is WHEN the same with TIME; but if any thing, it confifts in the Relation which it bears to Time. Simpl. in Præd. p. 87. B. Ed. Bas. 1551. And again --- όταν δέ τι ωράγμα, έτερον ον τε χρόνα, κή έχ ώς μέρο χρόνε λαμδανόμενον, χίσιν έχει προς χρόνου, κ) δια τέτο εν χρόνο ές ν, ώσπερ ή έν Σαλαμίνι ναυμαχία ἐν τῷδε χρόνω τότε άλλη κατηδορία γίγνεται, ที่ TE Поте, ลีมมท ยังส ซุลอุลิ To Hosov.-But when any particular THING, WHICH IS DIFFERENT FROM TIME, and which is not assumed as any PART OF TIME, has a RELATION TO Time, and for this reason is IN Time, as for example the Sea-fight at Salamis, which happened at such a particular Time: then there arifes A DIFFERENT PREDICAMENT, that of WHEN, a PREDICAMENT DIFFERENT from that of QUAN-Simplic. in Prad. p. 88. Ejufd. Edit.

The

:

The answer to this question connects their C. XII. Meeting with a certain Place; and in the Relation between these two, we see the rise of the Predicament, WHERE.

- upon the Heath, There we go to meet Macbeth (f).

LET us take another example. Virgil, we are informed, wrote his Georgics at Naples. By Naples, in this instance, is the Place of Virgil circumscribed, which might else have been at Rome, at

U 4

Mantua,

⁽f) 'Αλλ' ἄσπερ ἐπὶ τε χρόνε ᾶλλο μὶν ἢν ὁ χρόν 🕒, άλλο δε το κατά χρόνον, 🤅 χρόνε τί Ετως άλλο μέν ο Τόπ 🖫 άλλο δὶ το κατά Τόπου, ή τίπο τί.-For as in TIME, Time itself is one thing, and that, which is according to Time, or something belonging to it, is another thing; so also is PLACE one thing, and that WHICH IS ACCORDING TO PLACE, or SOMETHING BELONGING TO IT, another Thing. Simpl. in Prad. ut sup.

UBI non est Locus, sed Esse in Loco. Quando non eft Tempus, fed Esse in Tempore. Fell, p. 104, 107.

C.XII. Mantua, &c. The connection therefore of Virgil with this City gives us an answer to the Question, WHERE.

AGAIN, he wrote them, we are told, while Cæsar Augustus was on his Oriental Expedition. Here the time of this Expedition circumscribes the time of Writing, which might else have been (for ought we know) during the Wars with Brutus, with Antony, &c. This relative Connection gives an answer to the Question, When.

——— Dum Cæsar ad altum Fulminat Euphraten bello, victorque volentes

Per populos dat jura, viamque affectat
Olympo:

Illo Virgilium me tempore dulcis alebat *
Parthenope, studiis florentem ignobilis oti (g).

THESE

⁽g) Virg. Georg. iv. sub fin.

THESE elegant lines, which we so C. XII. justly admire, are in fact nothing more than the common date of an epistle; as if the Author, having finished his work, had subjoined Naples, such a Month, such a Year: so great, even in trivial matters, is the force of Numbers, and sublime Ideas.

Hence then we perceive the nature both of When, and of Where. When is not mere Time, nor is it Beings and Events; but it is Beings and Events, as they stand related to Time. Again, Where is not properly Place, nor is it Beings and Events; but it is Beings and Events, as they stand related to Place. If therefore the When only be given, and not the Where, then might the thing have happened either here, or at the Antipodes: and, by parity of reasoning, if the Where only be given, and not the When, then might the Event have happened, either yesterday,

C. XII. yesterday, or before the flood. 'Tis then only comes precision, when we view the two united (h).

praise of those two subordinate accomplishments (for Sciences I cannot call them) Geography and Chronology. By acquainting us with the relations, borne by illustrious persons and great events to the different portions both of Time and of Place, they afford us proper means to contemplate human affairs; to view the general Order and Concatenation of Events, and our own Connection with this Order, as Members of the same universe.

⁽b) Οῦτως δὲ κὸ το Πε κὸ το Ποτὲ ἀδελφά τως ἐςὶ τος καρέχουλα την συντίλειας τος κοινην ἐπίσης παρέχουλα την συντίλειας τος κουκμένοις την ἴσην χειίας συμβαλλόμενα. And thus it is that When and Where are a fort of Brothers one to another, affording equally a cammon Perfection to all things that are generated, and contributing an Utility of equal Value to all things, that are in Motion. Simplic. in Prad. p. 87. Ed. Basil. 1551.

In general it may be observed, that C. XII. whatever is an answer to the Question, WHERE, belongs to the Genus or Predicament of WHERE: and whatever is an answer to the Question, WHEN, belongs in like manner to the Predicament of WHEN. When did fuch a thing happen? -Now; this inftant; to-day; yesterday; a century ago; in fuch a year of our Lord; fuch a year of the Hegira; fuch a year of Rome; fuch an Olympiad, &c. To these may be added such terms in the past, as Lately, Formerly, Long ago, &c. and such also in the future, as Immediately, Soon, Hereafter (i), &c. Again, WHERE did fuch a thing happen?—Here; There; in England; in Europe; in China; in the Moon; in the Sun, &c. To these may be

added

⁽i) See many of these Terms elegantly and accurately explained in Aristotle's Physics, 1. iv. c. 13. The Terms alluded to are νῦν, ποτέ, κόη, ἄρτι, πάλλαι, ἐξαίΦνης, κ. τ. λ.

C. XII. added such Tesms as Near, Far off,

Above, Below, &c.

All these Terms, by thus answering these Questions, serve to indicate the Relation of some Being, or Event, either to Time, or to Place; and, tho' some of them do it with greater precision, and some with less, yet did they not all do it in some degree, they could not belong to these two Predicaments.

WE cannot affert the same of such terms, as an Inch, a Foot, or a Cubit; a Day, a Month, or a Year. The reason is, they indicate no Relation of Time, or Place to particular things, but only measure out definite Portions in these two infinite Natures.

WITH regard to the human Body, not only the Whole fills its proper Place, but so too does every Limb. Hence, as it's particular Place is a measure to each Limb,

Limb, so is this Limb in it's turn made C. XII. a measure to that Place, in order to define a like portion of it, existing elsewhere (k). And hence the origin of such Measures, as an Inch, a Foot, a Cubit, and the like, which are all of them deduced from certain Limbs in the Human Body.

But tho' the Limbs of Man were tolerably adequate to measure Place, yet were his Motions by no means adequate to the mensuration of Time, derived (as they appear) from such a number of Appetites; from such a variety of Fancies,

and

⁽k) This is indeed a common Property to all Menfuration, that the *Measurer*, and the thing measured, should reciprocate, so that while the Gallon measures the Wine, the Wine should measure the Gallon; while the Ell measures the filk, the filk should measure the Ell.

See before, the Quotation given in the Note, p. 22. Zisns is there rendered a Quart, not as if this last represented that Greek measure, but as it was a measure, familiar to an English Reader.

C. XII. and contradictory Opinions. Here therefore were mankind obliged to quit themfelves, and to recur to Motions more orderly than their own; to the real Motion
of the Moon, to the apparent Motions
of the Sun, in order to obtain such orderly Measures, as those of Days, and
Months, and Years.

AND thus from the nature and origin of these Terms, we may perceive how they are distinguished from the Predicaments of WHERE and WHEN.

THERE is (if I may use the Expression) an enlarged When, such as To-day, during this Month, this Year, this Century; and a precise When, the indivisible instant, in which the event happened. So also is there an enlarged Where, as in London, in England, in Europe, &cc. and a precise Where, that is to say the exact Place, which each individual fills (1).

Now

⁽¹⁾ See Hermes, p. 118, Note (g).

Now as every man exists in such a C. XII. precise Where, and during such a precise When, so is it with reference to these two Relations of his own, that he recognizes the When and the Where of all other Be-WHEN lived Charles the Great? Almost three hundred Years before the first Crusade. Tho' this Answer tell us the distance between Charles and that Expedition, yet are we still uninformed as to the Time, When he lived, unless we have fomething given us, to connect him with ourselves. And when, we demand, happened the first Crusade? - About seven hundred Years ago. Here we have the temporal Relation between ourselves, and that Event; so that having previously learnt the like relation between that Event and Charles the Great, we of course recognize the Time, WHEN that Prince existed; that is to fay, the temporal Relation between our own existence, and his. The same too happens in ascertaining the Place, WHERE. U 15 AND

C.XII.

And hence it follows, that such Meafures of Time and Place, as a Year, a
Century, a Foot, a Furlong, tho' they
belong not of themselves to the present
Predicaments or Arangements, may yet
be made a Part of them, by being properly associated. Such they become, when
we say a Furlong hence, a Century since,
a Foot below, a Year after. The reafon is, they are brought, by such association, to define Relative Existence, in doing which the very Essence of these Predicaments consists.

And now a word, as to the force of these two Predicaments; their influence in the World; and more particularly in human affairs.

CESAR, when he was affaffinated, fell at the feet of *Pompey's* Statue. The celebrated *Hampden* received his death's wound upon that *Field*, where he had

[·] Clarendon's History, Book VII.

first executed the Ordinance for levying C. XII. troops to serve the Parliament. From a royal Banqueting-house, built by himself in prosperity, was an unfortunate Prince led to an unjust Execution. In each of these instances the Place, Where, is a plausible Topic; a Topic equally suited either to raise compassion, or, if we would sophisticate more harshly, to insinuate Judgments, divine Vengeance, &c. But to quit topical arguments, which in fact demonstrate nothing.

'Twas by an unfortunate fall so near the conclusion of the race, that the swift sooted Salius lost the prize to young Euryalus (m). 'Twas by being attacked when assep, and over-powered with liquor, that the gigantic Polypheme sell a sacrifice to Ulysses (n). 'Twas by living in an age, when a capricious audience ruled,

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that

^{*} St. Luke, xiii. 4.

⁽m) Eneid. v. 286, &c.

⁽n) Odyss. ix. sub fin.

yielded to Philemon, his inferior by the confession of all succeeding ages (o). The Race is not to the Swift, nor the Battle to the Strong, nor yet Favour to men of Skill; but TIME and CHANCE happeneth to them all (p).

The same concurring Causes, which acted in these cases like adversaries, can become in others the most powerful allies. $\Delta \delta \varsigma \mu o \varpi \tilde{s} \varsigma \tilde{\omega}$, Give me Where to stand, was a well known saying of the samous Archimedes. He wanted but a Place, where to fix his Machine, and he thought himself able to move even the World (q). Shakespeare tells us,

There

⁽⁰⁾ Vid. Quinctil. l. x. c. 1.—A. Gell. l. xvii. c. 4. who says of him, ambitu, gratiâque, et factionibus sopenumere vincebatur.

⁽p) Ecclefiafter, xi. IT.

⁽q) See the Life of Archimedes in Rivaltus's Edition of his Works, Paris, 1615. Fol.

There Is A TIDE in the affairs of men, C.XII.

Which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune:

Omitted, all the voyage of their life

Is bound in shallows—— (r)

When Horace sent a Messenger with some of his Works to Augustus, his charge was to deliver them, if Augustus was in health; and not only so, but in good humour; and not only so, but in a humour to call for them:

Si validus, fi lætus erit, fi denique poscet (s).

Such a Stress did this polite author lay on the propriety of THE WHEN. Virgil mentions finely the

— MOLLISSIMA fandi TEMPORA (t).

X 2

He



⁽r) Julius Cæsar, Act iv. Sc. 5.

⁽s) Hor. Epist. 1. ii. Ep. 13.

⁽t) Entid. iv. 293.

C.XII. He makes too his Fury suspend her Powers of Michief, till she could catch a LUCKY MOMENT to make her influence more extensive:

At sæva e speculis TEMPOS Dea NACTA.
nocendi,

Tartaream intendit vocem, &c (u).

AND hence we may collect a just idea of the Term, Opportunity. It is not merely *Time*, concurring with Events, for *Time* attends them all, be they prosperous or adverse; but it is Time, concurring FAVOURABLY; 'tis Time, cooperating as an auxiliary Cause (x).

TIME.

⁽u) Eneid. vii. 511.

⁽x) According to the Stagirite, Good passes throball the Predicaments, and, as it stops at each, assumes a different Denomination. In Substance, it is MIND and DEITY; in Quality, 'tis that which is Just; in Quantity, that which is Exact, and according to Measure;

TIME (it is said) and CHANCE happeneth to all.—And what is this CHANCE?

—Is it the Chance mentioned by Milton,
as residing at the Court of Chaos (y)?

Or is it the same, which some Philosophers suppose to have framed the World,
and to have maintained in it ever since no
inconsiderable Sway?—If such Chance be
the strict opposite to a rational Principle,
'tis hard to conceive, how it should have
supplied it's place, and without the least
ingenuity have produced a work so ingenious. 'Tis hard also to conceive, how
without a Reason that should exist, which

fure; and in the Predicament WHEN, it is OPPORTUNITY, is of To Hote, o Kaspos that is to say, Good of Favourable, acceding to the Time When, and characterising it, gives it by such accession the Name of Opportunity. Aristot. Ethic. Eudem p. 86. Edit. Sylb. Locum autem Actionis, Opportunitatem Temporis esse dicunt; Tempus autem Actionis opportunity Grace Eurzipia, Latine appellatur Occasio. Cic. de Offic. i. 40.

⁽y) Parad. Loft, Book ii. 965.

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it requires so much Reason (even in part only) to comprehend (2). There is however another sort of Chance, which, under the name of Fortune, we find described as follows—a Cause not manifest to human reasoning (a); not a Cause devoid of Reason, but a Cause, which human Reason wants the means to investigate.

WE may learn from experience, that whatever opening there may be left for human Freedom, (and enough is there

left

⁽z) Hanc igitur in Stellis constantiam, hanc tantam tam variis cursibus in omni æternitate convenientiam temporum, non possum intelligere sine mente, ratione, consilio. Cic. de Nat. Deor. ii. 21.—Dubitant de Mundo, ex quo et oriuntur et siunt omnia, casune irse sit effectus aut necessitate aliquâ, an ratione ac mente divinâ: et Archimedem arbitrantur plus valuisse in imitandis Sphæræ conversionibus, quam Naturam in efficiendis. Cic. de Nat. Deor. ii. 34.


⁽a) — δοκεῖ μὲν αἰτία ή Τυχτ, ἄοπλ ὅτὰ ἀνθρωπίνη διανοία. — Arift. Phys. ii. 4. p. 33. Edit. Sylb. Inflead of διανοία, they used afterwards the Term λογισμῷ.

left both for Merit and Denicrit) it is C.XII. not so uncontrouled, as in the least to affect the Universe. It is not in our power to interrupt the course of Nature; nor can we, like the Giants of old, heap mountain upon mountain. There is an irreversible Order of things, to which we necessarily submit; an indissoluble Concatenation of successive Causes with their Effects, by which both the Being and the Well-being of this Whole are maintained.

This divine Order or Concatenation has different denominations: referred to the Supreme Being as to it's author, we call it FATE; referred to his Forefight for the Good of all, we call it PROVIDENCE (b).

X 4

The



⁽b) Three Terms are here employed, CHANCE, FATE, and PROVIDENCE; the two first of which have been often improperly afferted, the last has been often hardily denied, and all this to favour the Atheistic System.

C, XII.

'Tis this which mingles itself with all our Actions and Designs; which co-operates with the Pilot, the Husbandman, and the Merchant; nor with these alone, but with all of every degree, from the meanest Peasant, up to the mightiest Monarch. If it co-operate favourably, they succeed; if otherwise, they fail. And hence the supposed efficacy of Time and Place, so often of such importance in this co-operation. 'Tis hence, the Race is not to the swift, nor the Battle to the strong, &c.

A PILOT sails, with intention to reach a certain port. All, that the skill of a good Navigator can suggest, is done;

The Author of these Notes has endeavoured to give such Meanings to the Terms Chance and Fate, as may render them subservient to the Cause of Providence, and by making them wholly dependent on THE Supreme Intelligent Principle, to make them weaken the System of Atheism, rather than contribute to it's Support.

yet he sails at a Time, when hurricanes C. XII. arise, and, instead of gaining the destined port, is dashed upon the rocks. A Farmer with proper industry manures and sows his fields; yet the Seasons destroy his harvest, and (according to his own Phrase) the Times fight against him. A Merchant travels for the sake of gain to a distant country, and there contracts a pestilential disease, which carries him off.

These Incidents, thus connected with Time and Place, are referred in common language to Chance, as to their Cause; and so indeed they may, as far as Chance implies a Cause, which human reasoning was not able either to foresee or obviate. But if we go farther, and suppose it a Cause, where there is in fact no Reason at all; in such case we do nothing less than deify Chance, committing the affairs of the World to the blindest of Guides, instead of that QNE, All-GOOD, All-Powerful, DI-

VINE

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C. XII. VINE INTELLIGENCE, which in the same undivided instant both sees, and hears all things (c).

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And so much for the two Genera or Arrangements of When and Where.

CHAP.

⁽c) See Epicharmus, quoted in the Note, p. 115.

C H A P. XIII.

Concerning Position or Situation—
What it is, and how deduced—how it
exists in Beings in animate—in Vegetables
—in Man—animal Progression—Works
of Art—Attitudes—illustrations of Attitude—from Poets—from Actors—from
Orators—It's Efficacy, whence—Position,
among the Elements of Democritus—it's
Instuence and Importance in the natural
World—in the intellectual.

THE Arrangement or Predicament C.XIII. of Position or Situation has a near affinity with that of Place. They are both of the relative order, and are both conversant, when taken strictly, about corporeal Substances only. They differ however, in as much as the simple Possession of Space constitutes Place; the

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C.XIII. the manner (a) of possessing it, Position.

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Now

(a) Differt SITUS ab UBI in hoc, quod UBI est Lo-CATIO TOTIUS, SITUS est ORDINATIO PARTIUM IN LOCO. UBI est simpliciter ESSE IN LOCO; SITUS, secundum PARTIUM ORDINATIONEM. Fell, p. 104.

Ad SITUM omnem requiritur TRIPLEX HABITUDO, quæ conjuncta constituit Situm; Habitudo Partium alicujus Totius inter se; Partium alicujus Totius ad ipsum Totum; Partium et Totius ad Locum. Sanderson, p. 49, l. i. c. 14.

Prædicamentum SITUS (Kesobas) respicit Positionem vei, tum respectu partium suarum inter se, tum respectu Loci, aliarumque rerum. Wallis, 1. i. c. 13.

— ἔτε ἔν τὸ κείμενον σῶμα, ἔτε τὸν τόπον, ἐν ῷ κεῖται, τῆ διανοία ωτριλαμβάνοντα, δεῖ νοεῖν τὸ κεῖσθαι, μόνην δὲ τὴν ἔχυσάν ωως Θέση ἐν τῷ γένει τῷ κεῖσθαι λογιζόμενον κατὰ ωάντα τὰ ὅντα, ὅσα ωέΦυκεν ἔτερα ὑΦ ἔτέρων ἀνέχεσθαι, ἢ ἐνιδρύεσθαι τὰ ἔτερα ἐν τοῖς ἔτέροις ἡ γὰρ τοιάδε συμπλοκή τῶν ἐνιδρυμέσων κὰ τῶν τὴν ἔδραν ωαρεχόντων κυριωτάτη κὰ ωρωτίσα ἐςὶ τὰ κεῖσθαί ὑπογραΦή—We are not to understand the Genus of Lying or Position, by taking into our Difcussion either the Body lying, or the Place, in which it lies, but singly and solely by taking into our account the peculiar Mode of Site in the Genus of lying, as it runs thro' all those ranks of Beings, which are formed by nature to be supported some of them by others, or to be seated some

Now the manner, in which a Body C.XIII. possesses, has respect to certain Relations, which exist, some within, and some without it; Relations, which arise from it's Parts, it's Whole, it's immediate Place, and the Place surrounding it.

We shall explain what we affert (which perhaps may appear obscure) by beginning from Bodies the most simple, and passing from these to others, more complex and diversified.

THE simplest and most perfectly similar of all Bodies is the Sphere (b). If there-

fome of them upon others; for 'tis THIS CONNECTION BETWEEN THINGS, THAT ARE SEATED, and THINGS THAT AFFORD THE SEAT, which makes the primary and the firiteft Description of Lying or Position. Simpl. in Prad. p. 85. Ed. Basil. 1551.

⁽b) The Sphere, and other folid Figures, foon after mentioned in this Chapter, are for the greater part well known. He however, who wishes for ocular inspection,

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CXIII. therefore we take a Sphere, and place it upon the ground, the Part farthest from the Earth's centre we call it's Top; that the nearest, it's Bottom; and all lying between we call it's Middle. These Distinctions in the Sphere regard external Objects only, because the Sphere being every where similar contributes nothing to them itself. If we roll it therefore along, the Distinctions are not lost; only, while the Motion continues, they perpetually vary, and that merely with reference to local Dislinctions, existing without.

> And hence it follows, that the Sphere, tho' it have Place, yet according to these reasonings has in strictness no Position, because it has no peculiar Parts deducible

from

fpection, may find them all (the Sphere alone excepted) among the Diagrams of the eleventh and twelfth Books of Euclid, to which Books we refer him, as they are easy to be had, under various Editions.

from it's own Figure, which Parts can C.XIII. be called *Top* or *Bottom*, as contradifinguished one to another.

WHAT is true of the Sphere, may be afferted almost as truly of the five Platonic Bodies, the equilateral Pyramid, the Cube, the Octoedron, &c. and that, because they are not only regular, but because their several Faces are every way similar.

WHAT is true of these Bodies, is true also of their Opposites, the Bodies I mean, which are not only dissimilar, but universally irregular. Fragments of Rock, and Hillocks of Sand, have neither Top nor Bottom, but what is merely casual; and therefore, the of necessity they exist in Place by being Bodies, yet, as they have no internal local Distinctions under the meaning here adopted, it of course follows they cannot properly have Position.

Bur

C.XIII.

But if we pass to those Bodies, which are neither irregular, like the broken Rock, because they have Order and Proportion; nor yet every way similar, like the Sphere, because they have Extensions that are unequal (such for example as the Cylinder, or the Parallelipipedon); here we shall find the very Bodies, from their own Attributes, to concur with the World around, both in acquiring to themselves Position, as well as in diversifying it.

THE Cylinder for example extends farther one way than another, and therefore possesses within itself three such parts, as two Extremes, and one Mean. If we so place it therefore, that one of these Extremes (no matter which) shall be most remote from the Earth's Centre, and the other most near; in such case, by this manner of blending external and internal Relations, the Cylinder is said to stand. If we remove in part the higher Extreme from

from it's Perpendicular, and thus differ- CXIII.
ently blend Relations, the Cylinder is
faid TO INCLINE. And if we pursue
this Inclination, till the two Extremes of:
Top and Bottom become horizontal, then
is it said TO LIE. The Motion, which
leads from Standing to Lying, we call
FALLING; that from Lying to Standing,
we call RISING. Every one of these Affections may well happen to the Cylinder,
because it's peculiar Figure, taken with
it's peculiar Place, co-operates to the
production of the Positions here described.

'Tis not so with those Bodies already mentioned, where these internal Characters are not distinguished. The Sphere and the Cube neither FALL nor RISE, because they neither STAND nor LIE more at one time than another.

But suppose we go farther; suppose to one Extreme of this Cylinder we add

Y

a new

C.XIII. a new Part, that is a Capital; to the other

Extreme another Part, that is a Base:
the two Extremes of the Cylinder would
no longer in such case remain indiscriminate, but the Characters of Top and Bottom would become distinguished and ascertained, even in the Figure itself, without looking to things external.

THE consequences of these new Characters are new Modes of Position. A Pillar (for such we must now suppose it) is not only capable, like the simple Cylinder, of Standing and of Lying, but in as much as two of it's Parts, that is to say it's Extremes, are essentially distinguished, if it rest on it's Base, it stands upright; if on it's Capital, it stands inverted.

Let us carry our suppositions farther, and by a Metamorphosis, like one of Ovid's, transform this Pillar into a Tree.

Let the Capital sprout into Branches, the Shaft

Shaft become a Trunk, and the Base CXIII. strike into Roots. Here then in a vegetable Subject we behold the same Distinctions; a Top, a Bottom, and a Middle of it's own, leading as before to the same Diversities of Position.

IF we still pursue the Metamorphosis, and transform the Tree into a Man, making it's Branches into a Head, it's Trunk into a Body, and it's Roots into Feet, we shall discover also in an animal Subject the same Distinctions as before; and the Subject will in consequence be capable of Lying, as well as of Standing; of Standing Upright, as well as inverted.

But this is not all. Man is not only an extended substance, like the Column, or the Tree, but over and above, as an Animal, he is by nature locomotive. Now the Part of him in progression, which leads the way, we denominate his Fore-part or Front; the Opposite, his Hinder-part

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C.XIII. part or Rear; and the two Parts upon each Side, his Right and his Left.

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AND thus has Man, in consequence of his animal Frame, over and above the former Distinctions of Top and Bottom (both of them common to the other Subjects already described) four additional Distinctions peculiar to him as an Animal, the Distinctions of Front and Rear, of Right and Lest, which four are wholly unknown both to the Column, and to the Tree.

WHILE he is under the Position of STANDING, these four Distinctions have little force, but when he happens to Lie, then is their Essicacy seen, and each of them leads to a new, and different Position. If his Front, while he is lying, be nearest to the Earth, then is he said to lie PRONE; if his hinder-part or Rear, then to lie Supine; if neither of these, then 'tis either on his Right, or on his Left; which

which *Positions* are unknown either to C.XIII. the Pillar, or the Tree.

Thus, besides the Standing Positions of Upright and Inverted, has Man, in consequence of his Frame, four other Positions, which appertain to him, as he lies; so that his Frame taken together, as one perfect Whole, is susceptible of six Different and Specific Positions, which have reference to the six Different and Specific Extensions of his Body (c).

FABLES tell us, that the triangular Island Sicily was thrown upon the Giant Typhoeus. Under one Promontory lay

· Diministry Crooxle

⁽c) See these different Extensions, which Aristotle calls Distances, διακάσεις, fully discussed in his Treatise de Animalium ingressu, p. 129. Edit. Sylb. In his History of Animals, we read—ἔχει δ' δ ἄνθρωπ & τὸ ἄνω κὰ τὸ κάτω, κὰ τὰ ἔμπροσθεν κὰ τὰ ἀπίσθια, κὰ δεξιὰ κὰ ἀριςτερά. Hist. Animal. p. 17. Edit. Sylb.

CXIII.

his Right Arm; under another, his Left; under a third, his Legs; under mount Atna, his Head; under the whole island, his Body, having his Breast upwards, his Back downwards. These Positions refer to the several Extensions above described.

Vasta giganteis ingesta est insula membris Trinacris, et magnis subjectum molibus urget

Æthereas aufum sperare Typhoëa sedes.

Nititur ille quidem, pugnatque refurgere sæpè;

DEXTRA sed Ausonio manus est subjecta

Peloro;

LEVA, Pachyne, tibi: Lilybæo CRURA premuntur;

Degravat Ætna CAPUT: sub quâ RESU-PINUS arenas

Ejectat, flammamque fero vomit ore Typhoeus (d).

⁽d) Ovid. Metam.'v. 346.

BUT not to anticipate with regard C.XIII. to Poets, of whom we shall say more hereafter.-In a Cube there are fix Faces, capable of denoting as many Positions; and yet there is this important Difference between the Cube and the Man: the Faces of the Cube being all of them Similar, it's Positions, being only nominal, can only refer to things without, and every Face can alike concur to the forming of the same Position. But the Parts analogous to these in Man being all of them dissimilar, his Positions, being real, are by no means thus commutable; but if the Head be uppermost, then, and then only, is he, by Position, Upright; if his Back be uppermost, then, and then only, is he, by Position, Prone; nor can he possibly be called either Prone or Upright, were any other Part to exist in the same Place, excepting the two here mentioned.

Y 4

FROM

C.XIII. FROM what has been alleged, we see the true Origin of Position or Situation. "It arises from the Relation, "which the Distinctions of Parts with-"In bear to the Distinctions of Place "without; and it varies of course, "as this Relation is found to vary." The fewer of these internal Distinctions any Being possesses, the less always the number of it's possible Positions. As it possesses more, it's Positions increase with them.

As to the Progression of Animals, peculiar to them as Animals, that Progression, (I mean) by which they move not as mere Bodies, but as Bodies possessed of Instinct and Sensation; it is to be observed, that this Progression is formed by the help of Joints and Muscles, and that these, during their operation, form within the Animal Body a variety of Angles and Flexures. Now hence

hence arises a fresh multitude of charac- C.XIII. teristic Positions. There is one Position, under which a Bird flies; another, under which a Horse gallops; a third, under which a Man walks. &c.

THESE latter Positions differ from those already described, because they depend not on a simple Relation of the whole Body to things without, but on a diversified Relation of it's different Parts, one to another. The Painter well knows the force of these Positions, since 'tis by these he superinduces Motion upon immoveable Canvas; so that from the Position, which we see, we infer the Progression, which we see not (e).

AND this naturally leads us to confider the Power of Position or Situation in Works of ART. Among the common Utenfils of life, such as Chairs,

Beds,



⁽e) See Vol. I. Treatise 2. chap. ii. p. 61.

C.XIII. Beds, Tables, &c. there is a Position which is proper, and another which is absurd; a Position, by which they attain their End, and another, which renders them useless. Some derive their very Essence (if I may use the Phrase) from their Situation; for example, the Lintel, from being over the Door; the Threshold, from being under it (f). We may pass from these to Productions more elegant.

Tis the Knowlege of these various Positions peculiar to Animal Bodies, and to the human above the rest (commonly known by the name of ATTITUDES)

⁽f) Τὰ δὶ Θίσει [λέγεται,] οἶον ἐδὸς κὰ ὑπέρθυρου ταῦτα γὰρ τῷ κεῖσθαι ωως διαΦέρει—Other Substances are DENOMINATED FROM THEIR POSITION, as the THRESHOLD, and the LINTEL; for these differ by the peculiar manner of their being SITUATED.—And soon after—Οὐδὸς γάρ ἐςιν, ὅτι ἔτως κεῖται κὰ τὸ εῖναι, τὸ ὅτως αὐτὸ κεῖσθαι σημαίνει—For it is a THRESHOLD, because it is so SITUATED; and it's Existence indicates it's Being SITUATED AFTER THIS MANNER. Metaph. H. c. 6. p. 135. Edit. Sylb.

which constitutes so eminent a part in C.XIII. the character of a perfect Painter. To the Statuary, if possible, it is a more important Science still, because he has no helps, like the Painter, from Co-lour, Light, and Shade.

INSTANCES in support of this affertion (if it need supporting by instances) may be alleged innumerable both from Pictures and from Statues.

PAINTING gives us the ATTITUDES of St. Paul, and the Sorcerer Elymas, in the Cartoon of Raphael—of Apollo, and the dancing Hours, in the Aurora of Guido—of the fleeping Christ, his Mother, and St. John, in the Silence of Caracci—of many and diversified Holy Families, in the works of Carlo Maratti, &c.

FROM ATTITUDES in Painting we pass to those in Sculpture; to that of the Medicean Venus, the Farnesian Hercules, the

C.XIII. the Niobe, the Laocoon, the Wrestlers, the dying Gladiator, &c.

'Tis easy, when we are describing these Beauties, to be diffuse in our expressions, and to exclaim, as we describe, how charming, how exquisite, &c. But the observation is just, as well as obvious—

Segniùs inritant animos demissa per aurem, Quàm quæ sunt oculis commissa sidelibus (g).

HE, therefore, who would comprehend ATTITUDE in Works such as these, must either visit the Originals, or else contemplate them (as he may easily do) in Models, Drawings, and Books of Sculpture and Painting (h).

WE

⁽g) Hor. Art. Poet. 180.

⁽b) Those, who dwell in the neighbourhood where these Notes were written, may find excellent examples of ATTITUDE at Wilton House (Lord Pembrake's) among the Statues and Basso-Relievos there preserved; in particular the Cupid bending his Bow;

We shall find less difficulty in the C.XIII. works of *Poets*, because these address us in Words, and convey to us their Ideas not thro' our language but their own. 'Tis thus Virgil gives us an ATTITUDE OF SITTING IN DESPERATION:

—— SEDET, æternumque SEDEBIT Infelix Theseus——— (i)

SHAKESPEARE, of SITTING IN DE-SPONDENCE:

She sate, like Patience on a monument, Smiling at grief——— (k)

MILTON, OF CONJUGAL AFFECTION:

MILTON.

the Faun, who, as he stands, turns his Body, and looks backward; the Figures in the Morriage-Vase; the Amazon fighting, the Basso-Relievos of Meleager, of Niobe, of Ceres and Triptolemus, &c.

⁽i) Æn. vi. 517.

⁽k) Shakespeare's Twelfth Night, Act. ii. Sc. 6.

CXIII. ——— He, on his fide

LEANING HALF RAISED, with looks of

cordial Love

Hung over her, enamour'd— (m)

OVID makes Thescelus, as he elevated a javelin, to be miraculously petrified in the VERY ATTITUDE OF AIMING:

— Utque manu jaculum fatale parabat Mittere, in HOC hæsit signum de marmore GESTU (n).

More formidable is a fimilar ATTI-TUDE at Milton's Lazar-house:

— OVER them triumphant DEATH his dark
SHOOK—but delay'd to strike— (0).

THERE

⁽m) Par. Loft. v. 11.

⁽n) Ovid. Metam. v. 182.

⁽⁹⁾ Par. Loft, xi. 491.

THERE are ATTITUDES less tremen- C.XIII. dous, that mark Reverence and Humi-

Thus Shakespeare,

These Crouchings, and these lowly Courtesies

Might fire the blood of ordinary men (p).

THE LYING, OF BEING EXTENDED ON SOME SURFACE, is an ATTITUDE in most instances so connected with Death, that DEATH is often denoted by that Attitude alone.

Thus Nestor in Homer, speaking of the Greek Commanders, slain before Troy—

— ἔνθα δ' ἔπείλα κατέκταθεν ὅσσοι ἄριςοι,
Ενθα μὸν Αἴας ΚΕΙΤΑΙ ἀρήῖος, ἔνθα δ' ᾿Αχιλλεὺς,
Ενθα δὲ Πάτροκλ۞, ΘεόΦιν μήςωρ ἀτάλαντ۞,
Ενθα δ' ἐμὸς Φίλ۞ υἰός—— (q)

There

⁽p) Shakespeare's Jul. Casar, Act iii. Sc. 1.

⁽q) Hom. Odyf. r. 108.

C.XIII. There fell the bravest of the Grecian Chiefs;

There LIES great Ajax; there Achilles

LIES;

There too Patroclus, knowing as a God; There my own much-low'd Son—*.

THUS SHAKESPEARE,

O! mighty Cæsar, dost thou LIE so LOW?

Are all thy triumphs, glories, conquests, spoils,

Shrunk to this little measure— (r)?

SLEEP, whom the Poets deify, appears under a SIMILAR POSITION:

- CUBAT ipse Deus, membris languore solutis (s).

'Twas perhaps from this Resemblance in Position, joined to that other, the

Ceffation

See also Hom. Il. E. v. 20, and Mr. Clarke's Note, where he quotes Quinstilian.

⁽r) Shakef. Jul. Cef. Act iii. Sc. 3.

⁽s) Ovid. Metam. xi. 612.

Cessation of the Sensitive Powers, that C.XIII: SLEEP and DEATH were by the Poets called Brothers (t), and that the former (u) upon many occasions served to represent the latter.

If we pass from Poets to Actors (by Actors, I mean those of Dramatic Com-

Εύδομες Το μάλα μαπρον, ατέρμονα, νήγρε ον υπνον. See Homi Iliad. A. 241. Virg. Æn. x. 743. Horat Od. 1. iii. 11. v. 36. Mosch. Idylb. iii. 105.

Even in Prose-writers, when we read of persons being dead, we sometimes read that they are FAL'N ASLEEP, or that they SLEPT with their fathers. Corinthians i. c. xv. v. 6. 2 Chronicles c. ix. v. 314

It feems indeed to have been a custom with all nations, in instances of this fort, to mitigate the Harshness of the Thing fignified, by the Mildness of the Terms that signify it: a well known Figure, called in books of Rhetoric Euphemismus.

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positions)

⁽i) See Hermes, 1. i. c. 4. p. 52.

⁽u) When Sleep represents Death, it is commonly marked with some strong Epithet: by Homer it is called a brazen Sleep; by Virgil; an iron Sleep; by Horace; simply a long Sleep; which Idea the Poet Moschus heightens, by calling it not only a long Sleep, but a Sleep, without an end; a sleep, out of which we cannot be awak'd.

C.XIII. positions) we shall find that ATTITUDES and Positions make at least a moiety of their merit; so that the they are to speak 'tis certain, as well as to ast, yet 'tis from asting, not from speaking, that they take their denomination.

Nor are just Positions without their Use to that real Astor upon the Stage of life, I mean the Orator. Demosthenes, in whom Rhetoric attained it's last Perfection, was at first so unsuccessful, that he was in a state of despair, 'till Satyrus, a celebrated Tragedian, shewed him the amazing force of Astion, by the different manners of repeating certain Passages out of Euripides and Sophocles (x).

And whence is it that Positions detive this wonderous Efficacy?—'Tis in fact because the Body is an Organ to the Soul; an instrument, whose Gestures cor-

respond

⁽x) Plutareb. Demofib. p. 849. Edit, Xyland.

respond to every Affection, and are diver- C.XIII. fified by Nature herself, as those Affections are found to vary. Words move only those, who understand the language; and even, where the Language is under-Rood, acute Sentiments often escape the comprehension of unacute Hearers. But Action, spontaneously indicating the Motions of the Soul, is a Language which not only the vulgar, but even the stranger comprehends. Every one knows the external Gestures and Signs, by which, without teaching, both himself and others indicate their several Affections; fo that feeing the same Signs recur, he readily knows their Meaning, in as much as Nature herself supplies the Place of an Interpreter. But to pass from these Speculations to others more general.

THE primary Elements of Democritus were Atoms and a Void. As for the Variety and the Specific Differences, which he found to exist in things, he deduced Z 2 them

C.XIII. them out of his Atoms, first by Figure, as A for example differs from N; next by Order, as AN for example differs from NA; and lastly by Position, as Z for example differs from N, these Letters in Figure being in a manner the same (y).

THUS POSITION, according to this Philosopher, stands among the Principles of the Universe.

A HIGH rank this, and yet perhaps not an undeserved one, if, by attending to particulars, we contemplate it's extensive influence. For not to mention

⁽γ) What others called σχήμα, FIGURE, Democritus called 'Ρυσμός; Τάξις, ORDER, he called Διάθηγη; and Θίσις, SITUATION, or POSITION, he called Τροπή. See Ariflot. Metaph. p. 11. 134. Edit. Sylb. See also Lib. de Gen. et Corrupt. l. i. e. 2. where Philoponus in his Comment informs us, that these strange words were λίξιις Αδδερικαί, Abderic Words; Words used in Abdera, the city to which Democritus belonged.

the force of Position in the different C.XIII. parts of every animal; not to mention the admirable SITUATION even of subordinate Subjects; the grateful variety of Lands and Waters, of Mountains and Plains; what shall we say to the Posi-TION of the Heavens above, and of the Earth beneath; of the Sun himself in the centre, and the several Planets moving round him? If we carry our hypothefis farther, and suppose (as has been well coniectured) that the Solar System itself has a proper Position respecting the fixed Stars; and that they, prefiding in other Systems, maintain a certain Position respecting the System of the Sun; we shall have reason so to esteem the importance of this Genus, that perhaps upon it's Permanence depends the Permanence of the World.

Nor need we be furprifed, tho' it be properly an Attribute of things corporeal, if we discover the traces of it even in Z 3 Beings

be an Effect, of which the Cause is a sawereign Mind, all that we discover in Effects we may fairly look for in their Causes, since here it's prior Existence (2) is in a manner necessary.

Thus our own Minds are not only the Place and Region of our Ideas (a), but with respect to these Ideas, such is the influence of Position, that upon this in a manner depends our whole Perception of Truth. Let us for example invert the Terms of a simple Proposition, and instead of saying, that Every Man is an Animal, say that Every Animal is a Man; and what becomes of the Truth which

fuch

⁽z) See Hermes, p. 381, &c.

⁽a) — Kai ev dù oi déposses the fuxère eval totou eidan—Well therefore do they conceive, who fay that the Soul is the Region of Forms, or Ideas. Arist. de An. iii. 4. p. 57. Edit. Sylb. See before, p. 98, in the Note, and p. 112, 113.

fuch Proposition contained? Let us derange in any Theorem the Propositions themselves, consounding them in their order, blending them promiscuously, putting the first last, and the last first; and what becomes of the Truth which such Theorem was to demonstrate? Tis lost, till the Propositions recover their natural situation.

--- tantum feries, juncturaque pollet *.

Democritus, whom we have just mentioned, in order to shew the importance of Arrangement in natural Subjects, and the amazing Differences that arise, where the Change is most minute, ingeniously remarks, that out of the same Letters are formed Tragedy and Comedy (b). We may affirm as considently,

[.] Hor.

 ⁽b) — ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν γὰρ τραγωδία γίνεται, κỳ κωμυβία γραμμάτων. De Gen. et Corrupt. 1. i. c. 2.
 p. 4. Edit. Sylb.

C.XIII. that out of the fame Terms are formed.

Truth and Falsbood (c).

THE Efficacy indeed of this INTELTLECTUAL POSITION is so great, that thro' it not only the wise know, but the unwise become informed. 'Tis by the strength of this alone that all Teaching is performed; all Learning acquired; that the simple and uninstructed are led from Truths acknowleged (d) to Truths unknown.

⁽c) SIMPLE TERMS are to be found in the several PREDICAMENTS OF ARRANGEMENTS here treated, being THE FIRST PART OF LOGIC.

From different Arrangements of these Terms arise Propositions; and from different Arrangements of Propositions arise SYLLOGISMS.

PROPOSITIONS are the Object of THE SECOND PART OF LOGIC; SYLLOGISMS, of THE THIRD.

There is no going farther, for the most enlarged Speculations are but Syllogisms repeated. Such then, in a Logical and Intellectual View, is the FORCE and EXTENT of the PREDICAMENT of POSITION OF SITUATION, here treated.

⁽d) There is an Order or Arrangement peculiar to Learners; and of course, with respect to them, the Principle

known, and thus ascend by due de-C.XIII, grees to the sublimest parts of Science.

What then shall we say to that STUPEN-DOUS POSITION, to that MARVELLOUS ARRANGEMENT, EXISTING WITHIN THE DIVINE MIND; where the whale of Being is ever present in perfect Order; and to which no single Truth is ever latent or unrevealed (e)?

Principle or Beginning of Knowlege is different from what it is, according to the order of Nature. Hence the following observation.— H & ('Aρχη') öven an κάλλιςα εκαςου γένοιτο ο ιου κ' μαθήσεως, εία από τε πρώτε κ' της τε πράγματο αρχης ενίστε αρκτίου, αλλ' όθευ ράς αν μάθοι—There is another Species of Beginning, and that is the Point, from which any thing may be done after the best manner; for example in the affair of Learning any thing, we are sometimes not to begin from what is first, and which is the Principle or Beginning of the Thing itself, but we are to begin from that Point, whence any one may learn the most easily. Metaph. 1. iv. c. 1.

In the Meno of Plato there is a striking example of an Arrangement of Truths, which lead an uninstructed Youth to the Knowlege of a fine and important Theorem in Geometry. See the Dialogue of that name in Plato, and Mr. Sydenham's elegant and accurate Translation, enriched with Diagrams.

⁽e) See before, p. 110, 161, 204, 5, 6, 266, 272, 287, 8.

C.XIII. If we would comprehend the Dignity of Position in this it's ARCHETYPAL FORM. let us view it at the same instant with something, it's perfect contrary: let us compare it for example to the fick Man's Dream, or to that Chaos of Ideas, which fills the Mind of one delirious. As we can find few Situations more unfortunate, than these latter; so we can conceive no one more respectable, or divine, than the former.

> AND so much for the Genus or Arrangement of Position, which arises from the Genus or Arrangement of WHERE, as this from the Genus or Arrangement of RELATION, both Position and Where being in their nature Relatives,

> > CHAP.

C H A P. XIV.

Concerning HABIT, or rather the BEING HABITED-It's Description-it's principal Species deduced and illustratedit's Privation—Conclusion of the second or middle part of the Treatise.

HE GENUS OF HABIT, OF rather CXIV. of BEING HABITED, is of so little importance, when compared to the other Predicaments, that perhaps it might be omitted, were it not in deference to antient authority (a).

Tho' it have respect both to Habits, which are worn, and to Persons who svear them; yet is it not recognized ei-

ther

⁽a) The Authority alluded to is that of the Pythagoreans and Peripateties.

C.XIV. ther in the one or the other, but is a RELATION, which arises from the two taken together (b).

Now as every such Habit, as well as every such Wearer, are both of them Substances, the Relation must necessarily be a Relation, existing between Substances. It cannot therefore be the Relation existing between Mind and it's Habits (such as Virtue or Science) nor that between Body and it's Habits (such as Agility or

· . .

Health),

⁽b) Quad non ita intelligendum est, ac si res ipsa, qua sic habentur, sint hujus Prædicamenti (puta Vestitus ipsi, &cc.) qua ad alia Prædicamenta spectant, sed Habitio barum, seu ipsum Habere, to exertava. Wallis. Logic. 1. i. c. 14.—Soon after he explains Habitio, and informs us it means, Vestitum esse, Tunicatum esse, Togatum esse, Corona cingi, Calceo indui, &cc.

Sanderson in his Logic explains the Predicament as follows—Corpus babens est Substantia; Res babita sere est Forma artisticialis de quartá Specie Qualitatis; AP-PLICATIO HUJUS AD ILLUD est HABITUS bujus Pradicamenti. Lib. i. 6. 14.

Health), for these Habits are not Sub- C.XIV. stances, but inherent Attributes (c).

AGAIN, it cannot be the Relation existing between a Man and his Possessions;
for, tho' these are both of them Substances, and tho' a Possession may be said
to have an Estate, he cannot be said
to have it upon him; he does not wear
it (d).

The

⁽c) Simplicius, when he gives the reason, why Habit and the Body-Habited cannot co-exist, as Substance and it's Attributes co-exist, says—συμφοή γας ταυτά ές, κ) αυτό έκεινο—For these Attributes are con-natural [that is, grow with the Being] and are the Being it-self. Simplic. in Prad. p. 93.

⁽d) Διο ωθε τα ατήματα, η ανδράποδα, η Φίλυς, η ωπάτερας, η υίεις κατα τύτο το γένω έχειν λεγόμεθα, διότι ων εν ωτριθέσει ταυτά έςι, καίτοι κτήματα
δντα.—For which reason we are not said, in the sense of this Genus, το Have Possessions, or Slaves, or Friends, or Fathers, or Children; for these none of them are said to exist in their being THROWN ROUND US, or SUPERINDUCED, altho they are all [in some sense or other] our Possessions. Simplic. ut suprá.

C.XIV. The being Habited therefore is in it's ft-ictest Sense something less than the first Relation, that between a Substance, and it's Attributes; something more, than the second Relation, that (I mean) between a Possessor, and his Possessor (e).

Tis to be hoped that these Reasonings on a subject so trite, will be pardoned for their Brevity. They are to shew, not

what

⁽e) — nò foine mieron wüs elvau to ixen, të neuthodau, nò të nad ëlv dianeisdau në mit yap ëxilau, us
no deunotus: xupilerau and tën ëluden utmatun, a ë
mepineimeda. në de ommatinoi est nò eluden, xupilerae
and two eleun, ai ommatinoi noir, ommoneis noas,
nò nu enintatoi—the Having any thing on appears to be a fort of Medium between Possessing, and
the being Habitually disposed. As far as it is
bad, after the same manner as Whiteness is had, [or any
inherent Attribute,] it is distinguished from Possessing
without, with which we are not said to be inveloped
or cloathed. As far as it is corporeal, and from Without, it is distinguished from [inherent Attributes or]
Habits, which belong to us, as things con-natural,
and not as things adventitions. Simplic. ut suprá.

what the Relation is, but what it is C.XIV.

If it be demanded—And what then is it?—the Answer must be, It is a Re-LATION existing after a peculiar manner; when an ARTIFICIAL SUBSTANCE is SU-PERINDUCED (f) upon a NATURAL ONE, and becomes contiguous to it, tho' it be not united in vital Continuity.

Such was the very Armour he had on,

When he th' ambitious Norway combated (g).

THE primary End of being habited seems to have been PROTECTION; and that, either by way of desence against the inclemencies of Nature, as in the case of common Apparel; or by way of desence,

against

⁽f) See the preceding Notes in this Chapter, parcicularly the second.

⁽g) Hamlet, Act i. Se. I.

C.XIV. against Infults, as in the case of Helmets, Breast-plates, Coats of Mail, &c.

FARTHER than this, as Habits were various both in their materials and shapes; and, as among the number of those who wore them, some were superior to the rest by their Dignity and Office: hence it was found expedient, that many of these superior Ranks should be marked by the Distinctions of Peculiar Habits; so that this established another End of being Habited, over and above Protestion, an End, which gave Robes to Peers, Uniforms to Admirals, &cc.

FARTHER still, some Regard, when either of the sexes habited themselves, was had to Decency; some to Beauty and Adventitious Ornament; of which last we may be more sensible, if we contemplate the elegant draperies of the Grecian Statues, or those in the capital

pital Pictures of the great Italian Mas- C.XIV. ters, and compare these truly graceful and fimple Forms to the tasteless and ever mutable ones of ourselves, and our neighbours (h).

As there are many forts of Habit, which have respect to this last End, I

The following Anecdote, communicated to me by the late Lord Lyttelton, appears to be worth preserving. When Sir John Vanbrugh had finished Blenheimhouse, the then Duchess of Marlborough asked him for the Plan of a Garden. Sir John told her, he could give no Plan himself, and he feared she might apply to others, as incapable as he was, naming certain Gardeners of the time, that are now unknown. continued he, if your Grace would have a Garden truly elegant, you must apply for a PLAN to THE BEST PRINTERS OF LANDSCAPE.

· So happily did this ingenious man predict (as it were) a Taste, which, taking it's rise not many years after from Kent, has been fince completed by Brown, and no where with greater beauty and magnificence, than on the very Spot, of which we are now writing, I mean Blenheim.

A a

mean



⁽b) The same Simplicity, which contributes to the Decoration of our Persons, contributes also to the Decoration of Nature.

C.XIV. mean to Beauty or adventitious Ornament; fo when a man is found to cultivate this End to an excefs, it constitutes the character, which we call a Fop (i). Nay, even the Conveniences of Dress, when too minutely studied, degenerate into an effeminacy, which carries with it a reproach. 'Twas hence that Turnus upbraided the Trojans for wearing a Covering over their hands, and for tying their Caps on with Strings, that is to say in mo-

Et tunicæ manicas, et habent redimicula mitræ (k).

dern language, for ufing Gloves and Chinstays.

 $\mathbf{a}\mathbf{W}$

⁽i) Horace, in the first satire of his first book, calls the wild and extravagant Nævius, by the name of VAPPA; which Baxter ingeniously explains, quod infano sumptu stolidas sequeretur delicias. Nos bujuscemodi homunciones FOPPS dicimus; an et hoc a VAPPA, quærant aiii.

VAPPA meant originally the Juice of the Grape in a state of perfect insipidity, when 'twas neither Wine, nor Vinegar. VAPPA proprie dicitur, quod nec vinum, nec acetum est. Vet. Scholiast. in Horat. Satir. l. i. \$. 2. v. 13.

⁽k) En. ix. 616.

We have already mentioned the Use C.XIV. of Habit as to Distinction. In almost all Countries something of this hath taken place, to distinguish the Noble from the Ignoble; the Scholar from the Mechanic; to mark the Sacerdotal, the Military, the Juridical, &cc. 'Tis to the Fallibility, which sometimes attends this method of distinguishing, that we owe those proverbial Sayings, THE CLOAK makes not the Philosopher; THE COWL makes not the Monk (1).

'Tis in a Sense less strict and precise, that we take the word HABIT, when we say of the Plains, they are cloathed with Grass; of the Mountains, they are cloathed with Wood; and more remotely still, when we apply the Notion of Habit to the MIND——Having on the

⁽¹⁾ Pallium non facit Philosophum—Cucullus non facit Monachum.

C.XIV. BREAST-PLATE of Righteousness—taking the Shield of Faith (m), &c.

In the Language of Poetry there is fometimes much elegance derived from this Arrangement; as for example, when the Morn, at day-break, is faid to be clad with Russet Mantle; or when the Moon, in diffusing her pallid light, is faid to throw o'er the dusk her silver Mantle (n); or when the Psalmist says, on a greater subject, Thou deckest thyself with Light, as it were with a Garment (o).

Tho' from all these instances we may perceive the force of this Genus, yet another still remains, I mean the force of it's Privation. Nakedness is found to heighten other circumstances of Distress:

Nubus

⁽m) Ephesians, ch. vi. v. 14, 16.

⁽n) Hamlet, Act i. Sc. 1 .- Par. Lost, iv. 608.

⁽⁰⁾ Pfalm civ. v. 2.

Nudus in ignotâ, Palinure, jacebis a- CXIV. renâ (o).

Tho' the Sense be metaphorical, yet Shakespeare avails himself of the same Privation in the pathetic Speech, which he gives to Wolsey:

Had I but serv'd my God with half the zeal

I ferv'd my King, he would not in mine age Have left me NAKED to my enemies (p).

THE same Privation has it's effect also in a way more Comic, and contemptuous. 'Tis thus Aristophanes talks about Philosophers:

Τες ώχριῶντας, τες άνυποδήτες λέγεις (r).

Aa3

You



⁽p) Æn. v. 871.

⁽q) Shakes. Henry VIII. Act iii. Sc. 6.

⁽r) 'Agisop, Nip. 103.

C.XIV. You mean those pallid, those BAREFOOTED fellows.

'Tis thus the Author of the Dunciad describes Friars——

Grave mummers, sleeveless some, and shirtless others (s).

In some instances, such partial Privations of Habit become an indication of REVERENCE. Thus Moses, when on holy ground, was ordered to stand barefooted (t); and among Europeans 'tis a mark of Respect, to appear bareheaded.

AND so much for THE GENUS OR PRE-DICAMENT OF HABIT, which we divide into Species from it's different Ends

⁽s) Dunciad. iir. 113.

⁽t) Exod. iii. 5.

of PROTECTION, DISTINCTION, DE-C.XIV. CENCY, and ORNAMENT, to all of which is alike opposed their Contrary, PRIVATION. So much also for the TEN UNI-VERSAL ARRANGEMENTS, GENERA, OF PREDICAMENTS, with the discussion of which we conclude the Second, or middle Part of this Treatise.

A24 · CHAP.

C H A P. XV.

Concerning the APPENDAGES to the Universal Genera or Arrangements; that is to say concerning Opposites, Prior, Subsequent, Together or At once, and Motion, usually called Post-Predicaments—the Modes or Species of all these (Motion excepted) deduced, and illustrated—Preparation for the Theory of Motion.

C. XV. TAVING now gone thro' each of the PREDICAMENTS or Philosophical Arrangements, and confidered it's Character, and distinguishing Attributes, there remains nothing farther to complete the Theory, but an Explication of certain Terms, which have occasionally occurred; and which, from their subsequent place, and subsequent Contemplation, have been called by the

the Latin Logicians Post-Predica- C. XV. MENTS (a), and form the third, or last Part of this Treatise.

Thus for example, things have been sometimes mentioned in the sormer part of this Work, as opposed to one another; and hence it becomes expedient to confider the Doctrine of Opposites (b).

AT other times things have been treated as being some PRIOR, some SUB-SEQUENT, and others existing Toge-THER OF AT ONCE (c); and hence it becomes expedient to examine these several Terms, and to investigate the different meanings, of which each of them is susceptible.

LASTLY,

⁽a) See before, p. 35, 36.

⁽b) See before ch. vii. and ch. viii. p. 173. See also Arist. Prad. wegi των ANTIKEIMENΩN, p. 47. Edit. Sylb.

⁽c) See before, p. 181, 182, 221. See Arist. Prædic. wiel ve AMA. p. 54. Edit. Sylb.

C. XV. LASTLY, MOTION in it's various Species is so widely diffused thro' some of the most important Genera already treated, that it cannot be omitted in a speculation, where the professed End is to scrutinize Universals.

IT appears therefore that there still remain, as Subjects of our Inquiry, Opposites, Prior and Subsequent, Coexistent or At once, and last of all Motion.

Now in the first place, as to Opposites, the Reader must be reminded, that, having already spoken of them in a former Treatise (d), we omit them here, and refer to that.

THE

⁽d) See Hermes, 1. ii. c. 2, Note (i) p. 250, in which Note are enumerated RELATIVES, τὰ πρός τι; CONTRARIES, τὰ ἐναντία; CONTRADICTORIES, τὰ κατὰ ἀπόφασιν κὰ κατάφασιν. There is one Species omitted,

THE Doctrine (e) of PRIOR and SUB- C. XV. SEQUENT follows: and these perhaps may appear to be sufficiently discussed, if we enumerate, and explain the sollowing Modes.

THE MOST OBVIOUS MODE of PRI-ORITY is the TEMPORAL (f), according

omitted, ta nad Eir z signow, things opposed in the way of HABIT and PRIVATION; such as Sight and Blindness.

This Privation differs from that mentioned already in the third Chapter of this Treatife, because the Privation there is the road to natural Productions; the Privation here admits no Progress, nor any Return to the original Habit, at least in a natural way. See Amnon. p. 146, and of this Work, p. 56, 57, &c.

⁽e) See Arist. Prad. High TE NPOTEPON. p. 53. Edit. Sylb.

⁽f) This Mode Arifietle calls PRIOR κατὰ τον χρόνον, ACCORDING TO TIME; the Priority, depending
on the Quantity of Time being larger with respect to
the Subject, which is called older, or more antient—
τω

C. XV. ing to which we say, that the Trojan Wars were prior to the Punic, and the Battle of Marathon to that of Blenheim.

A SECOND MODE of PRIORITY is, when a thing is prior to some other, because it does not reciprocate in the consequence of Existence (g).

τῷ γὰς τον χρόνον ωλείω είναι, κὰ ωαλαιότερον κά ωρεσδύτερον λέγεται. Præd. p. 53. Edit. Sylb.

Ammonius, in commenting this Passage, observes an elegance in the Greek tongue, peculiar to itself—Παλαιότερον, he tells us, is applied indiscriminately to Beings animal and inanimate; Πρεσθύτερον is applied only to the animal Genus. Simplicius on the same occasion makes the same Observation, in Prad. p. 106.

The last Author has also the following remark concerning the different Modes of Temporal Priority—Τὰ δὲ κατά χρόνου ωρότερα, ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν γενομένων τὰ ωρρρώτερον ὅντα τε Νῦν ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἐσομένων, τὰ ἐΙγύτερον. Simpl. in Præd. p. 106. B. Things PRIOR IN TIME among the PAST are those the FARTHEST from the PRESENT NOW; among the FUTURE, are those the NEAREST to it. Simpl. in Loc.

(g) The Words in Aristotle are—το μο αυτισρέφου κατά του τε είναι ακολέθησιν. Pradic, p. 53. Edit. Sylb.

ontaining Crooxile

A FEW examples will illustrate the C. XV, apparent difficulty of this character. The number One according to this doctrine is prior to the number Two, because if there exist Two, 'tis a necessary consequence that there should be One; but if there exist One, it does not reciprocate, that there should be Two. Thus every Genus is prior to any one of it's various Species, because if there be such a Species as Man, or Lion, there is necessarily such a Genus as Animal; but if there be such a Genus as Animal; there is not necessarily such a Species as Man, or Lion.

This Mode of Privrity, which we call PRIORITY ESSENTIAL, will be found of great importance in all logical Disquisitions, and may therefore perhaps merit some farther attention,

Accord-



He alleges the same Instance from Numbers, which is given here.

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According to this, that thing of any two or many things is PRIOR, which, by being taken away, annihilates the rest; or which, if the rest ARE, must necessarily BE (h).

For example—If there were no Theorems of Science; to guide the Operations of Art, there could be no Art; but if there were no Operations of Art, there might still be Theorems of Science. Therefore is Science PRIOR to Art. Again, if there were no fuch Things as Syllogized Truths, there could be no such Sciences as Optics or Astronomy. But, tho neither of these, there might notwithstand-

⁽h) What is here said, is explained in what immediately follows. Simplicius says, agreeably to the explanation here given, καλείν δε ενώθασιν οι νεώτεροι το τοιώτον Πρότερον, συνεπιΦερόμενον μέν, μη συνεπιΦέρον δε, κ) συναναιρέν μέν, μη συναναιρέμενον δε.—The latter Logicians are accustomed to call this Mode of Priority, that which is CO-INFER'D, but does NOT CO-INFER; that which CO-ANNIHILATES, but is not CO-ANNIHILATED. Simpl. in Præd. p. 106.

ing be such things, as Truths Syllogized. C. XV. Therefore is Logic PRIOR to these, and, by parity of reasoning, to every other particular Science. Again, if there were no such Principles as Self-evident Truths, there could be no fuch things as Truths Syllogized. But, tho' no Truths Syllogized, there might still be Truths selfevident. Therefore the FIRST PHILOSO-PHY, which treats of these primary and original Truths, being PRIOR to Logic, is PRIOR also to the tribe of Sciences, as are these to the tribe of Arts; so that of course the whole structure of Logic, of Sciences, and of Arts, may be said to rest upon this first Philosophy, as upon that only firm and solid Base, against which the Powers of Ignorance and Sophistry can never totally prevail.

THERE is a THIRD MODE of PRIOR-ITY, seen in ORDER and ARRANGEMENT. Thus in the demonstrative Sciences, Definitions and Postulates are PRIOR to Theorems C. XV. rems and Problems; in Grammar, Syllables are PRIOR to Words, and Letters to Syllables. 'Tis thus in a well composed Oration, the Proëme is PRIOR to the State and Argument; and these last, to the Peroration (i).

A FOURTH MODE of PRIORITY is that of HONOUR and AFFECTION, when we prefer Objects, that we revere or love, to others that less merit, or at least that we esteem less to merit our Regard and Attention (k).

'Αθανάτες μεν πρώτα θεές, νόμω ως διάκεινζαι, Τίμα:—ἔπειθ' Ήρωας άγαυές

⁽i) Τρίτου δὲ κατά τινα τάξιν το πρότερου λέγεται, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐπιςημῶν κὰ τῶν λόγων ἐν τε γὰρ ταῖς ἀποδεικτικαῖς ἐπιςήμαις, κ. τ. λ. Arift. Præd. p. 53. Edit. Sylb. This is not translated, being expressed in the Text.

⁽k) Έτι σαρά τὰ εἰρημένα τὸ βέλτιον κζ τιμιώτερον σρότερον τῆ Φύσει δοκεῖ εἰώθασι δὲ οἱ σολλοὶ τὰς
ἐντιμοτέρυς κζ μάλλον ἀγαπωμένες ὑπ' αὐτῶν, σροτίρυς σαρ' αυτοῖς Φάσκειν εἶναι— Arift. Præd. Ibid.—
not translated for the reason before given.

Τές τε καταχθονίες σέδε δαίμονας, εννομα ρέζων C. XV. Τές τε γονείς τίμα, τές τ' αγχίς ' εκγεγαῶτας (l),

The Gods immortal, as by Law divine

They stand arrang'd, FIRST honour: NEXT

revere

Th' illustrious Heroes, and terrestrial Race
Of Genii, paying each the legal Rites:
Honour thy Parents NEXT, and those of
kin
The nearest, &c.

HIEROCLES, in his comment on these verses, commonly called for their excellence the Golden Verses of Pythagoras, has largely expatiated on this divine Precedence and Subordination.

Thus Horace, with respect to that Priority of Beings, sounded on the Religion of his Country—

Bb

Quid

⁽¹⁾ Pythag, aurea carmina.

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Quid PRIUS dicam folitis Parentis Laudibus—— &c.

Proximos illi tamen occupavit

Pallas honores (m).

He adopts PRIORITY, derived from the fame principle, when he speaks of the favourite topics, which his Genius led him to cultivate:

Quid PRIUS illustrem satiris, musaque pedestri (n) ?

THE Stagirite, who records these various Modes of PRIORITY, observes on this fourth Mode (and apparently with reason) that it was in a manner the most alien and foreign of them all (0).

⁽m) Horat. Od. l. i. 12.

⁽n) Horat. Sat. 1. ii. 6. v. 17.

^{. (}a) His Words are— τι δι δι κ κίδου αλλοτειώτατ Φ των τεόπων ετ Φ - Arift. Prad. Ibid. p. 54.

HE mentions also a FIFTH MODE, C. XV. but he introduces it with a sort of doubt.

It should seem (p), says he, besides the Modes here mentioned, there was another Mode of PRIORITY even in things reciprocating; altho, so far as they reciprocate, they may be said to co-exist.

THE fact is, if either of them in any sense can be called CAUSE to the other, it may for that reason be called PRIOR, if not in Time, at least in Efficacy and Power.

For example, the actual Existence of a Man reciprocates with the Proposition, which affirms him actually to exist. For if the Man actually exist, then is the Proposition true; and reciprocally, if the

⁽p) Δόξειε δ' αν κή ωαρα τως είρημένως έτερ είναι τῦ ωροτέρα τρόπων των γαρ αντιςρεφόντων ΤΟ AITION, μ. τ. λ. lid. p. 54.

C. XV. Proposition be true, then does the Man actually exist. And yet, the these things in this manner reciprocate, is not the Proposition Cause to the Man's Existence, but the Man's Existence to that of the Proposition; since according as the Man either is or is not, in like manner we call the Proposition either true or false (q).

This last Mode of Priority we call Causal Priority, or the Being Prior By Causality.

We must not however quit this Speculation, without observing that Cause and Effect do not always thus reciprocate, but that for the greater part the Cause is naturally PRIOR. For example: Hunger and Thirst are the natural Causes of Eating and Drinking; and thus, by being their Causes, are naturally prior to

⁽q) The Words of Aristotle are—τῷ γὰς τῶναι τὸ ফংলুγμα ἡ μὴ, ἀληθης ὁ λόγω ἡ ψινδὰς λίγεται.—
Ibid. p. 54. Edit. Sylb.

them

them. Crimes too are the natural Cause, C. XV. why Punishments are inslicted; and therefore Crimes, by parity of reason, are prior to Punishments. The Sentiment, tho' obvious, is well expressed by Pætus Thrasea. Nam Culpa quam Pæna TEM-PORE PRIOR EST; emendari, quam peccare, posterius est (r).

Nor are Crimes only prior to Punishment, but so is Judicial Process; since to punish first, and then to hear, is what Sir Edward Coke chuses to call (in a language somewhat strong) the damnable and damned Proceedings of the Judge of Hell (s):

Castigatque, auditque dolos— (t).

AND thus it appears there are FIVE PRINCIPAL MODES OF PRIORITY; that

⁽r) Tacit. Annal. xv. 20.

⁽s) Cake's Institutes, vol. ii. p. 54, 55.

⁽t) Eneid. vi. 567.

C. XV. is to fay, the TEMPORAL, the Essen-TIAL, that of ORDER, that of PRECE-DENCE, and that of CAUSALITY; which five being known, THE MODES OF WHAT IS SUBSEQUENT (it's natural opposite) are easily known also (u).

WE are now to examine the Modes of Co-existence, or that of being AT once and Together (x); and these Modes have evidently great connection with the preceding.

THE most SIMPLE Modes among these, as well as among the Modes of Priority, is the TEMPORAL, perceived in things or events, which exist during the same time (y).

UNA

⁽u) — δήλου δὶ ὅτι ὁταχῶς τὸ ωρῶτον, τοσαυθαχῶς Τὸ τὸ ὑτιρον λέγοιτο. Simplic. ut fuprà, p. 106. B.

⁽x) Aristot. Præd. p. 54. Edit. Sylb.

 ⁽y) — ων κ΄ γένεσις ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ – Prædic. p.
 54. Edit. Sylb.

UNA Eurusque Notusque ruunt---- (z)

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-OMOΥ το όλεμός τε δαμά κ λοϊμος Αχαιές (a).

War and the Plague AT ONCE destroy the Greeks.

Persons, in this manner co-existing, are called Contemporaries: such as Socrates and Alcibiades; Virgil and Horace; Shakespeare and Johnson.

A SECOND MODE OF CO-EXISTENCE is founded in NATURE and ESSENCE, where two things necessarily reciprocate in consequence of their existing, while neither of them at the same time is the Cause of existence to the other (b),

TI6

⁽z) Æn. i. 89.

⁽a) Iliad. A. v. 61.

⁽b) Thus expressed by Aristotle—Φύσει δε AMA, δσα αντικρέφει μεν κατά την τε είναι ακολύθησιν, μηδαμώς δε αίτιου Θάτερου Θατέρω τε είναι, Prad. p. 54. Edit. Sylb.

Half are TOGETHER OF AT ONCE, for they reciprocate; if there be Double, there must be Half; and if Half, there must be Double. They are also neither of them the Cause, why the other exists. Double is no more the Cause of Half, than Half is of Double. This last condition is requisite, because if either of the

THERE is A THIRD MODE OF Co-EXISTENCE, seen in different Species of the same Genus, when, upon dividing

Two were effentially and truly a Cause to the other, it would pass, by virtue of it's Causality, from Co-existence to Pri-

By referring to the Chapter on Relatives, it is eafy to perceive, whence this Speculation arises; for in that Chapter the same Example is alleged as here, by way of illustration of the same Doctrine. See before, p. 221.

ority (c).

the

⁽c) See before, p. 371, 2.

the Genus, we view them arranged to- C. XV. gether, contra-distinguished one to another (d).

'Tis thus the Genus, Triangle, being divided into equilateral, equicrural, and scalene, no one of these Species appears to be by nature prior, but all of them TO EXIST AT ONCE in a state of Contradistinction. The same may be said of the three animal Species, the aerial, aquatic, and terrestrial, when we divide, after the same manner, the Genus Animal (e).

AND thus are the Modes of Co-exist-ENCE or Together either the Tem-

PORAL



⁽d) Thus expressed by Aristotle—n) τα ἐν τε αὐτε γένες ἀντιδιηρημένα ἀλλήλοις ΑΜΑ τῆ Φύσει λέγείαι—Ibid. 55.

⁽e) — ຜ່າເປັນກຸຄຸກິດປີ ຂໍເ ອີເ λ ຂົງເຂດເ ຜີ $\lambda\lambda$ ກິ λ ວເς ເລີ ແລະຂີ τ ກິ່ນ ແປ້ເກີນ ຢືາແຄ່ງເຮານ ເວີເວນ ເວີ ເປັນຄວາ ເພື່ ເພື່ອເຊື້ອ ເມື່ ເພື່ອເຊື້ອ ເມື່ອເຊື້ອ ເມື່ອເມື່ອ ເມື່ອເມື່ອ ເມື່ອເມື່ອ ເມື່ອ ເມື່ອເມື່ອ ເມື່ອ ເມື່ອເມື່ອ ເມື່ອເມື່ອ ເມື່ອເມື່ອ ເມື່ອເມື່ອ ເມື່ອເມື່ອ ເມື່ອເມື່ອ ເມື່ອເມື່ອ ເມື່ອເມື່ອ ເມື່ອ ເມື່ອ ເມື່ອເມື່ອ ເມື່ອ ເມື້ອ ເມື່ອ ເມື່ອ ເມື້ອ ເມື່ອ ເມື່ອ ເມື່ອ ເມື່ອ ເມື້ອ ເມື້

C. XV. PORAL, the ESSENTIAL, or the SPE-CIFIC.

> AND here, should any one object to these Distinctions, as either too trivial or too scholastic for the purposes of a polite writer; we answer, that we no more wish an author to mention them. when not professedly his subject, than we would have him differt, without a cause, upon nouns, pronouns, and the principles of Grammar. All we hope from these elementary Doctrines, is to see them in their Effects; to see them in the accuracy of the composition, both as to reasoning and language. 'Tis thus a grazier, when he turns his oxen into some rich and sertile pasture, never wishes to inspect what food they have devoured, but to see a fair and ample Bulk, the effect of food well digested. Besides, when Sophists affail us, and either exhibit one thing for another, or two things for one and the same; to what surer weabott

pon can we recur for defence, than to C. XV. that of precise and well-established Distinction (f)?

THERE remains to be treated the Theory of Motion; in which, without attempting to impeach or contradict any modern Speculations, we shall inquire, what was the opinion of the Ancients concerning it; in what manner they attempted to catch it's fugitive nature; and how they divided it by it's Effects into it's fubordinate Species.

Bur

⁽f) Learning and Science, or rather learned and scientistic Terms, when introduced out of Season, become what we call PEDANTRY. The Subject may have merit, the Terms be precise, and yet, notwithstanding, the Speaker be a PEDANT, if he talk without regard either to Place, or Time.

The following story may perhaps illustrate this Affertion. "A learned Doctor at Paris was once purse chasing a pair of stockings, but unfortunately could find none, that were either strong enough, or thick enough. Give me, says he to the Hosier, stockings of Matter Continuous, not of Matter DISCRETE."

Menagiana, tome ii. p. 64.

C.XV.

But this is a Theory demanding a feparate Chapter, where those, who question the doctrines, may perhaps amuse their curiosity, while they peruse an attempt to exhibit the sentiments of Antiquity upon so singular a subject; a subject, in it's existence so obvious, in it's real character so abstruse.

CHAP.

C H A P. XVI.

concerning Motion Physical—It's various Species deduced and illustrated—blend themselves with each other, and why—Contrariety, Opposition, Rest—Motion Physical—an Object of all the Senses—Common Objects of Sensation, how many—Motion, a thing not simple, but complicated with many other Things—it's Definition or Description taken from the Peripatetics—the Accounts given of it by Pythagoras and Plato analogous to that of Aristotle, and why.

ALL Motion is either Physical, or C.XVI.

NOT PHYSICAL. As by Motion

Physical I mean that, which is obvious
to the Senses, so by Motion not Physical, I mean that, which, by being
the object of no sense, (as for example
the

C.XVI. the Succession of our Thoughts and Volitions) is the Subject of after contemplation, and knowable not to the Sensitive, but to the rational Faculty.

This therefore will be the Plan of our following Inquiry.

In the present Chapter we shall confider Motion Merely Physical, both in it's several distinct Species, and in it's general or common Character.

In the next Chapter we, shall inquire whether there be OTHER MOTION BESIDES; and if such may be found, we shall then examine, how far it is distinguished from the Physical, and how far it is connected.

FIRST therefore for the first (a).

⁽a) In the Order of Nature the Genus precedes it's several Species; but in the order of Human Perception the several Species precede their Genus, which last is the order adopted here. See Hermes, p. 9.

As the most obvious of all Motions is C.XVII the Motion of Body, so the most obvious Motion of Body is that, by which it changes from Place to Place (b), itself remaining, or at least supposed to remain, both in one Place and the other, precisely the same. 'Tis thus a Bowl moves over a Plane; a Bird thro' the Air; a Planet round the Sun. This Motion is properly Motion Local; or, if we chuse a single Name, we may call it Passage or Transition. It's peculiar character, as opposed to any other Motion, is to affect no Attribute of Body, but merely that of Local Site.

Cæruleo per summa levis volat æquora curru, Subsidunt undæ, tumidumque sub axe tonanti

Ster-



⁽b) Called therefore in Greek ή κατα τόπου μεταδολύ, and fometimes by a fingle word, Φορά. See Arift. Prædic. p. 55. Edit. Sylb. and Ammon. in Loc. p. 171. B.

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C.XVI. Sternitur æquor aquis; fugiunt vafte æthere nimbi (c).

Here the Chariot flies, the Waves subfide, the Clouds disperse, all is in LOCAL MOTION.

THERE are other Motions, which affect the more inherent Attributes. Thus when a lump of Clay is moulded from a Cube into a Sphere, there is Motion more than local; for there is the acquisition of a new Figure. The same happens, when a man from hot becomes cold, from ruddy becomes pale. Motion of this Species has respect to the Genus of Quality, and (if I may be permitted to coin a word) may be called ALIATION (d).

If thou be'ft He! but O! how fal'n, how CHANG'D

From Him, who in the happy realms of light,

⁽c) Bu. v. 819.

⁽d) 'Αλλοίωσις, in barbarous Latin, Alteratio. Vid. Arift. ut suprà.

Cloath'd with transcendent brightness, didst C.XVI.

Myriads, tho' bright --- (e).

Here we behold Qualities that are changed, a Scene of ALIATION.

ANOTHER SPECIES OF MOTION is seen in Addition and Detraction; as when we either add, or take away a Gnomon from a Square. Here is no Aliation, or Change of Quality, (for the Figure, as a Square, remains the same in either case) but the Effect of such Motion is a Change only in the Quantity, as the Square becomes either smaller or larger. When Quantity is enlarged, we call the Motion Augmentation; when 'tis lessend, we call it DIMINUTION (f).

Behold a wonder: They, but now who feem'd In BIGNESS to surposs Earth's Giant Sons,

⁽e) Par. Loss, i. 84. See p. 174.

⁽f) Augmentation, Asknows—Diminution, Malwess. Vid. Arift. ut sup.

C c Now

CXVI. Now LESS than smallest Dwarfs, in nar-

Throng numberless---- (g)

Here we behold DIMINUTION.

PARVA metu primo; mox fefe ATTOLLIT IN AURAS,

Ingrediturque solo, et caput inter nubilacondit (h).

Here we behold Augmentation.

All these Motions have this in common, that they are Changes or Roads from one Attribute to another (i), while the Substance remains the same, both in Essence and in Name. Thus the Planet Jupiter, which was a year ago in such

⁽g) Par. Loft, i. 777.

⁽h) En. iv. 176. See chap. ix. where the Species of Quantity are enumerated.

⁽i) Οὐ κατηδορίαι εἰσὶν, ἀλλ' ὁδὸς εἰς τὰς κατηδορίας—They (that is, these several Species of Motion) are not Predicaments, but a ROAD to the Predicaments. Ammon. in Prad. 171.

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in another, tho' his Attributes of Place are changed, is yet both in Essence and in Name still the same Planet. By patity of Reason, 'tis the same individual Man, who, by change in Quantity, from sleshy becomes emaciated (k).

But

(k) Speaking of these Species of Motion, Ammonius says—xive vois nata nord, population and changed either in QUANTITY or in QUALITY, or in PLACE, still preserving [during these Motions] their original essential Form. Ammon. in Prad. p. 172.

Here we find the Phrase Eldo seriodes, commonly called Substantial Form, but which we chuse (as thinking it more accurate) to translate Essential. To explain—Let us for example call Spheritality (if we may employ such a word) the Essential Form to a Bowl. Every one will admit that the Bowl may undergo many Changes; may become White from Black, Hot from Cold; and (by a more easy Change than these) it may roll from one Place to another; and yet notwithstanding it may still continue to be a Bowl. But when it's Sphericality, that is to say it's Eldo strades, it's essential Form departs, when supposing it's Matter to be Clay) it is moulded from a Sphere

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But there are other Motions, which in their Effects go farther. Thus when the Substance of a Man becomes not only pallid and emaciated, but it's living Principle is detached from that which it enlivens. Putrefaction and Dissolution of the Body ensue, and 'tis no longer a Change within the Substance, but the very Substance is lost both in Essence and in Name (1). Such Motion is called Cor-RUPTION, DISSOLUTION, OF DYING. On the contrary, when the Seed of any Species, whether Animal or Vegetable, by Evolution, Accretion, or other latent Process of Nature, produces a certain Being, which had no existence before; 'tis a Change, like the former, that goes not merely to Attributes; but by a more efficacious Operation to the very Substance

itself.

a Sphere into a Cuhe, from that instant the Bowl is no more, it has no longer an existence either in Essence, or in Name. See before, p. 90.

⁽¹⁾ See the Note immediately preceding.

itself. Such Motion is called Gene- C.XVI.

THE following difference subsists between these two latter Species and the former; the former are no more than Roads to different Modes of Being; the latter lead to Being itself, and to it's opposite Non-being (m).

However separate and distinct these Species of Motion may be found, yet being all of the same Genus, they naturally blend themselves together.

The Particle In, prefixed in the Quotations to μn orto, and to or, is to distinguish the Non-being and Being here mentioned from Being and Non-being absolute. In means in a manner, as it were, after a fort. See below, 397, 398.

Cc3

Thus



⁽m) Hence Generation is called—'Oδος από τε πη μη δυτω είς το από δυ, τετίς ιν από τε δυνάμει δυτω είς το είς το είς το πη δυτω το παικο το Βείνα το Αςτ—Corruption or Dissolution, on the contrary, is called 'Οδος από τε δυτω είς το μη δυτο τη Κοαρ from Bείνα το Νον-Βείνα. Αππον. in Prad. p. 172.

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Thus the Local Motion may possibly exist without the rest, yet 'tis impossible for the rest to exist without Local Motion. Generation is the Assemblage of parts; Corruption, the Separation; so that here Local Motion is evident in either case. 'Tis the same in Aliation; the same in Augmentation and Diminution. When Fear renders a person pale, such Change could not be, did not his Blood retreat locally from the surface to within: and as for Augmentation and it's Opposite, they are no more than the bringing to, and the carrying off; both which in their very Idea imply Local Motion.

THE other Species of Motion are incidentally blended also. He that increases in bulk, commonly increases with ruddiness; and he that lessens in bulk, commonly lessens with Paleness. There are both in the Qualities and the Quantities of the particles to be assembled, many Changes

Changes necessarily previous to Gene- C.XVL ration or Birth; and many others, as necessarily previous to Corruption or Death (n).

And thus have we established six Spr-CIES OF MOTION, which we denominate Physical, because they respect Physical Subjects. They are to be found in four of the Universal Genera, or ARRANGEMENTS; one in the Genus, Where, TRANSITION; one in Quality, ALIATION; two in Quantity, Aug-MENTATION and DIMINUTION; two in Substance, GENERATION and CORRUP-TION.

⁽n) See Aristot. Phys. 1. viii. c. 8.—where he shews at large that Local Motion is necessarily the primary Motion, as running thro' the rest, and essential to them all; and where he likewise explains in what manner the other Species of Motion necessarily blend themselves with each other. The Chapter is too long to be here transcribed. In his Tract de Anima, 1. i. c. 3. having spoken of the several Species of Motion, he adds, that Motion infers Place—wasai vap αι λεχθείσαι κινήσεις έν τόπω-For that ALL THE MOTIONS here enumerated are in PLACE.

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In all these Motions there is Opposit TION OF CONTRARIETY (9). Where two Species are coupled in one Genus, the two Species themselves are, in such case, Contraries; as Generation and Corruption, Augmentation and Diminution. Where the Species stands fingle, as Local Motion, or Aliation, the Contrarieties are more numerous, and therefore perhaps not mentioned. In Local Motion we behold Backward and Forward. Rectilinear and Curvilinear, Centripetal and Centrifugal, &c. In Aliation, or Change of Quality, we behold Blackening and Whitening; Straightening and Bending; Strengthening and Weakening; with many others, to which names are want-Lastly, all Motion whatever is contrary to Rest (p).

AND.

⁽⁰⁾ See the Chapter preceding, p. 361.

⁽p) Est δε απλώς τη μεν μινήσει ήςεμία ενάντιου—. In strictness the Contrary to Motion is Rest. Arist. Pradic. c. xi. p. 56. Edit. Sylb.

And now perhaps it may not be a- C.XVI. miss to inquire, what Physical Motion is. Some Philosophers have found a short method here, by telling us, 'tis a simple Idea, and therefore cannot be defined. Others, with more reason, have called it hard to be defined (q), a circumstance not unusual with other Subjects equally obvious, there being nothing more different both in accuracy and truth, than that Apprehension, which is adequate to the purposes of the Vulgar, and that, which ought to satisfy the investigation of a Philosopher.

In the first place, if we consider Mo-TION as an Object of Sensation, we shall

discover



The other Modes of Contrariety are explained in the subsequent part of the Chapter here quoted, which in some Editions is the sourceenth.

⁽q) — xadenor dabier auther (scil. ninners) ti esure Tis hard to comprehend what it is—So says the Stagistite, and gives his Reasons, which we postpone for the present, that we may not antisipate. Phys. 1. iii. c. 2. p. 45. Edit. Sylb.

discover it to be the Object not of one Sense, but of all. In a ring of Bells we hear it; in a succession of Savours we taste it; of Odours, we smell it; and that we feel or see it, there needs no example. Thus is it distinguished from those Objects, that are peculiar to one Sense alone; as from Colours, which we only see, or from Sounds, which we only hear. Simple therefore as it is, it is not only an Object of Sensation, but stands distinguished, as a common Object, from other objects that are PECULIAR.

AND are there then (it may be demanded) no other Objects of the same Character?—'Tis answered, there are; as Bulk and Figure, common Objects to the Sight and Feeling; Rest and Number, common Objects, like Motion, to every Sense (r).

⁽r) Koivà δε, κίνησις, ήρεμία, άριθμος, ακημα, μέγεθων τα γάρ τοιαῦτα εδεμιας ές το ίδια (scil. aiσθήσεως). The common Objects of Sensation are Mo-

And how (it is asked again) is Motion distinguished from these?—We reply, from Rest, by Contrariety; from
Number, by Continuity; from Bulk and
Figure, as the Parts of Motion are never
permanent, never co-exist. What Speculations does this Idea, Simple as it is
called, open, even while we consider it
no farther than as an Object of Sensation?

But we must not stop here, even while we consider it as Physical. As such we shall find it connected with a Body, which moves; and as such, necessarily performed thro' Space, and in Time; so that these also, and their Attributes of Insinite and Continuous, must be added

TION, REST, NUMBER, FIGURE, BULK; for these are peculiar to no one Sense. Arist. de Animâ, l. ii. c. 6. p. 34. These common Objects are well worthy of Attention in explaining the Doctrine of the Senses and Sensation.

C.XVI. to it's Theory, as so many necessary Speculations.

We cannot therefore but observe, that if it be a fimple Idea, 'tis strangely complicated with a multitude of others (s);

fuch

⁽s) See the Beginning of the third Book of Ariflotle's Physics, ch. i. where being about to treat of Motion, he shows with what other Subjects it is neceffarily connected, such as Continuous, Infi-NITE, PLACE, TIME, &c. and where accordingly, after he has given us the Opinions of his Predeceffors in Philosophy concerning these Subjects, he proceeds in due order to explain what he thinks himself. -His words are, as they here follow. nivnois einas ton Durenor to d'Anespor empaiseras εύθυς έν τῷ Συνεχεί διο καὶ τοῖς οριζομένοις το Συνεχές, συμβαίνει ωροσχρήσθαι ωολλάκις τῷ λόγφ τῷ TH'Ameieu, we eie "Ameigon diaigeren to Dunente un. Προς δε τάτοις ανευ Τόπα, κ Κενά, κ Χρόνα aduvaler uivaciv elvai. MOTION appears to be in the number of things Continuous: now Infinite immediately shews itself in that which is Continuous; for which reason, when they define Continuous, they have often occasion to employ withal the character of Infinite, in as much as CONTINUITY is that, which is DIVISIBLE TO INFINITE. Add to this, without PLACE, and VACUUM, and TIME, 'tis impossible that MOTION should bave existence. Physic. 1. iii. c. 1.

fuch as Space, Time, Infinitude, Contic CXVI.
nuity, together with Body, and it's vifible Attributes both of Quantity and of
Quality. But to proceed in our Speculation.

THAT there are things existing in act, in reality, in actuality (call it as you please) we have the evidence both of our Senses, and of our internal Consciousness; so that this is a matter of fact, which we take for granted. That there also are things which actually and really are not, is equally evident as the former, and requires no proving. A Sphinx for example actually is not; a Centaur actually is not; for these we may call Phantoms in the language of Lucretius,

Quæ neque sunt usquam, neque possunt esse profectò.

Lastly, every Substance that actually is, by actually being that thing, actually is not

C.XVI. not any other (t). A piece of Brass for example actually is not an Oak; an Acorn, not a Vine; a Grape-stone, not a Statue.

THERE is a difference however here; I mean a difference in the last mode of actually not being; for the the Brass is no more a Statue, than it is an Oak, yet has it a Capacity to become the one, and none to become the other. The same may be said of the Acorn, with respect to the Oak; of the Grape-stone, with respect to the Vine. Were it not for this definite nature of Capacity, which as much distinguishes the invisible Powers,

⁽t) This LAST SPECIES of NON-ENTITY should be carefully attended to, as the Doctrine of Motion wholly depends upon it, and as it is so effentially distinguished both from the PHANTASTIC Non-entities (the Sphinx, the Centaur, &c.) immediately preceding, and from that strongest of all Non-entities, the Non-entity of IMPOSSIBILITY, such as that the Diameter of the Square should be commensurable with it's Sides, or that the same Number should be both Even and Odd. See before, p. 389.

as Actuality distinguishes the visible At- CXVI. tributes, there would be no reason why an Acorn should not produce a Statue, as well as it produces an Oak; or why any thing (to speak more generally), should not be able to produce any thing (u):

What then, if there were no Capacity existing in the Universe?—Could there be Generations, Corruptions, Growths, Diminutions, Aliations, or Change of Place?—Impossible—But if these are all the Species of Physical Motion, it follows, that WITHOUT CAPACITY there can be no such Motions.

AND is Morion then for this reason pure CAPACITY, and that only?—Let us examine.—A Man, being in Salisbury,

⁽u) This Distinction of το Εντελεχεία and το Δυνάμει, of that which is in ACTUALITY, and that which is in POWER, is the Basis of all the Peripasetic Reasoning upon this Subject. See p. 277, &c. also p. 148, 149.

G.XVI. has a Capacity of travelling to London. Is he therefore, for merely possessing such Capacity, upon the road thither?—He is not .- Motion therefore, tho' Capacity, is not Capacity alone: there must be some degree of ACTUALITY, or else MOTION can never exist. Shall we then call it pure ACTUALITY?-We cannot affert that, when we have made Capacity one of it's requisites. Besides, how should Motion be seen in pure Actuality; an Actuality, which never exists, till Motion is at an end? A Man surely can no more be called moving towards London, who is actually arrived there, than he who, possessing the Capacity of going thither, forbears to exert any of his motive powers.

> IF Motion therefore be neither Capacity alone, nor Actuality alone, and yet both (as it appears) are effential to it; 'tis IN BOTH we must look after it,

> > AS

AS DERIVING IT'S EXISTENCE FROM C.XVI.

Such in fact it will appear; fomething MORE than dead Capacity, something LESS than perfect Actuality: CA-PACITY ROUZED, and striving to quit it's latent Character: not the CAPABLE Brass, nor yet the ACTUAL Statue, but the CAPACITY IN ENERGY, that is to fay, the Brass in Fusion, while it is becoming the Statue, and is not yet become. Thus too, when a Complexion is actually Red, we fay not that it reddens; much less do we affert so, while it remains perfettly Pale; but as every pale Complexion implies a Capacity to become red, 'tis in THE ENERGY OF THIS CAPACITY exists the Reddening, that is the Motion.

In the account of Motion here given we see the Doctrine of the *Peripatetics*. The more ancient Sects of *Pythagoreans* and *Platonics*, tho' they give different D d Descrip-

CXVI Descriptions, seem to have deduced them all from the same Principles. Thus because, whenever any thing is moved, it is fome way or other diverfified either in Quantity, or in Quality, or at least in Place, for this reason they called Mo-TION, DIVERSITY. Again, because, while opposite forces are equal, then is Motion suspended, and revives not till Inequality destroys the Equilibrium; for this reason they called Motion, Inequa-LITY. Again, because every thing, which is moving, is not in some certain Attributes, either what it was, or what it will be; for this reason they called Mo-TION, NON-ENTITY (x), not Non-entity absolute, but with a peculiar reference.

ALL these Descriptions of Motion naturally flow from one Source, and that

⁽x) — ἐλείου δὲ οἱ Πυθαγόςειοι την κίνησιν είναι Ετερότητα, κ) Ανισότητα, κ) το μη δν. Philop. in Physic. p. 144. For Non-Entity, see before p. 397, 98.

is, from it's indefinite (y) and unascer- C.XVI. tainable appearance. Now the reason why it so appears, is, as we have said, because we cannot place it either in the simple CAPACITY of things, or in the simple ACTUALITY. The Bow for example moves not, because it may be bent; nor because it is bent; but the Motion lies between; lies in an impersect and obscure union of the two together; is THE ACTUALITY (if I may so say) even of CAPACITY ITSELF (z); impersect and obscure,

⁽y) — aition of the eig tauta tilinal auties, other action to done it elval in xlungle. Phys. p. 45. Edit. Sylb.—The Cause of their placing MOTION among these things, is, that it appears to be something INDEFINITE.

⁽²⁾ We have just before stiled it the ENERGY OF CAPACITY; here, the ACTUALITY OF CAPACITY. These expressions are difficult, unless we attend to the manner, in which they are used. The original Greek expresses the Sentiment thus—ή τε δυνάμει δυτοβέντελέχεια, ή τοιθτου, κίνησις ές τυ—The Energy of ubat exists in Power, considered as so existing, is Motion. Arist. Physic. 43. Edit. Sylb.—And soon after, p. 45—τε δε δοκείν αόριςον είναι την κίνη-D d 2

CXVI. obscure, because such is CAPACITY to which it belongs.

לני מוֹדוֹסי סדו שדב בוֹן סנישמעוני דשי סדושים, פרב בוֹן בֹיבֹף-שנומי בנו שבושמו מעדאים מהאשל בדב שבף דם לשומדם בו-שמו שסססי אוזיבודמו בול מעמץ אחר, עדב דף ביובף בום שסססי भैरह प्राण्यताद हेर्प्हिशहाय क्रिंग राद होंग्या ठिल्रहाँ, बेरहमेन्द्र वेहं वाँ-יוסט של פון מדבאבר דם שנשמדטש על בניש בשבקובות מושישוני में दाज महत्त देश Χαγεμού απτην γαβείν τι έςίν. भे λαβ είς σέρησιν αναγκαΐου θείναι, η είς δύναμιν, η είς ενέε[ειαν απλην τέτων δ' εθέν Φαίνείαι ένδεχόμενον λείπείαι τοίνου ο είρημεν το το το το είναι, ενέργειαν μεν τινα είναι, roixurn d' evépyeiau, clau elnoueu, xahennu men idein, inder omerne d' elvas. Arift. Phys. 1. iii. c. 2. - The Reafon wby Motion oppears to be Indefinite, is, that there is no placing it simply either in the CAPACITY of things, or in their ENERGY: for neither is that necessarily moved. which is CAPABLE OF BECOMING a certain Quantity; nor that, which is a certain Quantity in ENERGY and Indeed the MOTION itself appears to be a certain Sort of Energy, but then 'tis an IMPERFECT one; and the reason of this is, the CAPACITY ITSELF is IM-PERFECT, OF WHICH it is the ENERGY. therefore it becomes hard to comprehend it's Nature: for 'tis necessary to place it either in Privation, or in Capacity. or else in simple Energy, and yet no one of these appears to be possible. The Manner therefore, which we have mentioned, is the only one remaining, which is, that it should be a peculiar Sort of Energy, and that, such a one as we bave described; HARD TO DISCERN, AND YET POS-SIBLE TO EXIST. P. 45, ut suprà. Edit. Sylb

AND

AND so much for Motion Physi-C.XVI. CAL, it's different Species, and it's general Character. We are now to inquire concerning Motion of another kind.

Dd₃ CHAP.

C H A P. XVII.

Concerning Motion Not-Physical—
This means Metaphysical, and why
fo called—Spontaneity—Want—Perception, Consciousness, Anticipation, Preconception—Appetite, Resentment, Reason—Motion Physical and Metaphysical
how united—Discord and Harmony of the
internal Principles—Powers vegetative,
animal, rational—Immortality—Rest,
it's several Species—Motion, to what
perceptive Beings it appertains; to what,
not—and whence the Difference.

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UR Contemplation hitherto may be called *Physical*, because 'tis about *Physical Motions*, that the whole has been employed, and 'tis from *Physical* Observations, that the whole has been deduced. But he, who stops here, has but

but half finished his Work, if it be true that Corporeal Masses only move, because they are moved (a); and therefore cannot be considered as the original Source of Motion.

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WHEN a Boy carries about with him an Insect in a Box, we call not this Motion the Insect's Motion as an Animal, because a Nut or a Pebble would have moved in like manner. (b) When the same Boy, piercing a Wing of this In-

DU 4

fect,



⁽b) — ioine dù το βίαιον είναι, ε ξωθεν à άρχη, μηθεν συμδαλλομίνε τε βιασθέντω.—That feems to be FORCED or COMPELLED, of which the Principle or Moving Cause is FROM WITHOUT, while the Being compelled contributes nothing from itself. Ethic. Nic. 1. iii. c. 1. p. 37. Edit. Sylb.

Chap. XVII. fect, makes it describe a circular Motion round a Pin or Needle, even this cannot well be called the Insect's Motion; for it's Motion, as an Animal, is not, like a Planet, round a Center. So far however the Motion differs from that in the Box, that by being a mixt Motion, the centrifugal Part is the Animal's own, the centrifugal Part is extraneous. But if ever the Wing detach itself, and the fortunate Insect flie off; at that instant the Mixture of extraneous is no more, and the Motion thence forward becomes properly and purely animal.

And what is it, which gives the Motion this proper and pure character?—It is Spontantity (c), that pure and innate Impulse arising from the Animal it-

⁽t) To instruct do gener ar eval, is in alexin in autiq— That should seem to be Spontaneous, of which the Principle or Moving Cause is in the Being itself. Eth. Nic. l. iii. c. i. p. 38. Edit. Sy b.

felf, by which alone it's Flight is then Chap. produced and conducted.

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AND thus, while we pass from Flying to Innate and Spontaneous Impulse, that is to say in other words, from Flying to its Caufe, we pass also insensibly from Motion Physical to Metaphysical; for ME-TAPHYSICS are properly conversant about primary and internal Causes. We call not such Impulse Metaphyfical, as if it were μετά την φυσικήν κίνησιν, something fubsequent to natural Motion, that is, to Flying (for this would fet Effect before Cause, a preposterous order indeed!); but we call it Metaphyfical, because tho' truly prior in itself, it is subsequent in Man's Contemplation, whose Road of Science is naturally upward, that is, from Effect to Cause, from Sensible to Intel-'ligible (d).

⁽d) See Hermes, p. 9. See also the second Edition of Vol. I. p. 365, and of the present Treatise, p. 344, Note (d). SPON-

Chap.

SPONTANEOUS Impulse (e) is to the Infect the Cause of Flying; so it is to the Dolphin, of Swimming; to the Man, of Walking. But what is the Cause of this Impulse itself? And why do Animals possess it, more than Stocks or Stones?

To folve this question, we must first semark, that every Animal, however exquisite in it's frame, is nevertheless far from being perfect, being still the Part of a greater and more perfect Whole (f),

to

⁽e) Oppin. Diog. Laert. vii. 85. Una pars in APPETITU posita est. Cic. de Offic. i. 28.—APPETITIONESque, quas illi oppias vocant, obedientes efficere Rationi—De Offic. ii. 5.—Animalia, quæ habent suos IMPETUS et rerum APPETITUS—Ejusd. ii. 3.—NATURALEM enim APPETITIONEM, quam vocant oppin, itemque, &c. De Fin. iv. 14.—Seneca uses the words, SPONTANEOS MOTUS. Epist. exxi.

⁽f) Ipse autem Homo—nullo modo perfectus, sed est quadam PARTICULA PERFECTI. Cic. de Nat. Deor.

to which it is connected by many neces- Chap. fary Wants.

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One of these for example is common to all Animals, that of Food or Aliment. Suppose then this Want were not to be gratified, what would be the consequence?—The Animal would perish. -And how has Providence obviated this danger?—It has given to every Animal, however base, however young, not only a Consciousness of this Want, but an obfeure Sensation of some distinction in things without; and a Preconception or Anticipation in favour of that Aliment which it is to prefer, from an inward feeling of it's proper Constitution (g). 'Tis

ii. 14. See of this Vol. p. 230, &c. and the end of the present Chapter.

What is applied by Cicero in the above Passage to Man, may with equal propriety be applied to all other Animals, and needs no proving. 'I was a fundamental Doctrine of the Stoics.

⁽g) - Πρώτου οίκεῖου είναι σαντί ζώω την αὐτέ susasio, no the tauths suveishow-The thing PRIMA-

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thus without either Teaching or Experience, but merely from an innate Feeling of what is conducive to their proper Being, that Infants are able to distinguish Milk from Vinegar; and Silkworms the Leaf of a Mulberry from that of a Laurel or an Ash (h). Now the

RILY INTIMATE to every Animal, is it's own Constitution, and a Consciousness of it. Diog. Laert. vii. 85.

(h) — Simul atque natum sit animal—ipsum sibi conciliari, et commendari ad se conservandum et suum Statum, et ad ea, quæ conservantia sunt ejus Status, diligenda; alienari autem ab interitu, issque rebus, quæ interitum videantur adserre. Cic. de Fin. iii. 5.

Thus Seneca—Omnibus (sc. Animalibus) Constitutionis su & Sensus est, et inde Membrorum tam expedita tractatie. Epist. cxxi.—Soon after—Constitutionem suam [Animal] crasse intelligit, summatim, et obscuré—and again—ante omnia est Mei cura: boc animalibus inest cunciis: nec inseritur, sed innascitur.— And soon after, speaking of the terror, which some Animals feel in their earliest state, when they first behold a Hawk, or a Cat, he adds—apparet illis inesse Scientiam nocituri, non experimento collectam; nam, antequam possint experiri, cavent.

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the Consequence of this Consciousness, of Chap. these Preconceptions or Anticipations, is a Spon-

Even the ferecious tribes of Animals, when their Powers become mature, are shewn, how to employ them, by an innate, internal Instinct.

Dente lupus, cornu taurus petit, unde, nisi Intus Monstratum-

As to INNATE IDEAS, there is certainly nothing fo true, (and it requires no great Logic to prove) that, if by INNATE IDEAS be meant INNATE PRO-POSITIONS, there never were, nor ever can be any fuch things existing. But this no ways tends to subvert that innate Distinction of things into Eligible and Ineligible, according as they are furtable to every Nature, or not suitable; a Distinction, which every Being appears to recognize from it's very birth.

Hence the Author above quoted in the same Epistle -tenera quoque animalia, a materno utero, vel quoquo modo effusa, quid sit infestum ipsis PROTINUS norunt, et mortifera devitant.

And 'tis upon this reasoning we may venture to affirm, that every fuch Being in it's earliest moments perceives itself to be an Animal, tho' it may not be philosophically informed, what an Animal really is-Quid sit Animal, nescit; Animal Esse se sentit: Ibid.

Whatever



Chap. Spontaneous Impulse: for 'tis in these that XVII. such Impulse finds an adequate efficient.

Cause.

Whatever others in ancient, or even in modern days, .may have thought concerning this Subject, that Philosopher furely can be hardly suspected of favouring Innate Ideas, who held THE HUMAN SOUL, or rather it's INTELLECTIVE PART, from it's comprehending all things, to be for that very reason semething pure and unmixed-inti warra voti, autyn eirziand this, because [in any compound] that which is alien, by shewing itself along with other Objects, impedes and obstruss-wageμφαινόμενου γάρ κωλύει το αλλότριον, η αντιΦράτθει-That therefore the HUMAN INTELLECT in it's Nature was nothing elfe than mere CAPACITY, or THE BEING CAPABLE - SEE MES αύτε είναι Φύσιη τίνα μηδιμίαν, αλλ' η ταύτην, ότι Suvaror-That in consequence it WAS NOT any single one of the whole tribe of Beings, before it comprehended and underflood it - ο άρα καλέμεν της ψυχτς Νές-Boin eriv everyeia two ovrwe, welv voeir-That 'twas not therefore probable it should be blended with the Body. for that then it would become vested with some corporeal Quality, and be either bot or cold, and have some corporeal Organ, as the fensitive faculty has; whereas now it has none -- διο κότι μεμίχθαι εύλο Γου αυτόν τῷ σώματι σοῖος γλρ αν τις γίγυοιτο, θερμίς ή ψυχρός, καν δργανόν τι ein, wenep to airbntiko von de uden ifi-He concludes at last his Reasonings with telling us-that the Intellect.

Cause. But if we include all these under the common name of Perception,

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Intellect, as be had said before, was in Capacity, ofter a certain manner, the several Objects intelligible; but was in actuality no one of them, until it first comprehended it—and that it was the same with the Mind or Human Understanding [in it's original State] as with a Rasa Tabula or Writing Tablet, in which nothing as yet had been actually written—in which nothing as yet had been actually with the soft of Nec, and it is not of the property of the property of the property of the series of the nothing of the series of the ser

As to the Simile of a RASA TABULA, or (to speak in a language more modern and familiar) that of A SHEET OF FAIR WRITING PAPER, tho' it be sufficiently evident of itself, it may be illustrated in the following manner.

The Human Intellect is pure unmixed, untainted CAPACITY, as a Sheet of fair Writing Paper is pure unmixed, untainted WHITENESS. The pure unmixed Character of this intellectual Capacity renders it fit for every Object of Comprehension, as the pure unmixed Character of the Paper makes it adequate to every Species of Writing. The Paper would not be adequate to this purpose, were it previously scrawled over with Syllables or Letters. As far only as it is clear, it is capable;

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we shall then find, that Perception is the proper Cause of Spontaneous Im-

PULSE :

capable; and if we suppose it persetly clear, then is it persetly capable. The same Sort of Reasoning is applicable to the HUMAN UNDERSTANDING.

Such we take to be the Sentiments of this ancient Bage on this important Subject.

The Sentiments and Subject, being both of them curious, will ('tis hoped) be an Apology for this Digression.

By it we think it appears, that it was a received Opinion among the Ancients, that Inflincts both in Man and Beast were original, and founded in Nature. That Aristotle held the same, appears not only from his History of Animals, but from the following remarkable Passage in his Politics, relative to Man. There speaking of the Social State, or State of Society, he says. Posses with in definition was in this tolant the society to such a Society to see By Nature in all men. Pol. p. 4. Edit. Syib.

We think also it farther appears, that whatever Aristotle thought of Instincts residing in the lower faculties of Man, Instincts respecting the purposes of common Life and Society, yet, as to the Supreme and Intellective Part, this he held in it's original State to be WHOLLY PURE and UNMIXED, and only sitted, by that Purity, for general and universal Comprehension.

PULSE; that 'tis so the Animal impels it- Chap. self, because 'tis so that it perceives; it does not so perceive, because it is so impelled (i).

THE Impulse hitherto spoken of is of earliest date, commencing in a manner with the Animal itself; and, as it merely respects the Body and bodily Pleasure, is distinguished from other Impulses by the name of APPETITE (k).

As Animals advance, the Scene of Perception enlarges, and the number of Spontaneous Impulses increase of course with it. Yet while Pleasure corporeal continues the fole Object, and there appears no Danger either in acquiring or pre-

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prehension. He seems (like the rest) to have justly distinguished between INNATE INSTINCTS, and INNATE PROPOSITIONS.

⁽i) — ορεγόμεθα ότι δοκεί, μάλλον ή δοκεί, διότι δρεγόμεθα. Arist. Metaph. A. ζ. p. 203. Edit. Sylb.

⁽k) EPIOTMIA.

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Chap. ferving it, the Impulse is still an Appetite, varying only in it's name, as the Pleasure, to which it is referred, varies in the Species.

> YET, besides these Preconceptions, the Sources of simple Appetite, there are also Preconceptions of offering Violence, and others of refisting Danger, and these naturally call forth another Power, I mean the Power of Anger (1). Few Animals, when young, feel any fuch Preconceptions; but the more ferocious and savage are sure to find them at maturity; and the irafcible Impulses soon spontaneously attend, prompting the Lion to employ his Fangs; the Vultur his Talons; the Boar his Tusk; and every other Animal of prey his proper and natural Preparations.

All these Spontaneous Impulses, as well of Anger as of Appetite, are equally in-

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⁽¹⁾ $\Theta \Upsilon M O \Sigma$.

cluded under the common name of Irra- Chap. tional (m), being called by this name, because they have nothing to do with Reason.

BUT when REASON becomes strong enough to view it's proper Objects; that Sight, to which no Being here but Man alone is equal; when the Moral and the Intelligible rise before his mental Eye, and he beholds the fair Forms of Good and of Truth; then too arise Impulses of a far more noble kind, those to Friendship, to Society, to Virtue, and to Science (n).

 A_{ND}

⁽m) AΛΟΓΟΣ, as well as ΛΟΓΙΚΟΣ and ΛΟ $^{-}$ ΓΟΣ, are Terms too well known, to need more than to be mentioned.

⁽n) This Progression from the lower to the superior Faculties is well described by Cicero.

Prima est enim conciliatio hominis ad ea, quæ sunt secundum naturam: simul autem cepit intelligentiam, vel notionem potius (quam adpellant Errorar illi) viditque rerum agendarum ordinem, et, ut ita dicam, concordiam s E . 2 multo

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And thus is Man not only a Microcosm in the Structure of his Body, but

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multo eam pluris æstimavit, quam omnia illa, quæ primum dilexerat: atque ita cogitatione et ratione conlegit, ut statueret in eo conlocatum summum illud hominis PER SE LAUDANDUM ET EXPETENDUM BONUM. Cic. de Fin. iii. 6.

Unicuique ætati sua constitutio est: alia infanti, alia puero, alia seni : omnes enim conflitutioni conciliantur, in quâ sunt. Infans sine dentibus est : buic constitutioni sua conciliatur. Enati sunt dentes : buic, &c. Sen. Epift. cxxi. The whole Epistle is worth perusal, in particular what follows-Ergo infans ei constitutioni suce conciliatur, quæ TUNC infanti eft, non quæ futura juveni eft. Neque enim, SI ALIQUID ILLI MAJUS IN OUD TRANSEAT, restat; non HOC quoque, in quo noscitur. SECUNDUM NATURAM EST.

See also his elegant Application of this Doctrine to the different Stages of that well-known Vegetable, Corn, from it's first appearance above the ground, to it's State of maturity. Nam et illa berba, que in Segetem, &c. Epift. p. 603. Edit. Varior.

See also how elegantly Cicero applies the same Doctrine to the Vine, where to the vegetative Powers he sfirst supposes Sense superadded; and then to Sense, Reajon; each Superaddition still increasing in value, tho' not robbing the former Powers of their due regard and attention-Et nunc quidem, quod eam tuctur,

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in the System too of his Impulses, including all of them within him from the basest

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ut de Viti potissimum lequar, est id, &c. De Fin.

See Vol. the First, Dialogue concerning Happiness, part the second, and the Notes, p. 302, &c.

The Number and Subordination of the animating Powers are well distinguished in the following Extracts.

Των δε δυνάμεων της ψυχής αι λεχθείσαι τοις μέν ενυπάρχεσι σάσαι (καθάπερ είπομεν) τοῖς δὲ τινὲς αὐτων, ενίοις δε μία μόνη δυνάμεις δε είπομεν Βρεπίκου, αίσθητικου, έρεκτικου, κιυητικου κατά τόπου, διανοητικόν ὑπάρχει δε τοῖς μεν Φυτοῖς το Βρεπικον μόνον, έτεροις δε το αὐτό τε κό το αἰσθητικόν εί δε το αίσθητικου, κ) το ορεκτικου δρεξις μεν γαρ έπιθυμία, κ) θυμός κ) βάλησις τα δὶ ζῶα σάντα μίαν ἔχει τῶν αισθήσεων, την άφην ω δε αίσθησις υπάρχει, τέτω ήδονή τε κο λύπη, κο ή έπιθυμία, το γαρ ήδε ο δρεξις ESIV auth-With regard to the Powers of the Soul that have been enumerated, to some Beings they appertain ALL of them; to others, only SOME of them; and to others, only ONE of them. The Powers we have mentioned, are the Nutritive, the Sensitive, the Power of Defire, of local Motion, of Ratiocination. Now to Plants there appertains only the Nutritive Power; to other Beings both this, and the Sensitive : but if the Sensitive, then the Power of Desire; for Appetite, and Resentment, and Be 3 Volition

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basest to the most sublime (o). cludes them all, as being possessed of all

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Volition (the three great leading Powers) are each of them a Species of Desire, and all Animals have at least one of the Senses, I mean the Sense of Touch. Naw to the Being, which possesses Sensation, to this appertain also Pleasure and Pain, and that which is Pleasurable and Painful. But if these, then Appetite; for Appetite is the Desire of that, which is Pleasurable. Arist. de Anim. l. ii. c. 3.

And soon after-Avet per yafe Te Beenling To aigθητικου εκ έςι τε δε αίσθητικέ χωρίζεται το Βρεπίικου έν τοις Φυτοις. Πάλιν δε, ανευ μεν τη απίκη των άλλων αἰσθήσεων εδεμία ὑπάρχει, άΦὴ δὲ ἄνεψ τῶν ἄλλων ύπαρχει τολλα γαρ των ζώων έτε όψιν έτε ακοήν έχ-มชาง, ซีระ อังนุทีร อีงพร ณัชิยทชาง หลู รพึง ณเชยทรามพึง รมิ นุโม έχει το κατά τόπον μινητικόν, τὰ δ' ἐκ έχει τελευταῖον δὲ κὰ τὸ ἐλάχιςον, λογισμον κὰ διάνοιαν οῖς μὲν γαρ υπάρχει λογισμός των Φθαρτών, τέτοις κὶ τὰ λοιπα ωάντα οίς δε έκείνων έκας ου, ε ωασι λογισμός, — άλλα τοῖς μὲν τόδὲ Φαντασία, τὰ δὲ ταύτη μόνον Cos-Without the Nutritive Power there is no Sensitive; but then the Nutritive is separated from the Sensitive in Plants. Again, without Touch there can be none of the other Sensations, but there may be Touch without any of the rest; for thus are there many Animals, which bave neither Sight, nor Hearing, nor even a Sensation of Farther still, of the Sensitive Beings same possess the Loco-motive Power, and others possess it not: the last Order

Perception; and Perception we have now found to be the Cause of all Spontaneous Impulse.

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Order of Beings, and those the sewest in number, are those, which possess the Powers of Reasoning and Discussion: and among the mortal and perishable Beings those, who possess these Powers, possess any one of these Powers in particular, do not all of them therefore possess the Reasoning Power, but some of them want even the Power of Phansy or Imagination; others of them conduct themselves and live by that [inferior Power] alone. Arist. de Anim. 1. ii. c. 3. p. 28. Edit. Sylb. See before, p. 106, Note (g).

It must be here observed, that Plants are said to LIVE (ζ_{n}^{m}) tho' not to be Animals (ζ_{n}^{m}) ; the Character of Animal being derived from the Power of Sensation, of which Plants are supposed destitute; while that of LIFE appertains to them, because they Grow, and Produce each of them Seed after their kind.

These different Powers, as they stand united in one subject, may be better comprehended, by marking their clear and distinct character, when they exist apart, in different Subjects.

(o) The preceding Speculations have refpect to the threefold Division of the Soul, adopted by the Pythagoreans and Platonics, by which they made it to be Rational, Irascible, and Concupiscible, and called it's E e 4 three

Chap. XVII. We must remember however that 'tis not Perception simply, which causes such Impulse; but 'tis Perception of Want within, and of adequate Good without; and that as this Good is sometimes an object of Sense, sometimes of Intellect, sometimes a mistaken Good, at other times a real one, (in as much as Sensation is fallible, and Reason may be deceived) so the whole amounts to this; the Cause of Spontaneous Impulse is the Perception of absent Good, and that either sensible or intelligible, either real or apparent (p).

AFTER this manner we perceive one of the most important Unions; the Union

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three Faculties Λόίω, Θυμός, and Ἐπιθυμία, Reason, Anger, and Concupiscence or Appetite. See Diog. Laert. iii. 90. Plato's Republic is founded on this Division.

⁽p) See Vol. the First, Treatise on Happiness, and Notes on the same, pages 212, 246, 334, 356.

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of those two capital Motions, the Phyfical and the Metaphysical. The Soul
perceives those Goods, which it is conscious that the Animal wants. Hence
an Impulse to obtain them by employing
the Organs of the Body; and this, as
far as the Soul only is concerned, we call
Motion Metaphysical. Hence the bodily
Organs actually are employed, and this
we call Motion Physical. Perception leads
the way; Spontaneous Impulse follows; and
the Body supplies the place of an Instrument or Tool (q).

As

⁽q) — Στως μὲν εν ἐπὶ το χινεῖσθαι κὰ πράτθειν τὰ ζῶα ὁρμῶσι, τῆς μὲν ἐχάτης αἰτίας τε χινεῖσθαι ὅρέξ-εως ἐσης, ταύτης δὲ χινομένης ἢ δι αἰσθήσεως, ἢ διὰ Φαντασίας κὰ νοήσεως— And thus it is, that ANIMALS proceed to move themselves and act, a Desire being the last and immediate Cause of their moving, and this Desire being occasioned either by Sensation, or else by IMAGINATION and INTELLECTION. Arist. de Animal. Motu. c. vii. p. 155. Edit. Sylb.

Τὰ μὲν γὰς ἐργανικὰ μέρη ωαρασκευάζει ἐπιτηδείως τὰ ωάθη, ἡ δὲ ὅρεξις τὰ ωάθη, τὴν δὲ ὅρεξιν ἡ Φαντασία:

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As every animal Motion has a view to Good, so, if it miss that Good, the Motion ceases, and the Animal is lest discontented: if it obtain it, the Animal is happy, but then too the Motion ceases; for the End is obtained, to which the Motion tended. And thus is all animal Motion in it's Nature finite, as it has a Beginning and an End; as it begins from the Want of Good, and ends in it's Acquisition. Hence too as it ends where it begins, it bears an analogy to Motion circular, where we run a complete round,

Φαντασία αὐτη δε γίγνε αι η δια νοήσεως, η δι αἰσθήσεως.—The Corporeal Feelings prepare in a proper manner the organic Parts of the Body; Desire prepares those Feelings; that Desire is prepared by some Fancy or Appearance; and this last arises either thro' Intellection or Sensation. Ejust. 1. c. 8. p. 157. Edit. Sylb.

If it be asked why nothing has been said concerning Aversion and Evil, as well as concerning Volition and Good; the Answer is, that to sty Evil is to seek Good; and to escape Evil is to obtain Good; so that in the present inquiry they are both included.

by returning to the point whence we began.

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'Tis no-unentertaining Speculation to attend to these internal Motions, as they arise from the different prevalence of their different internal Causes. Within the Soul of Man there are Passions, and a Principle of Reason: sometimes the internal Motion arises from many Passions at once, and the Soul is like a Sea when agitated by contrary Winds.

Imo in corde PUDOR, mixtoque INSANIA
LUCTU (r).

Here the Motion is tempestuous, and Reason during the Storm appears to be overwhelmed. At other times she interposes, but without success; and in such case the Motion is equally turbid and ir-

regular.



⁽r) En. x. 870.

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regular. Thus Medea, when the is about to murder her children:

Καὶ μανθάνω μὲν, οἶα δρᾶν μέλλω κακά· Θυμὸς δὲ κρείτ]ων τῶν ἐμῶν βελευμάτων (s).

I know the mischiefs, that I soon shall act, But Passion over-rules my better thoughts.

There are times too, when Reason acts with greater success, and when the Motion becomes of course more placid and serene. But whenever she is so far able to establish her authority, as to have the Passions obey her uniformly without murmuring or opposition, then follows that orderly, that fair and equal Motion, by which the Stoics represented even HAP-PINESS itself, and elegantly called it the Well-slowing of life (t).

Besides,

⁽s) Arrian. Epict. 1. i. c. 28. p. 144. Edit. Upton. Euripid. Med. v. 1078, 9.

⁽t) "Ευροια βίν — See Diog. Laert. vii. 88.—Hinc intellecta eft illa beata vita, secundo destuens cursu. Senec. Epist. 120. See also of this Treats. p. 261, 262.

Besides the well-flowing here mentioned, which is of a kind purely moral, there is another highly valuable, which is of a kind purely intellectual. It is under this Motion, that the Man of Speculation passes, thro' the road of Syllogism, from the simplest Truths to the most complicated Theorems.

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pure and original Truth is the Object of our most excellent Volition (it being all that we seek, considered as Beings intelligent), so is it as strictly and properly the Object of our most excellent Perception; there being no perceptive Power, but our Intellect alone, that can reach it. 'Tis here then we behold the meaning of an antient and important Doctrine, that the PRIMARY OBJECTS OF PERCEPTION AND OF VOLITION ARE THE SAME (u).

⁽u) Το OPEKTON 3 το NOHTON RIVER, & RIP νέμενου τάτων δε ΤΑ ΠΡΩΤΑ, ΤΑ ΑΥΤΑ—The Desirable

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'Tis hence also we may learn, that not only ALL GOOD IS TRUTH (as there can be none such without a reason, from which it is so denominated), but also that ALL TRUTH IS GOOD, as it is the sole pursuit of the contemplative, the natural Object of their Wants, equally as honours are to the ambitious, or as banquets to the luxurious (x).

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DESIRABLE and the INTELLIGIBLE move, without being moved; and of these two Genera those Objects, that are Highest and First, are the Same. Arist. Metaph. A. L. p. 202. Edit. Sylb.

When a Theorem of Archimedes moves within us a Defire to understand it; or when, being understood, it raises within us our necessary Assent: we do not conceive the Theorem itself to be moved, either by the Defire, or by the Assent, as the Horses are moved, that give Motion to the Waggon, or the Waggon moved, that gives motion to it's Load.

(x) Tho' we feldom hear of Goods in our common intercourse with Mankind, but what have reference to the Body, or at best to the lower Affections; yet HAS THE HIGHEST FACULTY OF THE SOUL A PECULIAR GOOD, as much as the other faculties have, from

Having said thus much concerning Perception, and that highest Species of animal Impulse, I mean Volition, it must not be forgot, that there are other internal Motions of a very different character, where both Perception and Spontaneous Impulse are in a manner unconcerned.

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WITHIN every Animal there is an INNATE and ACTIVE POWER, which ceases
not it's work, when Sense and Appetite
are asleep; which, without any conscious
co-operation of the Animal itself, carries
it from an Embryo or Seed to the maturity of it's proper Form. Now so far
this Power may be called a Principle of
Motion. At Maturity it stops (for were

from the intellectual Possession of which Good it seeks FELICITY and PRACE.

....

I loved her (says the wise Man, speaking of Wisdom; and what is Wisdom, but the most exalted Truth?) I loved her above Health and Beauty, and chose to have her instead of Light: for the Light, that cometh from her, never goeth out. Wisd. vii. 10.

Chap. XVII. the progress infinite, there could be no Maturity at all); and so far it may be called a *Principle of Cessation* or *Rest* (y). From this point of Rest it deserts the Being gradually, and in consequence of such desertion the Being gradually decays.

Tis by this Principle that the Magnitude of the Thistle, the Oak, the Bee, the Elephant, and every other natural Production, whether animal or vegetable, is to a certain degree circumscribed and limited; and when that Limit either fails or exceeds in a conspicuous manner, the Being becomes a Monster. See Vol. I. p. 295, Note xviii.

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⁽y) Speaking of the difference between the Operation of the Elements and mere MATTER, and that of NATURE, and an internal Principle, the Stagirite obferves-Των δε Φύσει συνεκώτων σέρας ές η λόγο μεγέθες κρα αὐξήσεως ταῦτα δε ψυχης, ἀλλ' έ συρος, ກໍ dong μαλλον ທີ່ ປົກຖ -- As to things, which derive their Constitution from NATURE, there is a BOUND and Proportion in their Magnitude and Growth; and these proceed from their Soul, not from the Element of Fire; and are caused rather by Reason, than by Matter. De An. ii. 4. p. 30. Edit. Sylb .- And, not long before, describing a Physical or natural Substance, he makes it to be something έχουτ 🕒 άςχην κινήσεως κή ςάσεως is αὐτῷ, which possesses within itself a Principle of Mo-TION and of REST. De An. ii. 1.- p. 23. Edit. Sylb.

Et labor, et dura rapit inclementia mortis (z). Chap. XVII.

As the Local Motion of Animals is derived from Sense, and spontaneous Impulse; so from the Principle, just described, are derived their other Motions: from it's ACTIVITY, their Generation, their Augment tion, and Change to better; from it's Cessation, their Change to worse, their Diminution, and lastly Death*. 'Tis this is that internal Principle, which descends from Animals even to Vegetables; and which, as these last possess no other, is commonly called Vegetables to the commonly called Vegetables to the more obvious Name of Nature (a).

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⁽²⁾ Georg. iii. 67, 68.

^{*} See before, p. 384 to p. 389.

⁽a) See the Definition of NATURE in Volume the First, among the Notes on the first Treatise, p. 257, and more fully in the addition to Note 3, p. 282.

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WE must remember however, that while we speak of Motion here, we mean the invisible Cause, not the visible Effects; for these are purely physical, and belong to another Speculation. After the same manner are we to speak of those other

The VEGETATIVE LIFE here mentioned is sometimes called पेण्या क्णायां, fometimes प्रश्नीयमे, and at other times to Spenlixov, the NUTRITIVE PRIN-CIPLE; that Principle, which, passing thro' Plants, as well as Animals, never ceases to nourish and support them, thro' the period of their existence-asi yap ένεργει ή Φυτική ψυχή—κ μαλλον έν τοις υπνοις, ένθα αί λοιπαί της ψυχης δυνάμεις ήρεμέσι τότε γέν μάλιςα αι withis-The Vegetative Soul energizes at all times, and more during Sleep, when the OTHER Powers are at rest; and therefore 'tis then moftly are performed the Digestions. Philop. in Arist. de An. 1. ii.-Το ερίου το αυτέ ωσιεί το θρεπίκου μόριον έν τῷ καθεύδειν μάλλον ἢ ἐν τῷ ἐξεηδορέναι τρέΦεται γάρ κὸ αὐξάνεται τότε μάλλον ώς είδεν ωροσδεόμενα ωρός ταῦτα τῆς αἰσθήσεως.—The NUTRITIVE part of the Soul performs it's Work in SLEEPING, more than in Waking; for then, more than at any other time, are Animals nourished and enlarged in bulk, as they have NO NEED OF SENSATION FOR THESE PURPOSES. Ari-Aot. de Somne, cap. 1. sub fin. See before, p. 104.

motive

tism and Electricity; the visible Motions, XVII.

which they produce, being of a Species merely Physical, but the Cause of these Motions lying itself totally concealed.

Whether then we suppose it a Species of inferior Life, and say with Thales, that the Magnet and the Amber are animated (b); or whether we content ourselves with calling it an internal active Quality (occult we must not call it, for that is now forbidden) we may safely pronounce it a Quality, which, tho' we

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⁽b) This Opinion of Thales concerning the Magnet's having a Soul, because it moved Iron (ψυχην έχεις ετι τον σίδηφον κινεί) may be found in Arist. de An. l. i. c. 2. p. 7.

Philoponus, in his Comment on this Passage, gives us from Thales the following Sentiment, which, tho not immediately to our purpose, we have transcribed for it's importance—ἔλειεν, ως η Πρόνοια μέχοι των ἐχάτων διήκει, κὸ ἀδὲν αυτην λανθάνει, ἐδὲ τὸ ἐλάχισον—He used to say that Providence extends to the lowest of all Beings, and that nothing is hid from it, no not even that which is most minute. See before, p. 130.

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are sure of it's existence, is not otherwise comprehensible, than by reference to it's Effects; as we know Homer, who is out of Sight, by his Iliad, which lies before us.

THERE is yet another motive Principle, far greater in local extent than all yet mentioned; I mean that, by which not only every Atom of this our Earth has it's proper tendency, but by which even Planets, Satellites, and Comets, describe their Orbits.

ASTRONOMERS will inform us as to the force of Motion here, and how much on it's due Order depends this immense Universe.

THE best of ancient Philosophers, when they saw so many inferior Motions not to be performed without Counsel or Design, could not think of imputing such superior ones to the efficacy of blind Chance;

Chance; and therefore, whatever they Chap. might conceive of the immediate Cause (call it Gravitation or Attraction, or by any other name) they justly supposed the primary Cause to be A PRINCIPLE OF IN-TELLECTION:

— totam infusa per artus Mens agitat molem—— (c).

THEY indeed fo far considered MIND to be the Source of ALL MOTION. that 'twas thro' its Motive Powers, that they distinguished it from Body; which last was no more than a passive Subject, possessing nothing motive within itself, but deriving all it's Motions from something else.

'Twas hence too that they inferred THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL .-They reasoned thus.—" Vital Motion may

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" forfake

⁽c) En. vi. 727.

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" for sake the Body, because to the Body 'tis XVII. " not an Essential; and in such case the "Body is said to die. But Vital Motion " cannot for sake the Soul, because to the " Soul'tis an Essential, and 'tis not poss fible that any thing should be for saken by " itself (d)." But this by way of digression.

The whole Passage, which is rather too long to transcribe, is the Translation of an Argument, taken from Plato's Phadrus.-To de ลี่มงอ หเขยง, หู บัช ลีมงะ nivéμενον, n. τ. λ. Plat. Edit. Ficini. p. 1221. B.

See Macrobius in Somn. Scipionis, c. 13.

Cicero has used the same Argument in his Tract de Sencetute. - Cumque semper agitetur Animus, nec principium motus babeat, quia SE IPSE MOVEAT, ME FINEM QUIDEM habiturum effe MOTUS, quia NUN-QUAM SE IPSE SIT RELICTURUS-C. 21.

Quintilian has brought the Argument into the Form of a Syllogism. — Quicquid ex seipso movetur, immortale est : Anima autem ex seipsa movetur : immortalis igitur est Anima. Inst. Orat. V. 14.

A۹

⁽d) — Quod autem motum adfert alicui, quodque IP-SUM agitatur ALICUNDE, quando finem babet motus, VIVENDI FINEM HABEAT necesse eft. Solum igitur, QUOD SEIPSUM MOVET, quia NUNQUAM DESERITUR A SE, NUNQUAM ne moveri quidem definit. Quinetiam, &c. Cic. Tufcul. Difp. i. 23.

As to the rife and duration of Mo-Chap.
TION, the founder of the Peripatetic XVII.
Sect thus states the Question. "Was
"Motion (says he) ever generated with"out existing before; and is it ever again
"so destroyed, that there is nothing moved;
"or was it neither generated, nor is de"stroyed, but ever was, and will be;
"something appertaining to Beings, which
"is immortal and unceasing; a kind of
"Life, as it were, to all things that exist
by the power of Nature (e)"?

Those, who meditate an answer to these Queries, will remember that Motion is co-eval with the Universe, since we learn that, in its first and earliest æra, the Spirit of God Moved upon the face of the waters*. They will remember too that Motion is as old as Time, and their

⁽ε) Πότερον δὶ γέγονε ποτε κίνησις, ἐκ ἔσα πρότερον, κỳ Φθείρεται πάλιν ἔτως, ἔςε κινεῖσθαι μηδέν ἢ ἔτε ἐγένετο, ἔτε Φθείρεται, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ ἦν, κỳ ἔςαι, κỳ τᾶτ' ἀθάνατον κỳ ἄπαυς ον ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἔσιν, οῖον ζωή τις ἔσα τοῖς ψύσει συνεςῶσι πᾶσιν; Arift. Phyf. 1. viii. c. 1. p. 144. Edit. Sylb.

[·] Genesis chap. 1.

Chap. Coexistence so necessary, it is not possible to XVII. suppose the one, without supposing the other.

And thus, having before confidered Physical Motion, have we now confidered what may be called METAPHYSI-CAL, or (if I may use the expression) CAUSATIVE MOTION; including under this name every Animating Power, whether rational or irrational, which, though different from Body, acts upon Body, causing it to live, to grow, and move itself and other Bodies. These animating Powers are only known from their Effects, as the Painter's Art is known from his Pictures. And hence, as 'tis the Effect, which leads us to recognise the Cause, hence these animating Powers, tho' prior in existence to Physical Effects, are necessarily subsequent in human Contemplation, and are thence, and thence only called METAPHYSICAL (f).

⁽f) See 409, 451, 483. As to the character and subordination of the several Animating Powers, see before p. 421, 422. and so on to p. 438. as well in the Text, as in the Notes. See also Chapter the Sixth.

And now, having done with Motion, we must take some notice of Rest.

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THE most obvious Species of REST is that opposed to the most obvious Species of Motion; such for example as the Cessation of Gales, after they have been fresh and blowing:

Ingrato celeres obruit OTIO
Ventos——— (g).

the Cessation of Billows, after they have been loud and tempestuous—

SILENCE, ye troubled Waves, and thou Deep, Peace (h).

Bur

Both these Species of Rest are denoted in English by the common name of CALM. The Greeks, with their usual precision, have given a different Name to each: the first, that is the Wind-Calm, they call Novema, and define it Hermia is white air & TRAN-

⁽g) Horat. Od. 1, i. 16.

⁽b) Par. Loft, vii. 216.

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But 'tis expedient to be more particular.—The two instances of Rest, that, we have alleged, are of Motion purely Local. So is it, when the flight of an Arrow is spent; when a Bowl, that has been running, stops. But Rest is also connected with the other Species of Motion. The Cessation of Growth is Maturity; of the Vital Energies, is Death.

So too with respect to the higher saculties of the Soul, Sense and Reason.

TRANQUILLITY in a quantity of AIR; the second, that is the Sea-Calm, they call Γαλήνη, and define it Όμαλότης Θαλάτης, EVENESS in the SEA'S SURFACE. These definitions are of Archytas, and may be found in Aristotle's Metaph. p. 136. Edit. Sylb.

PLATO has brought the two terms together, in those harmonious Lines, delivered by Agatho in the Banquet—

Εἰρήνην μέν ἐν ἀνθρώποις, ωτλάρει δε ΓΑΛΙΙΝΗΝ, ΝΗΝΕΜΙΑΝ ἀνέμων, κοίτην ῦπνον τ' ἐνὶ κήδει.

See Platon. Symp. p. 1190, Edit. Fic. See also the learned and ingenious Translation of Mr. Sydenbam, p. 118.

The

The Rest of the sensitive Powers, after the labours of the day, is SLEEP:

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Dulcis et alta Quies, placidæque simillima Morti (i).

The Rest of the Passions, after having been agitated, is Composure and Equanismity; the Rest of the deliberative and reasoning Powers, after sedulous Investigation, is the Discovery of the thing sought, or rather the Acquiescence in Truth discovered, either real or apparent, either practical or speculative.

AND hence, in the last mode of Rest, or Acquiescence, the rise of our English Phrase, I am fixt; and of the Latin Phrase, Stat:

STAT conferre manum—— (k).

⁽i) En. vi. 522.—See before, Hermes, p. 52, and of this Volume, p. 336, 337.

⁽k) Æn. xii. 678.

The incomparable Sanctius in his Minerva gives the following excellent explanation of this Passage. Quam-

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Hence Science in Greek is called EIII-ETHMH, every Theorem being as it were a Resting Place, at which the man of Science stops (1).

LASTLY, there is a Rest of all the most interesting to mankind, I mean Prace, that happy Rest, which follows the Trepidations and Ravages of War.

AND now having done with REST, let us bring the whole to a conclusion.

diu emim deliberatur, consilium vacillat, et sententia fluctuat; ubi certum ac statutum est, qued quis facere vult, consistit consilium, et STAT SENTENTIA. Sanct. Minero. 1. iv. c. 4. p. 637. Edit. Amst. 1733.

In Perizonius's Note upon this part of Sanctius, it appears that SEDET is used in the fame fignification, and for the same reasons. See the Note following.

(1)— iτι δὶ κὰ ἡ νόησις ἔοικεν ἡριμήσει τινὶ, κὰ ΕΠΙΣΤΑΣΕΙ μᾶλλον ἢ κινήσει—Intellection appears to refemble a certain Resting and Standing still, rather than a Motion. De An. 1. i. c. 3. See Hermes, p. 368, where this Etymology is treated of more at large.

We

WE have said already, that the Cause Chap. of all Animal Motion is Good, either XVII. real or apparent. It is a farther Requifite, that it should be Goop, which is wanting; Good at a distance: for were it present, the Motion would then be superfluous. Thus we see the meaning of the Philosophical Critic, Scaliger: Mo-TIONIS ENIM APPETENTIA CAUSA EST: APPETENTIÆ, PRIVATIO (m): The Caufe of Motion is Appetition; of Appetition, is PRIVATION. 'Tis to this PRI-VATION or WANT, that the Wisdom of all Ages has imputed Industry, Perseverance, and the Invention of Arts and Sciences.

THIS, in Virgil, is the-

— duris urgens in rebus EGESTAS (n).

To

one ay Google

⁽m) Scalig. de Caufis Ling. Lat. c. 114.

⁽n) Geor. i. 146. See Vol. first, p. 257, p. 273, 4, 5.

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To this alludes Epicharmus, the Poet and Philosopher:

Πωλέσιν ήμῶν πάντα γὰς τ' ἀΓαθ' οἱ θεοί (ο).

Sell us all Goods at Labour's painful price.

To this alludes the Scripture, at Man's earliest period,—In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread (p).

But the Want be thus essential to set Man, and not only Man, but all animal Nature, in Motion, yet is Want itself an Imperfect. And to be in want is to be imperfect. And hence it follows, that true Greatness, or Superiority of Nature, consists not in having many Wants, even the we can find means to get them

gratified;

⁽o) Xenopb. Mem. l. ii. c. 1.

⁽p) Gen. iii. 19.

gratified; but in having as few as pof- Chap. fible, and those within the compass of XV our own abilities.

'Tis to this Doctrine that Virgil nobly alludes, when he makes Evander with an heroic dignity receive Eneas, not at the gates of a proud Palace, but at the Door of an humble Cottage:

Ut ventum ad sedes, hæc, inquit, limina victor

Alcides subiit; hæc illum regia cepit:

AUDE, hospes, CONTEMNERE OPES, et te QUOQUE DIGNUM

FINGE DEO; rebusque veni non asper egenis (q).

Conformable to the same way of thinking is what Socrates says to Antipho in Xenophon: "You seem (says he) O An-"tipho, to be one of those, who imagine

⁽⁹⁾ Æn. viii. 362.

[«] Happi-

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e But I for my part esteem THE WANT-

" ing of nothing, to be Divine; and

"THE WANTING OF AS LITTLE AS

60 POSSIBLE, to come NEAREST TO THE

66 DIVINITY; and, as THE DIVINITY IS

66 Most excellent, so the being nearest

66 TOTHE DIVINITY is the being NEAREST

"TO THE MOST EXCELLENT (r)".

ARISTOTLE seems to have followed his old Master (for such was Socrates), with respect to this Sentiment. "To "that Being, (says he) which is in the "MOST EXCELLENT STATE, HAPPINESS" appears to appertain WITHOUT ACTION "AT ALL; to the Being nearest to "the most perfect, thro" a small and

⁽r) Έσικας, ω 'Αντιφών, την ευδαιμονίαν σισμένος τρυφήν κ) πολυτέλειαν είναι' εγώ δε νομίζω το μέν μηθονος δείσθαι, θείσν είναι, το δε ώς ελαχίςων, εγίυτάτω το το Θείω' κ) το μέν Θείσν, κράτιςον, το δε εγίυτάτω το το Θείω, εγίντάτω το πρατίςω. Χεπορό. Μεπ. 1. i. c. 6. Sect. 10.

⁶⁶ SINGLE

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" single action; to those the most Chap. "REMOTE, thro' ACTIONS MANY AND " various (s)." He soon after subjoins the reason, why the most excellent Being has no need of Action. " It has (fays he) " within itself the final Cause," that is to say, perfect Happiness: but ACTION ALWAYS EXISTS IN TWO, when there is both A FINAL CAUSE, and A Power to obtain it, each of them separate, and detached from one another (t).

AND

⁽s) *Εοικε γάρ τῷ μὲν ἄριςα ἔχοντι ὑπάρχειν τὸ εὖ ανευ ωράξεως τῷ ὅξ ἐγιύτατα, δια ολίγης κ μιάς. τοις δε ωορρωτάτω, δια ωλειόνων. Arift. de Calo. l. ii. c. 12. p. 54. Edit. Sylb.

⁽¹⁾ Τῷ δ' ὡς ἄριςα ἔχοντι ἐδῖν δεῖ ϖράξεως, ἔςι γαρ εν αυτώ το है ένεκα ή δε ωραξίς ές ιν αξεί έν δυσίν, อีรลง หรู นี้ ย้งยนล ที่ , หรู รอ รษรษ ยึงยนล. Ibid.

The following Remark may perhaps explain this Sentiment, if it should appear obscure.

When a Being finds it's Good fully and wholly within itself, then, itself and it's Good being ONE, it finds no Gg Caule

Chap. XVII. AND hence perhaps we may be able to discern, why Immobility should be a peculiar Attribute to the Supreme and Divine Nature, in contradistinction to all other Beings, endued with Powers of Perception. To Him there

Cause of Motion, to seek that, which it possesses already. Such Being therefore, from it's very nature, is IMMOVEABLE.

But when a Being and it's Good are separate, here, as they necessarily are Two, the distant Good, by being perceived, becomes a Final Cause of Motion, and thus awakens within the Being a certain Desire, of which Desire Motion is the natural Consequence. Such Beine therefore by its nature is MOVEABLE.

Ammonius, in the following Quotation, appears to have had this Doctrine and these Passages of Aristotle in his view.

"Οσα φου πλειόνων τινών δίεται, πλείονας κινήσεις κινείται τὰ δε όλιδοδεᾶ, όλιδοκίνητα αμέλει τὸ Θείον, ανενδεες δν, κ) πάντη ές ιν ακίνητον — All fuch Beings, as are in want of many things, are moved in many Motions; thefe, who have few Wants, have few Motions; but the Divinity, being Without Wants, is therefore Perfectly immoveable. Ammon. in Præd. 144. B. 145.

are



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are no Wants, nothing abjent which is Good, being himself the very Essence of pure Perfection and Goodness (u).

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And so much for that Motion which, tho' subsequent in contemplation to the Physical (x), and thence called METAPHY-sical, is yet truly prior to it in the real order of Beings, because it appertains to the First Philosophy. So much also for the Theory of Motion.

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⁽u) See before, p. 161, 162.

⁽x) See before, p. 409

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Conclusion — Utilities deducible from the Theory of these Arrangements—Recapitulation.

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And trine of these Philosophical Arrangements, or, in other words, of Categories, Predicaments, Comprehensive or Universal Genera, (for we have called them indifferently by every one of these names) together with such Speculations both previous and subsequent (a), as were either requisite to explain the Subject, or else naturally arose out of it; we imagine the Utilities of this knowlege will be obvious to every one, who has studied it with impar-

⁽a) See before, p. 36, 36, 360, 361, and below, p. 464.

tiality, and has aimed to know, what it Chap. really is.

In the first place, as we have usually begun the consideration of each Arrangement from Speculations respecting Body, and have thence made a Transition to others respecting Mind; we may hence mark the Connection between these two great Principles, which stand related to each other, as the Subject and its Efficient Cause, and in virtue of that Relation may be said to run thro' all things (b).

AGAIN, our Mind, by this orderly and comprehensive Theory, becoming furnished, like a good Library, with proper Cells or Apartments, we know where to place our Ideas both of Being and it's Attributes, and where to look for them again, when we have occasion to call

Gg 3 them

⁽b) See before, p. 34.

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them forth. Without some ARRANGE-MENT of this fort, the Mind is so far from increasing in Knowlege by the Acquisition of new Ideas, that, while it increases the Number of these, it does but increase it's own Perplexity. It is no longer a Library well regulated, but a Library crowded and confused,

Et dominum fallunt——— (c).

AGAIN, as these ARRANGEMENTS have a necessary Connection with the whole of Existence; with all Beine or Substance on one hand, with every possible Accident of Attribute on the other; it follows of course that sa general a Speculation must have naturally introduced many others; Speculations, not merely Logical, but extending to Physics, to Ethics, and even to the First.

Phila-

⁽c) Horat. Epift. 1. i. 6.

Philosophy (d). The Reader from these Chap. incidental Theorems (if the Author has fucceeded in his endeavours to represent them) will have a taste how the Ancients wrote, when they reasoned upon these Subjects, and may gratify his curiofity (if he please) by comparing them with the Moderns.

IT was not from an oftentatious wish to fill his page with Quotations, that the Author has made such frequent and copious extracts from other Authors. He flatters himself, that by this he has not only given authority to the Sentiments, but relieved also a Subject, in itself rather From the Writers alleged, both ancient and modern, the Reader will perceive, how important and respectable He will perceive these Authorities are. too, that, in the wide regions of Being, some Sages having cultivated one part,

⁽d) See before, p. 16.

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and some another, the Labours of Ancients and Moderns have been often different, when not hostile; often various, when not contradictory; and that, among the valuable discoveries of later periods, there are many so far from clashing with the ancient doctrines here advanced, that they coincide as amicably, as a CHILLINGWORTH and an ADDISON in the same Library; a RAPHAEL and a CLAUDE in the same Gallery.

It is not without precedents, that he has adopted this manner of Citation. It was adopted by Ariftotle long ago in his Rhetoric and his Poetics. Ariftotle was followed by those able Critics, Demetrius, Quinctilian, and Longinus. Chryspppus, the Philosopher, so much approved the method, that in a single Tract he inserted nearly the whole of that celebrated Tragedy, the Medea of Euripides: so that a person, who was perusing the Tract, being asked what he was reading, replied

replied pleasantly, 'Twas the Medea of Chap, Chrysippus (e). Cicero has enriched his XVIII. philosophic Treatises with many choice morfels both from Greek and Roman Writers; and this he does, not only approving the practice himself, but justifying it by the practice of the Philosophers then at Athens, among whom he names Dionysius the Stoic, and Philo the Academic (f). Seneca and Plutarch both pursued the same plan, the latter more particularly in his moral Compositions. To these may be added, tho' of a baser age, my own learned Countryman, John of Salisbury (g), who, having perused and Rudied

⁽e) Diog. Laert. 1. vii. § 180.

⁽f) Tusc. Disput. l. ii. § 10.

⁽g) This extraordinary Man flourished in the reign of Henry the second, and was therefore of Old Salisbury, not of New Salisbury, which was not sounded till the reign of Henry the third. John (of whom we write) having had the best Education of the time, and being not only a Genius, but intimate with the most eminent Men, in particular with Pope Adrian (who

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Chap.

studied most of the Latin Classics, appears to have decorated every part of his Works with splendid fragments, extracted out of them. Two later Writers of Genius have done the same in the narrative of their Travels; Sandys at the beginning of the last Century, and Addison at the beginning of the present.

And so much by way of Apology for the Author himself. But he has a farther Wish in this exhibition of capital Writers; a Wish to persuade his Readers, of what he has been long persuaded himself, that every thing really elegant, or sublime in composition, is ultimately referable to the Principles of a sound Logic; that those Principles, when Readers little think of them, have still a latent

force,



⁽who was himself an Englishman) became at length a Bishop, and died in the year 1182. See Fabricius in his Biblioth. Lat. v. ii. p. 368, and in his Biblioth. Med. et Insim. estat. See also Cave's Histor. Literar. v. ii. p. 243.

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force, and may be traced, if fought after, even in the politest of Writers*. Chap.

By reasoning of this kind he would establish an important Union; the Unions he means between Taste and Truth. Tis this is that splendid Union, which produced the Classics of pure Antiquity; which produced, in times less remote, the Classics of modern days; and which those, who now write, ought to cultivate with attention, if they have a wish to suravive in the estimation of posterity.

TASTE is, in fact, but a Species of inferior Truth. 'Tis the Truth of Elegance, of Decoration, and of Grace; which, as all Truth is fimilar and congenial, coincides as it were spontaneously with the more severe and logical; but which, whenever destitute of that more solid support, resembles some sair but languid

^{*} See the numerous Quotations thre' every part of this Treatife.

Body;

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Chap. XVIII. Body; a Body, specious in seature, but desicient as to nerve; a Body, where we seek in vain for that natural and just perfection, which arises from the pleasing harmony of Strength and Beauty associated.

RECOMMENDING an earnest Attention to this Union, we resume our Subject by observing, that 'tis in contemplating these orderly, these comprehensive Arrangements (h), we may see whence the sub-ordinate

A Satire

^{. (}b) There are few Theories so great, so comprehensive, and so various, as the Theory of these PREDI-CAMENTS, or PHILOSOPHICAL ARRANGEMENTS.

The Ancients had many methods of representing Works of such a diversified and miscellaneous character.

Fruits of various kinds, promiscuously blended, used to be presented in a Dish, as an offering to Ceres. This Dish, so filled, they called LANX SATURA; and hence LANX SATURA, or rather Satura, or Satira alone (Lanx being understood) came to signify by metaphor a miscellaneous writing; such as were the Compositions of Lucilius, Horace, Persius, Juvenal, and others.

ordinate Sciences and Arts all arise: History, natural and civil, out of Sub-

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STANCE;

A Satire in this fense did not mean Sarcasm, Calumny, or personal Abuse; it meant no more than a Writing, where the Subject was various and diversified, such as Juvenal well describes it, when he speaks of his own works:

Quicquid agunt homines, nostri est PARRAGO libelli.

Again, we all know that GROVES and FORESTS are diversified with Trees; with Trees of various Figures, Magnitudes, and Species; and hence it was that Statius called his miscellary Collections of Poems by the name of SILVE.

Now it was from these ideas that Mr. Stuart, with his usual Taste and Classical Elegance, has designed the Frontispiece, which adorns this Volume.

We there behold a Temple of the Tuscan Order, dedicated to Ceres; to which Goddess a Roman of distinction, with proper attendants about him, is making an offering of the LANK SATURA, or Dish of pramiscuous Fruits. Behind we see a GROVE, which, besides the propriety of being an usual place for Temples, has a fine effect in forming the back-ground of the Piece.

The LANK SATURA and the GROVE equally contribute to denote the Miscellaneous Character of these Philosophical Arrangements.

This Account of the Lanx Satura is taken from Diemedes the Grammarian, and may be found in the Preface

Chap-XVIII. STANCE; Mathematics, out of QUANTITY; Optics, out of QUALITY and
QUANTITY; Medicine, out of the same;
Astronomy, out of QUANTITY and MoTION; Music and Mechanics, out of the
same; Painting, out of QUALITY and
SITE; Ethics, out of RELATION; Chronology, out of WHEN; Geography, out of
WHERE; Electricity, Magnetism, and Attraction, out of Action and Passion;
and so in other instances.

EVERY Art and every Science being thus referred to it's proper Principle, we shall be enabled with sufficient accuracy to adjust their comparative value (k), by comparing the several Principles, from which they severally flow. Thus shall we be saved from absurdly overprizing a single Art, or a single Science, and from

Preface of Dacier to his Translation of Horace's Satires, and in the same Presace, presided also to the Satires of the Delphin Horace.

treat-

⁽k) See before, p. 34, 35.

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treating all the rest with a sort of insolent contempt; advantages so little to be expected from any Knowlege less extensive, that, on the contrary, the more deeply knowing Men may be in a single Subject alone, the more likely are they to fall into such narrow and illiberal Sentiments.

It is indeed no wonder in such case, that mistakes should arise, since those, who reason thus, be they as accurate as may be in their own particular Science, will be found to reason about one thing, which they know, and about many, of which they are ignorant; and how from Reasoners such as these, so inadequately prepared, can we expect either an exact, or an impartial Estimate?

AND thus much at present for the Speculation concerning PREDICAMENTS, or PHILOSOPHICAL ARRANGEMENTS; in the treating of which, we have considered in the

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PHILOSOPHICAL, &c.

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the Beginning (1) such matters as were necessarily previous; in the Middle (m) we have considered the Arrangements themselves; and, in the End (n), various matters, naturally arising out of them, or which have incidentally occurred during the time of their being discussed.

AND thus this Part of Logical Speculation appears to be finished.

THE END

⁽¹⁾ See Chapter the first and second.

⁽m) See from Chapter the third to Chapter the fourteenth inclusive.

⁽n) See from Chapter the fifteenth to the Conclusion.

ADDITIONAL NOTES.

PAGE 2.—so EAGER WAS CATO FOR KNOW-LEGE, &c.] Thus Cicero describes him—quippe qui, ne reprehensionem quidem volgi inanem resormidans, in ipsa curia soleret legere sæpè, dum Senatus cogeretur, nihil operæ Reipublicæ detrahens.—De Fin. III. 2.—Where 'tis worth remarking, that CATO considered his Application to Literature as no way obstructing his Duty to the Commonwealth. The Studious character and the Political in Him were united.

Ibid.—THE PATRIOT BRUTUS FOUND TIME NOT ONLY TO STUBY, BUT TO COMPOSE A TREATISE UPON VIRTUE.] Thus the same Cicero—Placere enim tibi (Bruto scil.) admodum sensi, et ex eo libro quem ad me accuratissime scripsisti, et ex multis sermonibus tuis, Virtutem ad beate vivendum se ipsa esse contentam. Tuscul. Disput. v. 1. And again,—provocatus gratissimo mihi libro, quem de Virtute scripsisti. De Fin. 1. 3.

One or two short fragments of this Treatise of Brutus are preserved in Seneca, De Consolat. ad Helv. C. ix.

As to Pericles, Epaminondas, and the other great names mentioned in the same page with Cato and Brutus, see the note immediately following.

H h

P. 5,



P. 5.—FOR THE SPLENDOR OF THEIR ACTIVE CHARACTER] The following authorities may ferve to confirm the truth of this affertion.

In PLUTARCH's life of PERICLES We read 28 follows

- O δε πλείςα Περικλεί συγΓενόμενος, κỳ μάλιςα περιθείς δίκον ἀυτῷ κỳ Φρόνημα δημαγωγίας εμβριθές ερον, δλως

τε μετεωρίσας κỳ συνεξάρας τὸ ἀξίωμα τε ήθυς, 'Αναξωγόρας ήν ὁ Κλαζομένιος, δν οἱ τότ' ἄνθρωποι ΝΟΥΝ προσηγόρευον. But he, who was most conversant with PERICLES, and most contributed to give him a grandeur of mind, and to make his high spirit for governing the popular Assemblies more weighty and authoritative; in a word, who exalted his ideas, and raised at the same time the dignity of his behaviour: the person, who did this, was ANAKAGORAS, the Clazomenian, whom the people of that age used to call NOYΣ or MIND. Plut. in Vit. Periclis, p. 154. B. Edit. Xyland.

PLUTARCH soon after gives good reasons for this appellation of ANAXAGORAS, viz. his great abilities, and his being the first who made MIND or INTELLECT (in opposition to CHANCE) a Principle in the Formation and Government of the Universe.

The Words of ANAXAGORAS on this subject, though well known, are well worth citing—Πάντα χρήματα ἢν ὁμε εἶτα ΝΟΤΣ ἐλθων ἀντὰ διεκόσμησε. All things were BLENDED TOGETHER: then came MIND (or an Intelligent Principle) and gave them ARRANGEMENT. Diog. Laert. 11.6.

EPAM-

EPAMINONDAS, in his political capacity, was so great a man, that he raised his Country, the Commonwealth of Thebes, from a contemptible state to take the lead in Greece; a dignity which the Thebans had never known before, and which fell, upon his loss, never to rise again. The same man was a pattern in private life of every thing virtuous and amiable; so that Justin well remarks—fuit autom incortum, vir melior, and dun, esset.

CORNELIUS NEPOS, having recorded the other parts of his Education, adds—et Philosophiæ Præceptorem babuit Lysim, Tarentinum, Pythagoreum; tui quidem sie suit deditus, ut adolescens tristem et severum senem omnibus æqualibus suis in samiliaritate anteposuerit, naque priùs oum a se dimiserit, quam doctrinis tanto antecessit condiscipulos, ut sacilè intelligi posset pari modo superaturum omnes in cateris artibus. Coru. Nep. in Vit. Epaminon, c. 2. Justin. His. VI. 8. Cicer. de Oratore III. 34.

As for ALEXANDER the Great, we may form a judgment, what fort of Education his Father PHILIP withed him to have, from that curious Epistie which he wrote to ARISTOTLE, upon ALEXANDER's birth. It is in its character so simple and elegant, that we have given it intire, as preserved by Aulus Geilius:

Φίλιππος 'Αριςοτέλει χαίρειν.

"Ισθο μοι γείονότα υίόν" πολλην δυ τοῖς θεοῖς χάριν ἔχω, ἐχ ἔτως ἐπὶ τῆ γενέσει τᾶ παιδος, ως ἐπὶ τῷ κατὰ τὴν σην ηλικίαυ ἀυτον γείονέναι ἐλπίζω γὰρ αὐτον, ὑπὸ σῶ τραΦέντα κὰ παιδευθύντα, ἄξιον ἔσεθαι κὰ ἡμῶν, κὰ τῆς τῶν πραίμάτων διαδοχής.

PHI-

PHILIP to ARISTOTLE greeting.

Know that I have a Son born. On this account I am greatly thankful to the Gods, not so much for the birth of the child, as for his being born DURING YOUR TIMES: for I hope that by his being brede, and educated UNDER YOU, be will become worthy of us, and WORTHY TO SUCCEED IN THE MANAGEMENT OF AFFAIRS. A. Gell. IX. 3.

What in fact this education was, we may learn not only from Alexander's History, but from an observation of Plutarch, in answer to an objection, how Alexander could venture to attack such an immense power as the Persian with such contemptible forces of his own. Plutarch says, that no forces could be greater or fairer than the several accomplishments of Alexander's Mind—and concludes, that he marched against the Persians with better supplies from his Preceptor Aristotle, than from his Father Philip.—πλείονας παρά 'Αρισοτίλης το καθηπιτο, η παρά είλιπην το πατρός άρομμας έχων, διεδείνεν επὶ Πέρσας. Plut. de Alex. Fort. p. 327. Edit. Xyland.

As for SCIPIO, the illustrious Conqueror of Carthage, we have this account of him and his Companion Poly-BIUS (to whom we may add also PANÆTIUS) from Velleius Paterculus ——Scipio tam elegans liberalium studiorum, omnisque dostrinæ et austor et admirator suit, ut Polybium Panætiumque, præcellentes ingenio viros, domi militiæque secum habuerit. Neque enim quisquam hoc Scipione clegantiùs intervalla negotiorum otio dispunxit, semperque aut belli, aut pacis serviit artibus; semperque inter arma et studia versatus, aut corpus periculis, aut animum disciplinis exercuit. Vell. Paterc. Histor. L. I. p. 19 Edit. Lipsii.

During



During the campaigns of SCIPIO, POLYBIUS attended him even in the time of Action or Engagement; as, for example, in that bold attempt, when SCIPIO, with POLYBIUS and thirty Soldiers only, undermined one of the Gates of Carthage. See Ammian. Marcel. L. XXIV. 2.

During more quiet intervals Polybius did not forget the duties of a Friend, or the dignity of a Philosopher, but gave advice, and that suitable to the character which Scipio wished to support in the Commonwealth. Among other things he advised him (as Plutarch informs us) never to quit the Forum, or place of public refort, before he had made himself some Friend, who was intimately conversant in the conduct of his fellow-citizens—

μη πρότερου ἐξ ἀγορᾶς ἀπελθεῖν, ἢ Φίλον τινὰ ποιήσασθαι, σύνεγοις ὅντα τῶν πράξεων τῶν πολιτῶν. Plut.
Symposiac. L. III. p. 659. Edit. Xyl.

To these instances we may add the peculiar regard which Cæsar had for the Philosopher Aristo, and Pompey for the Philosopher Cratippus. Elian well remarks on these two great Romans, that, they did not, because their power was great, despise those who had the power of doing them the greatest Services: ε γας, έπεὶ μέγα ἐδύναντο, ὑπερεΦρόναν τῶν τὰ μέγιςα ἀυτὰς ἐνῆσαι δυναμένων. Elian. Var. Hist. VII. 21.

In the same author, L. III. C. 17. there is an express differtation on this subject, worthy of perusal, as being filled with examples both from the Grecian and Roman History.

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To these citations I shall add only one or two more.— Et certe non tulit ullos hæc Civitas aut glorià clariores, aut austoritate graviores, aut bumanitate politiores, P. Africano, C. Lælio, L. Furio, qui secum eruditissimes bomines ex Græcià palam semper babuerunt. Cic. de Orat. 11. 37.

In the same work, to prove the Union of the PHILOSO-PHICAL character and the POLITICAL, we have the sollowing testimony, taken from the history of those Sages, so much celebrated in antiquity, PITTACUS, BIAS, SOLON, &c. Hi omnes, practer Milesium THALEM, CIVITATIBUS SUIS PRÆFUERUNT. De Orator. III. 34.

See also Cicero's tract stiled Orator, Sect. 15. p. 137. Edit. Oxon. and the Phædrus of Plato, p. 1237, Edit. Ficini, in both which places the intimacy above-mentioned between Phricles and Anaxagoras is recorded, and the importance also of this intimacy, as to the weight it gave Pericles in the Commonwealth of Athens.

P. 55—TO THE BETTER CO-ARRANGEMENT OF, &c.] To the Quotations here given may be added the following one from VARRO.

PYTHAGORAS Samius ait omnium rerum initia esse Bina: ut sinitum et insinitum, bonum et malum, vitam et mortem, diem et noctem; quare item duo, status et motus. Quod stat aut agitur, Corpus: ubi agitatur, Locus: dum agitatur, Tempus: quod est in agitatu, Actio Quadripartitio magis sic elucebit: Corpus est, ut cursor: Locus, stadium quâ currit: Tempus, bora quâ currit: Actio, curso. Quare sit, ut omnia sere sint quadripartita, et ea æterna; quod neque unquam Tempus, quin suerit Motus, (ejus enim inter-

intervollum Tempus;) neque Motus, ubi non Locus et Corpus; (quod alterum eft, quod movetur; alterum, ubi;) neque, ubi sit agitatus, non Actio ibi. Igitur Initiorum quadrigæ, LOCUS et CORPUS, TEMPUS et ACTIO.

PYTHAGORAS the Samian says that the Principles of all things are two and two, or double: as for example, Finite and Infinite, Good and Evil, Life and Death, Day and Night; and by the same rule, Rest and Motion. [In these last] that which rests or is agitated, is Body; the Where it is agitated, is Place; the Whist it is agitated, is TIME; and in the agitation itself we view the Action.

This fourfold Division will better appear as follows. Call Body, the Person who runs; call Place, the Course, over which he runs; call Time, the hour during which he runs; and let the Race or Running, he called the Action.

Now it bappens, that almost all things are in this manner fourfold, and this fourfold Division is as it were eternal. The reason is, there never was Time, but there must have been Motion, (of which Time indeed is but the Interval;) nor Motion, but where there must have been Place and Body; (one of which is the thing moved; the other, that where it is moved';) nor Agitation, but where there must have been Action.

And hence it follows, that PLACE and BODY, TIME and ACTION, form, as it were, a joint Quaternion of Principles. Varr. de Ling. Lat. L. 4. p. 7 Edit. Ansfel.

We have given this Passage at length, not only as it explains Co-arrangement, but as it exhibits to us four of those Predicaments or Arrangements, which make Parts

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of this Treatise, viz. Substance, When, Where, Action.

P. 85.— OF PURE AND ORIGINAL BODY]—
Συνεχες μεν εν εςι το διαιρετον είς αει διαιρετά σωμα
δε, το πάντη διαιρετόν μεγέθες δε, το μεν εφ' εν, γραμμά το δ' επὶ δύο, επίπεδον το δ' επὶ τρία, σωμα κὰ παρὰ ταῦτα κὰ εςιν ἄλλο μεγεθος, δια το τα τρία πάνια είναι, κὰ το τρὶς πάντη.—Continuous is that, which is divifible into Parts infinitely divifible; Body is that, which is every way divifible. Of Extensions, that which is divifible one way, is a Line; that which is divisible two ways, is a Superfictes; that which is divisible three ways is Body; and besides these, there is no other Extension, because Three are All, and Thrice [Divisible] is every way [Divisible]. Aristot, de Cælo, L. I. C. 1.

In Support of this last Idea (that the Term Three implies All) Aristotle refers to the common practice of his own Language—τὰ μὲν γας δύο ΑΜΦΩ λέγομεν, τὰ τὰς δύο ΑΜΦΟΤΕΡΟΥΣ, ΠΑΝΤΑ δ' ἐ λέγομεν αλλὰ κατὰ τῶν τριῶν ταύτην τὴν προσηγορίαν Φαμίν πρῶτὸν. We call (says he) two things, or two persons, Both; but we do not call them All: it is with regard to Three, that we first apply this Appellation (viz. the Appellation of All.) Arist in loc.

This is true likewise in Latin; and is true also in English. Even the vulgar with us would be surprised were they to hear any one say, Give me ALL TWO, instead of Give me BOTH.

For the Grammatical Idea of Both see Hermes, p. 226.

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The French, by a strange solecism, say Tous DEUX, a fault which we should not expect in an elegant language, corrected and refined by so many able writers.

P. 90.—CAN NEVER SUBSIST WITHOUT IT.]
MATTER and ATTRIBUTE are effentially distinct, yet like Convex and Concave, they are by nature inseparable.

We have already spoken as to the Inseparability of Attributes: we now speak as to that of Matter.

Ήμεις δε Φαμεν ύλην τινα των σωμάτων των αισθητών αλλά ταύτην ε χωρις ήν, αλλ' αι μετ' εναντιώσεως— We say there is a certain MATTER belonging to all Bodies, the Objects of Sense; a Matter, NOT SEPARABLE, but ever existing with some Contrariety.

Soon after—'Αρχην μεν κ) πρώτην υποθεμένυς είναι την υλην, την αιχώριςον μεν, υποκειμένην δε τοις εναντίοις — First, and for a Principle, we lay down MATTER, which is INSEPARABLE from the Contraries, and is their Sub-JECT or Substratum. Arist. de Gen. et Corr. Lib. 2. P. 34, 35. Edit. Sylb.

By Contraries in this place he means the several Attributes of Matter, such as Hot and Cold, Black and White; Moist and Dry, &c. which are all of them Contrary one to the other, from some or other of which Matter is always INSEPARABLE.

P. 116.—ANIMATING FORMS, WHICH THOUGH THEMSELVES NOT BODY, ARE YET] — δσων χάς ές ειν άρχων ἡ ἐνέρ[εια σωματική, δήλον ὅτι τάυτας ἄνευ σώματος ἀδύνατον ὑπάρχειν' οἶον βαδίζειν ἄνευ ποδῶν, ὧς ε

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κ) θύραθεν είσιέναι αδύνατον-λείπεται δε τον NOTN MONON Supater inciorenai, no OEION civas mosor este γάρ αυτά τη ένεργεία κοινωνεί σωματική ένερίεια-As many Faculties or Principles of the Soul as require bodily ar corporeal Energy, [that is, which require a Body or an Organ to enable them to act] thefe, 'tis evident, cannot exist without a Body; as for example, the locomotive Faculty of walking cannot exist without Feet : so that for such Faculties to pass into the Body from without [originally separate and detached from it] is a thing impossible. - It remains therefore that MIND or INTELLECT ALONE fould pass into us FROM WITHOUT (that is, be separate and wholly detached] and should ALONE be something DIVINE; because with the Energy of this Faculty Bodity Energy bas no communication—that is, there is no want of corporeal Organs for reasoning and thinking, as there is want of Eyes, for Seeing, or of Ears for Hearing. Arift. de Animal. Gen. L. II. c. 3. p. 208, 209, Edit. Sylb.

In another Place, speaking of those Parts of the Soul, which are inseparable from Body, because they cannot energize without it, he adds—There is however no objection why some Parts should not be separable; and that, because they are the Energies of no one Body whatever. Besides (he goes on and says) it is not yet evident, whether the Soul may be not the Life and Energy of the Body, in the same manner as the Pilot is the Life and Energy of the Ship.—Où pañu ἀλλ ἔνιά γε ἐθὲν κωλύει, διὰ τὸ μηθενὸς εἶναι σώματος ἐντελεχείας. Ετι δὲ ἄδηλου, εἰ οῦτως ἐντελεχείας τὰ σώματος ἡ ψυχη, ὧσπερ πλωτηρ πλοίν. Λείβ. de Animâ, II. c. 1.

In this last instance he gives a fine illustration of the Supreme and divine Part of the Soul, that is, the MIND or INTELLECT. It belongs (it seems) to the Body, as a Pi-

a Pilot does to the Ship; within which Ship, though the Pilot exist, and which said ship though the Pilot govern, yet is the Pilot notwithstanding no part of the Ship: he may leave it without change either in the Ship or in himself; and may still (we know) exist when the Ship is no more.

P. 129. — EA CURA QUIETOS SOLLICITAT?]
'Twas the advice of the EPICURBANS with regard to themselves, not to marry, not to have children, not to engage in public affairs— & γαρ γαμητέου, ἀλλ' ἐδὲ παιδοποιητέου, ἀλλ' ἐδὲ πολετευτίου. Arrian. Ερίξι. III. 7. p. 384. Edit. Upt. 'The political Life, according to them, was like that of Sisiphus, a Life of labour which knew no end.

Hoc est adverso nixantem tundere monte Saxum, quod tamen a summo jam vertice rursum Volvitur, et plani raptim petit æquora campi. Lucret. III. 1013, Gc.

Hence, with regard to their Gods, they provided them a fimilar Felicity; a Felicity, like their own, detached from all attention. Thus Horace, when an Epicurean

—— Deos didici securum agere myum, Nec, fi quid miri faciat natura, Deos id Tristes ex alto cali demittere tecto. Hor. Lib. I, Sat. V.

Thus Epicurus himself—το μακώριου κ) άφθαρτου ετε αυτό πράγματα έχει, ετε άλλω παρέχει—
That which is Blessed and Immortal (meaning the Divine Nature) has neither itself any business, nor does it find bufiness for any other. Diog. Lacrt.

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Ausonius has translated the sentiment in two Iambics, Ep. cxvi:

Quod est beatum, morte et æterniem carens, Nec sibi parit negotium, nec alteri.

See also Lucretius I. 57. VI. 83, whom *Herace* seems to have copied in the verses above quoted.

Tis true this Idea destroyed that of a Providence; but to them, who derived the World from a fortuitous Concourse of Atoms, such a consequence was of small importance.

P. 131.—And scape thy notice.]

To the Citations in the note p. 150, may be added the following fine sentiment of THALES— Ἡρώτησί τις ἀντον, εἰ λήθοι Θεὺς ἄνθρωπος ἀδιχῶν ἀλλ ἐδὶ διανούμενος, ἔΦη—One asked him, if a man might escape the knowlege of the Gods, when he was committing Injustice: No, says he, not even when he is MEDITATING it. Diog. Laert. i, 36.

P. 138.—Who is it, that comprehends the Whole?]

This Reasoning and that in Hermes, p. 362, abundantly shew the Supremacy of the Mind among the Faculties of the Human Soul. 'Tis Mind that sees the Difference not only between Black and White, Bitter and Sweet, but (which no sense is equal to) the difference between Black and Bitter, White and Sweet, and the various tribes of beterogeneous Attributes. Nor does it shew this Supremacy in these Recognitions only,

ADDITIONAL NOTES.

but likewise, when under one and the same view it recognises Objects of Sense and of Intellect united, as in case of Syllogisms made of Propositions particular and universal, such as, (if I may be permitted to speak after so scholastic a manner) such as the Syllogisms Darii and Ferio in the First Figure.

To this may be added, that this joint Recognition of things multiform, contrary, and heterogeneous, and that by THE SAME FACULTY, and in THE SAME UNDIVIDED INSTANT, feems to prove in the strongest manner that such FACULTY, (by this Faculty I mean the MIND or INTELLECT) must be INCORPOREAL; for Body, being infinitely divisible, is by no means susceptible of such a simple and perfest Unity, as this Recognition must necessarily be.

P. 192.—The Mountain, which by its relation to the Molehill was great, by &c.]

This may be true with regard to Mountains, and Molehills, and the other more indefinite parts of Nature; but with regard to the more definite parts, such as Vegetables, and Animals, here the Quantities are not left thus vague, but are, if not ascertained precisely, at least ascertained in some degree.

Thus Aristotle— Esi yáp ti wási tois ζώοις πέρας τε μεγέθες διο κ της των ος ων ἀυξήσεως. Εὶ γὰρ ταῦτ είχεν ἄυξησιν ἀεὶ, κ τῶν ζώων ὅσα ἔχει ος οῦν ἡ το ἀνάλογον, ἡυξάνετ ἀν ἔως ἔζη. All Animals have a certain Bound or Limit to their Bulk; for which reason the Bones have a certain Bound or Limit to their growth.—Were the Bones indeed to grow for ever, then of course, as many Animals as have Bone, or something analogous to it, would continue

continue to grow as long as they lived. Avist. de Anim. Gener. ii. 6. p. 227. Edit. Sylb.

What follows from Simplicius is to the same purpose; only where he mentions Form, we must understand that efficient animating Principle, described in the fixth chapter of this work.

Exager Eldes gurunayet, mera rus oixeias idióraros, א אספב דו שונדפסי שטשובדפסי דה ופוסדחדו צ שמף אהאם μότον επιθέρει μεθ' έαυτε το είδος, αλλα κή μέγεθος, ο μετα διαςάσεως είς την ύλην παραγίγνεται. Πλάτος δε έχει κή τετο ενθάδε δια το αόριςον πώς της ενώλα Φύσεως. Εαν δί πολύ τον όρου παραλλαξη, η προς το μείζου, η προς το έλατίου, τέρας νομίζεται. Every FORM intreduces, along with its own original Peculiarity, a certain meafure of Quantity, bearing proportion to that Peculiarity; for it brings with itfelf not a FIGURE only, but a MAGUITUDE also, which passes into the Matter, by giving it extent. Now oven here this Magnitude has a fort of latitude, from the indefinite nature of the material Principle (with which it is united.] But yet, notwithflanding if it change the Bound or Limit, either as to greater or to lefs, in a remarkable degree, the Being [by such deviation] is estremed a Monster. Simplic. in Prad. p. 37. A. Rdit. Bafil.

SIMPLICIUS gives examples of this Deviation in the case of Giants and of Dwarfs.

P. 244.——SPECTATORS—MADE OUT OF THOSE THAT WENT BEFORE.] The Subject Matter is the fame in many fucceeding Beings; as the River is the fame; which, as it flows along, reflects many different Objects. Tis in this fense we are to understand the following After-

Affertion, and not with the least view to equivocal Production:

Ounsu dia to the tede φθοραν άλλα είναι γίνεσιε, κη την τέδε γένεσιε άλλα είναι φθοραν, άπαυς ου αναξιαϊου είναι την μεταβολήν. Wherefore, from the Diffolntion of one thing being the Generation of another, and the Generation of one thing being the Diffolntion of another, it naceffarily follows that the Change must be perpetual and never caafe. Arift. de Gen. et Cerr. L. I. C. 3. p. 10. Edit. Sylb.

The Change here alluded to is the common course of Nature in the Production of Beings, which, were it not for the Process above-mentioned, would either soon be at a stand, or would require a perpetual Miracle for the supply of new Materials.

P. 278.—THE THEORY OF ACTION AND RE-ACTION.]

Of this Doctrine we have the following account.— Airson di të min huesdas tais ninteres, ott to noise ninteres, ott to noise ninteres, ott to noise ninteres, ott to noise ninteres, ninteres, ott to noise ninteres, ninteres, ninteres, ott to noise ninteres,
Power, for instance, is after a manner re-impelled; and the compressing Power, after a manner re-compress. Aristot. de Animal. Gener. L. 4. p. 280. Edit. Sylb.

P. 281. — DOUBLE IN ITS POWERS, &c.] Inavov yaig Sategor mégos tãs evartimosms, éautó te appireus, no to artimement minor yinderoper, apiths yaig ampoir à aaron to et amparon, 20' éauté être të evosos. — One of the two Parts in the Contrariety is sufficient to judge both itself and its opposite. 'Tis thus that by the Strait we come to know both the strait and the crooked, for the strait Rule of the Artist is a judge of both. But the crooked on the other side is no judge either of itself, or of the Strait. Arist. de An. i, 5.

P. 283. — EXISTED PREVIOUSLY IN ENERGIE.]
Oσα Φύσει γίγνεται ἢ τέχνη, ὑπὸ ἐνεριία ὄντος γίγνεται ἐπ
τὰ δυνάμει τοιύτυ. — Whatever things are made either
by Nature or by Art, are made OUT of something, having a
capacity to become the thing produced, and that THROUGH
the operation of something, which already exists in Energy.
De Animal. Gener. p. 204. Edit. Sylb.

P. 297.—AS THEY STAND RELATED TO PLACE] The Force of this Arrangement or Predicament Where, is finely contrasted with the Predicament of QUANTITY, in that Laconic Apophibegm of AGIS. The Lacedomonians (said he) do not ask how many the Enemies are, but where they are: Our son de the Arredasposius sources MOSOI sign of modificos, adda MOT sign. Plut. Lacon. Apophih. p. 215. D. Edit. Xyland.

P. 332.—THE DYING GLADIATOR, &c.] To these Attitudes may be added that, given by Lysippus to the

the Statue of ALEXANDER the Great. That Prince had a certain Extension of Neck, which made him gently recline it upon his left Shoulder. When his Figure was cast in brass by Lysppus, the Artist ingeniously contrived to convert this natural defect into an Attitude of Magniscence. His Head, being reclined, was made, with a fort of insolent look, to contemplate the Heavens, as if things below were already at his command. And hence the meaning of that celebrated Epigram, in which this Work of Brass is supposed to address Jupiter in the sollowing words;

Αὐδάσοντι δ΄ ἔοικεν ὁ χάλκεος, εἰς Διὰ λεύσσων, Γῶν ὑπ' ἐμοὶ τίθεραι' Ζεῦ, σὸ δ' Όλυμπον ἔχε.

The Brass looks up to Jove, and seems to cry, This Earth is MINE; do THOU possess the Sky.

Plutarch. de Vitâ et For. Alex. p. 335. Edit. Xyland. See also Brodei Epigram. Gr. L. IV. p. 454. Edit. Franc. 1600, where the Lines here cited are introduced by two others.

P.337.—FROM POETS TO ACTORS, &c.] See Cic. de Orat. iii. 56, 57, 58, 59. Edit. Pearce, where 'tis worth remarking, (c. 59.) so much stress is laid on the management of the Countenance, and of the Eyes in particular, that we are informed the old men of that age did not greatly praise even Roscius himself, when he appeared in bis Mask—quo meliùs nostri illi senes, qui PERSONATUM ne Roscium quidem magnopere laudabant; ANIMI est enim omnis ACTIO; et imago animi vultus est, indices oculi.

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P. 355.—MOUNTAINS CLOATHED WITH WOOD. 3 Thus CICERO—Spatia frugifera atque immensa camporum, vestitusque densissimos montium, pecudum passus, &c. DeNat. Deor. ii. 64. p. 253. Edit. Davis.—And before, in the same treatise, he speaks of the Earth, as vestita storibus, herbis, arboribus, frugibus, &c. ii. 39. p. 195.—Yet all this we must remember is but metaphorical.

P. 366.——19 SCIENCE PRIOR TO ART? J Nihil est enim, quod ad ARTEM redigi possit, nisi ille PRIUS, què illa tenet, quorum Artem instituere vult, habeat illam SCIENTIAM, ut ex ils rebus, quarum Ars NONDO M. Actem essicere possit. Cic. de Orat. i. 42. Edit. Pearce, &c. p. 63. Edit. Oxon.

This Citation well proves a part of what is bere afferted, viz. the necessary Priority of some Science to every Art.

P. 389.—AND TO IT'S OPPOSITE NON-BEING.] These Motions under the name of Changes (perassa) are well explained, as follows.

"Οταν μέν εν κατα το ωσσίν η ή μεταδολή της ένανιώσεως, αυξησις και Φθίσις όταν δε κατα τόπον, Φορά. Εταν δε κατα ωάθω, κ το ωσιόν, αλλοίωσις όταν δε μηθεν υπομίνη, ε Θάτερον ωάθω η συμδεδηκός όλως, γέσεσις το δε, Φθορά.—When therefore the Change of the contrary Attribute is according to the QUANTITY, 'tis Augmentation or Diminution; when according to the Place, 'tis local Motion; when according to any Affection, or QUALITY, 'tis Aliation. When nothing remains, of which the new production can be

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we all considered as an Affection, or an Astribute, 'tis then GENERATION; and the contrary, DISSOLUTION. Arist. Me Gen. et Corr. L. I. c. 4. p. 14. Edit. Sylb.

P. 409.—BUT WE CALL IT METAPHYSICAL.]

Philoponus in a very few words well explains the term, Metaphysical. Speaking of the First and Supreme Cause of all things, he adds—west with it is incire either, the weather is protosopias. Geodogía yas dineior, the weather is protosopias, which is metaphysical past the principle, is the business of the First Philosophy, for it is a Subject belonging to Theology, and to that Speculation, which is metaphysical, that is to say, subsequent to matters physical, or rather indeed its a Subject Prior to matters physical, in as much as those things with regard to us are subsequent, which are by nature prior. Philop. in Aristot. de Gen. et Corr. p. 12. Edit. Ald. Venet. 1527.

415. THE COMMON NAME OF PERCEPTION.]

This word, Perception, is of the most extensive meaning, and not only includes Intellection but Sensation also, and that of the lowest degree. What is here called Perception, is by Aristotle called Knowledge.

— Γνώσεως τινος σώνα (scil. ζωα) μετέχεσι, τὰ μὲν πλείου, τὰ δ΄ ἐλάτθου, τὰ δὲ πάμπαν μικρᾶς, αἴσθησιν γὰρ ἔχεσιν ἡ δ΄ αἴσθησις, γνωσίς τις. Ταύτης δὲ τὸ τίμιου κὰ ἄτιμου πολύ διαφέρει σκοπέσι πρὸς Φρόνησιν, μ πρὸς τὸ τῶν κιψύχων γέν. Πρὸς μὲν γὰρ Φρό
Ι i 2

υπσιν, ώσπερ είδεν είναι δοκεί το κοινωνείν άφης κο γεύσεως μόνου προς δε αναισθησίαν, βέλτισου. 'Αγαπητον γαρ αν δόξη το ταύτης τυχείν της γνώσεως, αλλα μη κείσθαι τεθνεώς κ) μη δν.

All Animals share a degree of KNOWLEDGE; some of them, a greater; others of them, a less; and some of them, an exceedingly small degree; for they have all of them SEN-SATION, and SENSATION IS A SORT OF KNOWLEDGE. But the Value and the No-value of Sensation is widely different, when we compare it with RATIONAL COMPRE-HENSION on the one side, and with the race of BEINGS INANIMATE on the other. With regard to RATIONAL COMPREHENSION, the mere partaking of TASTE and Touch alone, appears to be as nothing; but with regard to pure INSENSIBILITY it is something most excellent. For [when compared to Beings Insensible] it may surely appear a bleffed Event, to be poffest of THIS Knowledge, and not [refembling them] to lie as dead and a Non-entity. Ariflot, de Animal. Gener. Lib. I. fub. fin. p. 197. Edit. Sylb.

P. 426.—ENDS IN IT'S ACQUISITION.]

Πάντα γὰρ τὰ ζῶν κὶ κινεῖ κὶ κινεῖται ενεκά τινος ῶςε τετ' ἔςιν αὐτοῖς wάσης κινήσεως wέρας, τὸ ε ενεκα. All Animals both move, and are moved for the fake of something; so that this something, that is to say, The Final Cause, is the Bound or Limit of all their Motion. Arist. de Animal. Mot. C. 6. p. 153. Edit. Sylb.

P. 463.—CONCERNING PREDICAMENTS OR PHI-LOSOPHICAL ARRANGEMENTS.] Many learned and ingenious Observations on this Subject, as well as on several other parts of antient Philosophy (the Peripatetic

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tetic in particular) have been given to the World in a Tract lately published, styled, On the Origin and Progress of Language, in two Volumes, 8vo.

There may be found too in the fecond Volume many judicious and curious remarks on Style, Composition, Language, particularly the English; observations of the last consequence to those, who wish either to write or to judge with accuracy and elegance.

The Author of these Arrangements might have availed himself of many Citations from this Work, highly tending to illustrate and to confirm his Opinions, but unfortunately for him, the greater part of his own Treatise was printed off, before the second Volume of this Work appeared.

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FINIS.

RAT

P. 21, after the Greek quotation, and before the words, edic Sylb. insert 12.

P. 31, 1. 16, for CATEGORICS read CATEGORIES.

P. 36, in the note, for Anti predicamenta read Ante-pred. P. 327, l. 7, for Parallelipipedon, read Parallelepipedon.

In the Index, under the article, Attitudes, for Dependence read Defpondence.

- under the article, Motion, after the word, Arifotle, instead

of p. 147 read 247.

— under the article, Power, after the words, or capacity, infert 9 277-

